

DECEMBER 1957
VOLUME 38, NUMBER 3

THE *Southwestern*
SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

The Supreme Court of the United States, 1946-56
PAUL C. BARTHOLOMEW

Needed Sociological Research in Latin America
NATHAN L. WHETTEN

India and the Second Five-Year Plan
ARTHUR A. WICHMANN

A Note on John Dewey's View of History
LLOYD P. WILLIAMS

The Interstate Compact in the Southwest
RICHARD H. LEACH

The Entrepreneur as Cultural Hero
DAVID HAMILTON

Published jointly by THE SOUTHWESTERN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
and the UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS PRESS



THE *Southwestern* SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

DECEMBER 1957

VOLUME 38, NUMBER 3

Contents

ARTICLES

- The Supreme Court of the United States, 1946-56 195

PAUL C. BARTHOLOMEW

- Needed Sociological Research in Latin America 206

NATHAN L. WHETTEN

- India's Economic Problems and the Second Five-Year Plan 215

ARTHUR A. WICHMANN

- A Note on John Dewey's View of History 228

LLOYD P. WILLIAMS

- The Interstate Compact, Water, and the Southwest: A Case
Study in Compact Utility 236

RICHARD H. LEACH

- The Entrepreneur as Cultural Hero 248

DAVID HAMILTON

- BOOK REVIEWS, *edited by* H. MALCOLM MACDONALD 257

- NEWS AND NOTES 288

Copyright 1957 by the Southwestern Social Science Association.

Entered as second-class matter at the post office at Austin, Texas, under act of March 3, 1879. Published quarterly.

THE SOUTHWESTERN SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is the official organ of the Southwestern Social Science Association. The subscription price is \$5.00 a year or \$1.25 a copy to members; \$2.50 a year to students. Subscriptions to the QUARTERLY and all membership payments should be addressed to the secretary-treasurer of the Association, Leon C. Megginson, Louisiana State University, Baton

Rouge, Louisiana. Any change in address should also be reported to the secretary-treasurer. Editorial offices of the QUARTERLY are located at the University of Texas, Austin 12, Texas. Manuscripts and other materials for publication should be addressed to Harry Estill Moore, Editor. Books for review and correspondence regarding book reviews should be addressed to H. Malcolm Macdonald, Book Review Editor. Printer's proofs, correspondence concerning proofs, and orders for reprints should be addressed to Mrs. Mayre Wall Eargle, Assistant Editor, University of Texas Press.

The QUARTERLY is indexed by the *Public Affairs Information Service* and the *International Index*.

THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

The Southwestern Social Science Association

<i>President</i>	J. WILLIAM DAVIS, Texas Technological College
<i>First Vice-President</i>	WALTER T. WATSON, Southern Methodist University
<i>Second Vice-President</i>	ALFRED P. SEARS, University of Oklahoma
<i>Ex-President</i>	O. J. CURRY, North Texas State College
<i>Ex-President</i>	JOHN W. WHITE, University of Arkansas
<i>General Program Chairman</i>	S. M. KENNEDY, Texas Technological College
<i>Past Program Chairman</i>	TOM ROSE, North Texas State College
<i>Secretary-Treasurer</i>	LEON MEGGINSON, Louisiana State University
<i>Editor of the QUARTERLY</i>	HARRY ESTILL MOORE, University of Texas

SECTION CHAIRMEN

<i>Accounting</i>	JAMES M. OWEN, Louisiana State University
<i>Agricultural Economics</i>	JAMES W. BENNETT, Texas Technological College
<i>Business Administration</i>	JAMES W. REDDOCH, Louisiana State University
<i>Business Research</i>	RALPH EDGEL, University of New Mexico
<i>Economics</i>	JAMES B. GILES, Rice Institute
<i>Geography</i>	JAMES I. CULBERT, New Mexico College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts
<i>Government</i>	WILFRED WEBB, University of Texas
<i>History</i>	JOHN PAYNE, Sam Houston State College
<i>Sociology</i>	FRANZ ADLER, University of Arkansas

BOARD OF EDITORS

The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly

<i>Editor-in-Chief</i>	HARRY ESTILL MOORE, University of Texas
<i>Book Review Editor</i>	H. MALCOLM MACDONALD, University of Texas
<i>Accounting</i>	SAM WOOLSEY, University of Houston
<i>Agricultural Economics</i>	JOHN SOUTHERN, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Texas A. and M. College
<i>Business Administration</i>	SAM LEIFESTE, Texas Christian University
<i>Business Research</i>	MERWYN BRIDENSTINE, University of Arkansas
<i>Economics</i>	VIRGINIA B. SLOAN, New Mexico Highlands University
<i>Geography</i>	RALPH OLSON, University of Oklahoma
<i>Government</i>	DICK SMITH, Tarleton State College
<i>History</i>	DONALD BERTHRONG, University of Oklahoma
<i>Sociology</i>	DONALD STEWART, University of Arkansas

The Supreme Court of the United States, 1946-56

PAUL C. BARTHOLOMEW
UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

TEN YEARS AGO, Professor Walter F. Dodd, then president of the American Political Science Association, delivered an excellent address at the annual meeting of the association. The substance of this address, subsequently published in the *American Political Science Review*, was a review of the work of the Supreme Court from 1936 to 1946. The time seems proper for a look at another decade of the Court's history.

In 1946, Professor Dodd stated that "governmental powers have been enlarged, but at the same time federal power and control have been made dominant." Certainly there is little in the recent work of the Court to cause one to say that this trend has been reversed. If anything is to be added to that statement, it would be a recognition of an acceleration of the trend. Indeed this has been so apparent that it has aroused very real animosity toward the Court and, oddly enough, on the part of those who were its staunchest defenders in the well-known unpleasantness of 1937.

The work of the Court during the ten years here under review is classified, for the sake of conciseness, under the following headings: The Bill of Rights, Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment, Equal Protection, The Commerce Power, The War Power and Presidential Power, Loyalty of Employees, Federal-State Relations, and State Powers.

The Bill of Rights

Religion.—This first of the guaranties of the federal Bill of Rights found expression in a number of cases, most of them of such notoriety that in a survey of this sort only passing notice need be taken of them. One of these cases was *Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township* (330 U.S. 1 [1947]), the New Jersey bus case. Here the Court in a five-to-four decision held that it was not a violation of the "wall of separation" between Church and State to provide bus fare for children bound for parochial schools. In a strong dissent, Mr. Justice Jackson held that such payment was very much religious support and, further, that there was real danger to the schools in

this whole matter inasmuch as what a government subsidizes it may also regulate.

The other well-known case was *Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education* (333 U.S. 203 [1948]). This involved the problem of using public schools for religious instruction under the so-called "released time" arrangement. This provided that pupils, with parental consent, could attend religious classes in the school building during school hours but with the teachers of these classes not regular members of the faculty and not paid from public funds. The Court, in an eight-to-one decision, held this to be contrary to the principle of separation of powers enunciated in the First Amendment and made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's "liberty clause." However, in 1952, when New York City's religious instruction plan was challenged before the Court in *Zorach v. Clauson* (343 U.S. 306), the justices upheld it by a six-to-three vote. The New York plan differed from the Illinois arrangement in that the instruction took place outside the school buildings and children were given "dismissed time" to attend.

Speech and press.—This is a category in which the Court was very busy in the course of this decade. A well-publicized case was *Terminiello v. Chicago* (337 U.S. 1 [1949]) in which the plaintiff had been convicted of disorderly conduct and breach of peace involving a near-riot resulting from an inflammatory racial speech. The conviction was reversed by a five-to-four vote on the basis that there was no clear and present danger involved. The dissent maintained that the decision abandoned the clear-and-present-danger rule and substituted absolute freedom of irresponsible utterance.

Several cases were before the Court in this period concerning Communists and free speech. Notable was *Dennis v. U.S.* (341 U.S. 494 [1951]) involving the "eleven Communists" who under the Smith Act had been convicted of teaching and advocating the overthrow of the United States government by force and violence. The Court upheld the Smith Act and the conviction by a six-to-two vote, noting that the act was directed at advocacy and not mere discussion, that speech is not an unlimited, unqualified right, and that certainly an adequate clear-and-present danger existed to justify these regulations.

Communists were also involved in *American Communications Commission v. Douds* (339 U.S. 382 [1950]). Here the Court sustained a Taft-Hartley Act provision requiring union officials to sign non-Communist affidavits. The Court held by a five-to-one vote that not only does the commerce power include the power to protect against political strikes and other deterrents to a free flow of goods, but also that there was no improper infringement of free speech here. There is, it held, no such thing as absolute

freedom of speech, and here there was clear and present danger to the government.

In still a third speech case involving Communists, the Court in *Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York* (342 U.S. 485 [1952]) upheld New York's much-discussed Feinberg Law. This law provides for the removal of school employees who advocate the overthrow of the government by unlawful means or who are members of organizations which have that purpose. The Court held that a state has the right to inquire as to the fitness of its employees, and that teachers, particularly, operate in a sensitive area in the schoolroom.

In *Niemotko v. State of Maryland* (340 U.S. 268 [1951]), the Court reversed a conviction, which had been based on a disorderly-conduct statute, noting that a permit system, for speeches in a public park, in the absence of definite standards, constitutes prior restraint on freedom of speech, press, and religion. A very similar matter was involved in *Kunz v. New York* (340 U.S. 290 [1951]), except that here an ordinance of the city of New York was called into question.

In *Burstyn v. Wilson* (343 U.S. 495 [1952]), New York's statutory censorship of movies was held unconstitutional. The Court noted that motion pictures come under the guarantee of a free press, and here there were such vague standards as to deny due process of law. Meanwhile, the Court, in *Beauharnais v. Illinois* (343 U.S. 250 [1952]), upheld an Illinois law forbidding publications or exhibitions inimical to a race or a religion. There was strong dissent to this five-to-four decision, maintaining that the law was contrary to free speech and lacked definite standards.

Search and seizure.—This perennial problem was given much consideration during this decade. In *Harris v. U.S.* (331 U.S. 145 [1947]), police had secured a search warrant charging check fraud. While operating under this warrant, a careful search of a five-room apartment revealed evidence of violation of the Selective Service Act. The resulting conviction was sustained and the search held valid as an incident to the use of the warrant.

This liberal approach was somewhat modified in *U.S. v. Rabinowitz* (339 U.S. 56 [1950]). Here the defendant was arrested with a proper warrant and the police then searched the one-room office and secured evidence. This the Court upheld as reasonable, since the room was open to the public, was under the control of the accused, and the search did not extend beyond this room used for unlawful purposes.

In similar cases the Court held that, wherever reasonable and practical, law enforcement agents must secure search warrants. In *Trupiano v. U.S.* (334 U.S. 699 [1948]), the search of a distillery was involved, and, in *Johnson v. U.S.* (333 U.S. 10 [1948]), the smell of burning opium was

held not sufficient to justify a search without a warrant. The Court noted that mere inconvenience for the officers, or a slight delay, is not a sufficient reason for failing to secure a warrant.

Evidence secured by unreasonable search and seizure has long been outlawed in the federal courts, but can be used in prosecutions in state courts. The Supreme Court reiterated this doctrine in *Wolf v. Colorado* (338 U.S. 25 [1949]), holding that due process does not require the suppression of evidence seized in unreasonable search because most of the English-speaking world does not regard such suppression as vital. The Court followed the same reasoning in *Irvine v. California* (347 U.S. 128 [1954]) and *Stefanelli v. Minard* (342 U.S. 117 [1951]), involving trespass and search of homes by police without a warrant.

The use of modern inventions was illustrated in *On Lee v. U.S.* (343 U.S. 747 [1952]). On Lee owned a laundry in Hoboken. Chin Poy, a government "undercover agent," engaged in conversation in the laundry while carrying a concealed "walkie-talkie" set which transmitted to an agent standing outside watching through the laundry's front window. After conviction on the evidence thus secured, On Lee charged unlawful search and seizure. The Court upheld the conviction, holding that there was no trespass, and that Chin Poy entered the place of business with the consent, if not by the implied invitation, of On Lee.

Self-incrimination.—Congress in 1954 passed an Immunity Act providing that whenever in the judgment of the United States Attorney the testimony of any witness or the production of books, papers, or other evidence by any witness in any case before any grand jury or court in the United States involving any interference with, or endangering of, the national security is necessary to the public interest, the District Attorney, upon the approval of the Attorney General, may make application to the Court for an order to the witness to testify. This being done, the witness cannot subsequently be prosecuted on the basis of the testimony he gives. In spite of this law, Ullmann, a witness, had refused to testify and was convicted of contempt. The Court upheld the Immunity Act in *Ullmann v. U.S.* (350 U.S. 450 [1956]), even to the extension of immunity from prosecution in state courts. The opinion noted that the immunity displaced the danger of self-incrimination and "once the reason for the privilege ceases, the privilege ceases."

A provision of New York City's charter was under attack in *Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of New York City* (350 U.S. 551 [1956]). The provision was that whenever a city employee utilizes the privilege against self-incrimination to avoid answering before a legislative committee a question relating to his official conduct, his employment shall terminate. In a five-to-four decision the Court held that dismissal without a chance for the

accused to be heard, as under this charter provision, violated due process of law.

Judicial procedure.—The rather important question of whether a civilian—an ex-serviceman—could be brought to trial by court martial for an offense committed during his term of military service was before the Court in *U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles* (350 U.S. 11 [1955]). The decision held that Congress cannot subject civilians to trial by court martial but that Congress could, if it so desired, provide for the trial of such offenses in the federal district courts, subject to the usual constitutional safeguards.¹

Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment

Several cases in this field emphasized an attitude the Court has consistently held for some time. Notable was the case of *Rochin v. California* (342 U.S. 165 [1952]), in which the accused had swallowed two capsules of morphine just as officers were about to arrest him on narcotics charges. At the direction of the police, an emetic was forced into Rochin's stomach against his will. The evidence of morphine thus recovered was used against him. This the Court held to be a violation of due process.

In *Haley v. State of Ohio* (332 U.S. 596 [1948]), involving a fifteen-year-old boy accused of murder, and in *DeMeerleer v. Michigan* (329 U.S. 663 [1947]) when a seventeen-year-old boy was similarly charged, the Court held that failure to provide counsel denied due process.

In *Foster v. Illinois* (332 U.S. 134 [1947]) and *Bute v. Illinois* (333 U.S. 640 [1948]), the Court noted that due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment may, under certain circumstances, even in a noncapital state felony case, make assignment of counsel essential to a fair trial.

An important and unusual case involved the use of testimony given in Congressional inquiries as evidence in subsequent criminal proceedings. *Adams v. Maryland* (347 U.S. 179 [1954]) arose because evidence Adams had given before a Senate investigating committee as to his gambling activities in Maryland was subsequently used by Maryland in convicting him of violating Maryland's antilottery laws. Federal law forbids such use "in any court," and the Supreme Court held that this meant that neither a federal nor a state court might use a person's own testimony before a Congressional

¹ A somewhat similar case was *Kinsella v. Kreuger* (351 U.S. 470 [1956]). This was a proceeding to test the validity of the conviction by court martial of the wife of a colonel in the United States Army in Japan who had been convicted of murdering her husband. The Supreme Court upheld the court martial proceedings, noting that "the Constitution does not require trial before an Article III court in a foreign country for offenses committed there by an American citizen and that Congress may establish legislative courts for this purpose." (The holding in this case was reversed by a decision handed down beyond the time limits imposed upon this report, *Reid v. Covert*, consolidated with *Kinsella v. Krueger* [354 U.S. 1 (1957)].)

committee as evidence against him. There is, of course, no bar to the prosecution of a committee witness for a criminal matter disclosed in his testimony before the committee but with the prosecution based on different evidence.

Several miscellaneous aspects of due process were before the Court in other cases. New York's "blue ribbon" jury arrangement was upheld in *Fay v. New York* (332 U.S. 261 [1947]) as not denying due process since there was no evidence that any group or class was singled out for exclusion.

State police power was upheld, along with North Carolina and Nebraska anticlosed shop laws, in *Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northeastern Iron and Metal Co.* (335 U.S. 525 [1949]). The Court noted that due process does not prohibit regulation of economic conditions that states regard as offensive to the public welfare.

Two noteworthy cases involved procedural due process. In *Christoffel v. U.S.* (338 U.S. 84 [1949]) there was a conviction of perjury before a House committee, for denial of Communist affiliation. Christoffel claimed that no quorum of the committee was present at the time of his statement as required by the applicable perjury statutes. The Court upheld his further contention that the committee was thus an incompetent tribunal and an incompetent tribunal is no tribunal. In a subsequent case, *U.S. v. Bryan* (339 U.S. 323 [1950]), the Court held that, under the circumstances, the lack of a quorum was immaterial since a quorum was not required under the statute there applicable.

Equal Protection

One thing, above all others, seems to have characterized the actions of the Court in the decade just passed: the broad use of the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the field of race relations, with a consequent curtailment of state powers. While most of the cases dealt with Negroes, one leading case had to do with Japanese. In *Oyama v. California* (332 U.S. 633 [1948]), a state law prohibiting aliens from owning land was declared invalid. The law had been applied to Oyama (born in America) because his father was ineligible for naturalization. This application was held to deny an American citizen his constitutionally-protected privileges as a citizen, even though the law might properly be applied to aliens. In *Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission* (334 U.S. 410 [1948]), the Court held invalid California's attempt to extend discrimination based on ineligibility to citizenship. The Court noted that the valid barring of aliens from land ownership rests on the power of a state to control the devolution and ownership of land within its borders, but this cannot be extended to cover the denial of a commercial fishing license.

The litany of cases involving Negroes in this period really begins with *Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma* (332 U.S. 631

[1948]) and *Shelley v. Kraemer* (334 U.S. 1 [1948]). The latter case brought to the Court the matter of enforcement by state courts of restrictive covenants barring Negroes from holding particular pieces of real estate. In a decision without dissent, the Court noted that such agreement between private individuals is not illegal, since the Fourteenth Amendment does not restrict the actions of private individuals. However, when a state, through its courts, aids in the enforcement of these covenants, the action then comes within the scope of the amendment as a denial of equal protection of the laws.

The Sipuel case began the parade of "educational" cases before the Court. It concerned the refusal to admit a Negro to the School of Law of the University of Oklahoma. The action was held to deny equal protection since many white applicants had been afforded legal education by the state. The same question was involved and the same answer was given in *Sweatt v. Painter* (339 U.S. 629 [1950]), which arose out of denial of admission of a Negro to the University of Texas Law School.

The facts were only slightly different in *McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents* (339 U.S. 637 [1950]), in which the University of Oklahoma, after admitting a Negro to its Graduate School, required that he follow a segregated arrangement in regard to seating in the classroom, use of the library, and service in the school cafeteria. The Court held that these conditions denied equal protection of the laws.

In this field of discrimination in education, the Court decided the two most publicized cases of the decade, the famed segregation cases. *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* (347 U.S. 483 [1954]) was a consolidated opinion including cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. All involved the basic question of separate public-school facilities for white and Negro students. In holding such arrangements invalid, the Court said that even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors in a school might be equal as between whites and colored, there was still denial of equal protection because "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." The Court based this conclusion in large part on sociological and psychological grounds, noting that to separate pupils "solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."

In a companion decision, *Bolling v. Sharpe* (347 U.S. 497 [1954]), the Court outlawed segregated public schools in the District of Columbia. Since the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the states and not to the federal District, the decision in this case was based on a denial of liberty without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. The Court reasoned that "segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the

District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause."

Several constitutional questions were raised in *State of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber* (329 U.S. 459 [1947])—double jeopardy, cruel and unusual punishment, and denial of equal protection. An attempt was made to execute Francis, convicted of murder, but, presumably due to some mechanical difficulty, death did not result. A second attempt at electrocution was challenged on the several constitutional grounds noted. In a five-to-four decision, the Court denied all three claims, holding that there was no more double jeopardy than in a new trial after conviction because of errors in the first trial, and that there was no cruel or unusual punishment since what is prohibited by the Constitution is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not psychological strain. Finally, the Court noted that equal protection does not extend to accidents. A strong dissenting opinion claimed that the circumstances of the case amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.

The Commerce Power

The outstanding cases in this category during this ten-year period involved charges of monopolistic enterprise. In Lorain, Ohio, the only newspaper in the town refused to take advertising from anyone who patronized a competing radio station. In *Lorain Journal Co. v. U.S.* (342 U.S. 143 [1951]), the Court held this to be a monopolistic practice which was subject to acts of Congress inasmuch as the distribution of news and advertising is an inseparable part of the flow of interstate commerce.

Three cases of widespread interest brought before the Court questions of monopoly in connection with baseball, the theater, and boxing. In *Toolson v. New York Yankees* (346 U.S. 356 [1953]), the Court declared baseball not to be subject to the Sherman Act, since, it said, Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws. Some two years later, when *U.S. v. Shubert* (348 U.S. 356 [1955]) and *U.S. v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc.* (348 U.S. 236 [1955]) were before the Court, there was a different answer. These cases involved the question of antimonopoly laws applying to stage attractions and professional championship boxing contests. The Court held the Sherman Act applicable to both, and suggested that the defendants might resort to Congress for exemption from the act. The Court distinguished these cases from the baseball case on the basis of an apparent lack of Congressional intention to include baseball, upholding, "without re-examination of the underlying issues," its 1922 decision exempting baseball.

An undue burden was deemed to be placed on interstate commerce in the case of *Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin* (340 U.S. 349 [1950]). A city ordinance of Madison prohibited the sale of milk there

unless pasteurized within five miles of the center of the city. The Court held that this was an economic barrier protecting local industry against competition from outside the state. Reasonable nondiscriminating alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, were available, so the attempt at economic isolation was void.

An unusual case was presented in *Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan* (333 U.S. 28 [1947]). The state of Michigan had attempted to apply its civil-rights legislation to the carriage of passengers on a steamer from Detroit to Bois Blanc Island, Canada. The Court held that, while the steamer was certainly engaged in foreign commerce, the situation was highly local in character, and with general competitive commerce not involved. Further, since there was no undue burden on foreign commerce, the Court upheld the application of the state statute.²

The War Power and Presidential Power

While the constitutionality of rent control in time of war was definitely settled some time ago, the Court had to rule on the question of such control after the conclusion of hostilities. In *Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co.* (333 U.S. 138 [1948]) the Court answered that question by holding that the war power includes the power to remedy the evils and deal with the problems brought about by the war, and these may well continue beyond the cessation of hostilities.

In the general area of war power was *Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer* (343 U.S. 579 [1952]). In an effort to stop a steel strike that he felt would jeopardize national defense, President Truman ordered the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of the steel mills and operate them. This action the Court held to be outside the constitutional powers of the President as commander-in-chief. The decision noted that the initiative in any such seizure of property must come from Congress. A dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Vinson maintained that the President was simply carrying out his constitutional powers to execute the "mass of legislation," including "the defense programs which Congress had enacted." Further, the President had informed Congress of his action and had stated clearly his intention to abide by the legislative will. The Chief Justice was joined in this dissent by Justices Reed and Minton.

² In the allied field of interstate commerce and state legislation was the case of *Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Commissioners of Montana* (332 U.S. 495 [1947]). Montana imposed a use tax on trucking firms and this was upheld as not discriminating against interstate commerce. Somewhat similar was the decision in *H. P. Hood & Sons v. Dumond* (336 U.S. 525 [1949]). An order of a New York Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets refused permission to the Hood Company of Massachusetts for an expansion of its facilities in New York because of fear that milk would be diverted thereby from the New York market. This was held by the Court to be discrimination against interstate commerce.

Loyalty of Employees

One of the areas of legal activity that has carried the most discussion for the past ten years, but that has been relatively unproductive from the point of view of rules of law, has been the matter of employee "loyalty" or "security." Possibly the outstanding case was *Peters v. Hobby* (349 U.S. 331 [1955]); however, all that the Court did was to hold that the Loyalty Review Board had acted in excess of its powers in determining that there was reasonable doubt as to Peters' loyalty. As is usual, whenever a case can be properly disposed of without determining a constitutional issue, the Court did not decide that issue.

An outstanding case in this "security" category was *Cole v. Young* (351 U.S. 536 [1956]). Cole held a post in the classified civil service as a food-and-drug inspector. He was discharged because of his association with Communists and with an allegedly subversive organization. Federal law permits dismissal when continued employment is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security. The Court held the dismissal of Cole was improper under the law, since such action is to be taken only in the case of employees who occupy "sensitive" positions, and it had not been determined that Cole's position was such.

State loyalty oaths were an issue in a case that came out of Oklahoma, *Wieman v. Updegraff* (344 U.S. 183 [1952]). The state legislature had provided for a loyalty oath for all state officers and employees, certifying that they had not belonged during the previous five years to any organization listed as subversive. The Court held that this denied due process since mere membership in a subversive group could not determine disloyalty. Membership might have been without knowledge of subversive character, and, too, some organizations became subversive at a later date.³

Somewhat allied with this field was the case of *Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Nelson* (350 U.S. 415 [1956]). The defendant was convicted of violation of Pennsylvania's Sedition Act. While the Pennsylvania statute proscribes sedition against either the state or the federal government, this case was concerned only with sedition against the United States. The Court held the state law void, noting that Congressional legislation had already occupied this field to the exclusion of parallel state legislation, that the dominant interest of the federal government precluded state legislation, and that administration of state acts would conflict with the operation of the federal plan.

³ A similar provision of a Los Angeles ordinance was upheld in *Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles* (341 U.S. 716 [1951]) as the Court interpreted the bar to public employment of those who had been members of a subversive organization as applying only to those who belonged "knowingly."

Federal-State Relations

A series of cases brought before the Court an argument that will probably be long remembered. These exemplified a rather rare exercise of original jurisdiction by the Supreme Court. Uniformly these cases—*United States v. California* (332 U.S. 19 [1941]), *United States v. Louisiana* (339 U.S. 699 [1950]), and *United States v. Texas* (339 U.S. 707 [1950])—involved the question of title to the resources in the land below low-water mark off the coasts of these states, the so-called "tidelands." The Court held that the federal government had exclusive control—"full dominion"—over the ocean and the land under it for a distance of three miles from low-water mark.

A Wisconsin law invalidating strikes in public utilities was itself held invalid in *Amalgamated Association of Street Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board* (340 U.S. 383 [1951]). This was held by the Court to be outside the field of state regulation in view of Congressional action in enacting the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor Management Relations Act.

State Powers

An unusual matter was before the Court in *Ray v. Blair* (343 U.S. 214 [1952]). A statute of Alabama permits Presidential electors to pledge themselves to support the nominees of a party's national convention. The Court upheld this law "even if such promises of candidates for the Electoral College are legally unenforceable because violative of an assured constitutional freedom of the elector. . . ."

Needed Sociological Research in Latin America

NATHAN L. WHETTEN
UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT

AS SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES struggles to become a scientific discipline, it is increasingly urgent that sociologists step outside their own culture and check the methods, concepts, and theories in other societies of the world. Sociological generalizations become valid only after they have been tested among peoples living under widely varying social situations; and this is one of the many reasons why sociologists should be particularly interested in research possibilities in other countries.

Although research in the social sciences has gained considerable headway in Latin America during recent years, the area still remains essentially virgin territory for sociological investigation.¹ The widely differing climates, topographies, ethnic groups, and the contrasts between isolated folk societies and rapidly expanding urban cultures all offer excellent opportunities for sociological research. This paper is an attempt to specify some of the more important areas of study that clamor for further attention in Latin America.

Demography.—The population of Latin America is growing at a faster rate than that of any other major area of the world. During the thirty-five-year period from 1920 to 1954, Latin America registered an increase in population of 96 per cent, as compared with 53 per cent for Anglo America.² Many people are of the opinion that this high rate of increase, abetted by widespread adoption of modern sanitation, control of contagious diseases, and the reduction of infant mortality, will result in serious overpopulation in certain parts of Latin America. Overpopulation can, of course, be offset by greatly increased efficiency in both agricultural and industrial production or by a considerable decline in the existing high birth rate.

In the face of such problems of truly gigantic proportions, demographers have an almost endless number of possible studies, with both theoretical and practical implications. The mere problem of identifying and describing the

¹ Space does not permit a discussion here of the status of sociology in Latin America. This will be found in an article by the writer entitled "Sociology in Latin America," to appear soon in *Sociology and Social Research*.

² Percentages computed from data contained in *United Nations Demographic Yearbook* (New York, 1955), p. 115.

various factors affecting differential fertility in Latin America would be a challenging task. But there are many others, such as studies in health, internal migration, and differential mortality.

The recently improved census procedures and analyses and the more careful recording of continuing statistics, such as births, deaths, marriages, and divorces provide increasingly good source material for such studies. Field research, of course, can supplement the statistical work.

Marriage and the family.—Closely related to the study of demography is the study of the family. Family patterns in Latin America are quite different from those in North America. In many parts of Latin America, families are formed, children are reared, and extended families come into being without having been initiated by any marriage ceremony. In most countries, only marriages by officials of the government are legally recognized. In some countries, church marriages are prohibited unless preceded by a civil marriage. In any case, either the expense involved or a negative attitude toward the value of civil marriages has resulted in widespread occurrence of what is known as *union libre* ("free union"). In 1944, for example, the records in Guatemala indicated that 75 per cent of the children born in the entire republic were illegitimate in that they were born to couples who had not been officially married but were living in a common-law relationship. The sociologist can ask himself: "Just how important is the marriage ceremony in promoting the stability of a family?" There is evidence that free unions do not necessarily imply promiscuity on the part of the parents. In most cases, quite the contrary. Many of the unions seem to be as stable as could be found anywhere. Persons united by free union often rear large families and exhibit a high degree of family solidarity. In other instances, however, especially among the non-Indian segment of the population and the more migratory plantation workers, it is reported that desertion, separation, and promiscuity do characterize some of these unions.

Another aspect of family sociology has already been mentioned indirectly. It is generally assumed that peasantry and a large-sized family are almost synonymous. If this hypothesis is true, the efforts to raise the levels and standards of living of the vast majority of mankind would have little prospect of success, for what small increases in the levels of living might be expected would be nullified by the concomitant increase in the population base. The hypothesis should not be taken for granted as true, however.

Recent field work in India, Japan, and Puerto Rico³ all point to the general conclusion that the rural population does not desire unlimited offspring.

³ William A. Morrison, "Attitudes of Females Toward Family Planning in a Maharashtrian Village," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* (New York), Vol. XXXV, No. 1, (January, 1957), pp. 262-86; The Population Problems Research Council, *The Mainichi Newspapers*, Tokyo, Japan (a series of thirteen publications are in print by this group on this general subject); Paul K. Hatt, *Backgrounds of Human Fertility in Puerto Rico* (Princeton,

Contrary to current belief on the subject of familism and rurality, a desire exists among the villagers of these widely separated societies to limit their offspring to a much smaller total than has previously been supposed. In Puerto Rico, for example, studies indicate that women have shown great interest in limiting the size of their families to three or four children when the knowledge and means of birth control have been made available to them. More field work needs to be done in Latin America, however, to learn more about these attitudes and to provide information that might serve as a basis for work in the applied aspects of population control.

Ethnic-group relations.—The matter of racial differences and prejudices has intrigued social scientists for a long time. Latin America makes an excellent laboratory for the study of ethnic-group relations, especially in those countries which have a relatively high proportion of Indian populations. These begin with Mexico and Guatemala in the north and extend along the Pacific Coast of South America to include Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. In these countries one finds from one-third to three-fourths of the total population consisting of Indians who maintain their separate cultures and way of life distinct from those of the mestizo or the white segment of the population. Various studies seem to indicate that the barriers to the assimilation of the Indian are not necessarily biological or inherently racial but are, to a large extent, cultural.

As a concrete illustration, let us look at the situation in Guatemala. There we find two broad groupings: Ladinos and Indians. The term *Indian* generally refers to the descendants of the pre-Conquest inhabitants, and the term *Ladino* refers to people of European descent; nevertheless, it is obvious that race mixture has taken place to the extent that although the skin color of the Indian is somewhat darker than that of the Ladino, the one so fades into the other that at the margins it is very difficult to distinguish the physical features of one from the other.

The Indians tend to inhabit the more isolated rural areas while the Ladinos predominate in the larger towns and cities. The Indians generally wear Indian-type dress, retain their native Indian languages, observe indigenous ceremonial practices, and exhibit a very high rate of illiteracy. The Ladinos wear European-type dress, speak Spanish, and have a higher rate of literacy than the Indians. Ladinos tend to regard the Indians as occupying a lower socio-economic status and to be actually inferior. This attitude appears to be based largely on cultural differences rather than on racial or inborn characteristics. If an Indian sloughs off his indigenous way of life and assumes Ladino customs, and especially if he moves away from the Indian community into a larger town, he may in fact become a Ladino.

Princeton University Press, 1952); J. Mayone Stycos, *Family and Fertility in Puerto Rico* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1955).

The transition from Indian to Ladino, however, is not a simple one that can be made overnight. An individual could not easily make it in his own community where he is known and recognized as an Indian. To make the change, he must move to an area where he is unknown and must dress and live in accordance with the standards found among the Ladinos. Sometimes the transition is not completed until the second or third generation. Often the attempted transition creates personality problems.

We need much more information concerning ethnic-group relations in Latin America. It would be particularly helpful, for example, to have case studies of Indians who are trying to slough off their Indian characteristics. Such studies would throw light on the personality stresses and strains that occur when various types of adjustment are undertaken; and they would provide a basis for action programs designed to ease the transition from Indian to Ladino.

Social-class structure.—Closely related to the problem of ethnic-group relations is that of social-class structure. Stratification in Latin America has traditionally derived from the agrarian nature of the various societies. Despite the recent economic advances made in some of the countries, widespread poverty still prevails. In 1949, for example, the per capita income in several of them amounted to less than \$100 per year, as compared to more than \$1,400 per capita in the United States. Even in the more prosperous countries of Latin America the annual income per capita did not exceed \$350.⁴ It is thus inevitable that a much higher proportion of the total population would be found in the lower class in Latin America than in the United States. As will be discussed later, land monopoly tends to prevail in most countries, with the result that the vast majority of the inhabitants are either landless and work for others on large plantations at low wages, or they have only small subsistence plots of their own to till. For such persons, there is comparatively little opportunity to move upward into more remunerative occupations. Vertical mobility, however, is beginning to be a little easier in those countries where industrialization and urbanization are opening up new economic horizons.

Ever since the Conquest, the upper class in Latin America has been composed primarily of the owners of the large landed estates. Generally, they are absentee landlords, who leave the management of their plantations to salaried administrators and spend most of the year in a large city, enjoying its gay social life. The owners are predominantly of European descent and often trace their lineage back to the original Spanish or, in the case of Brazil, to Portuguese conquerors, though intermarriage with Indians has taken place

⁴ Data from *National and Per Capita Incomes in Seventy Countries—1949*, United Nations Statistical Papers, Ser. E., No. 1, pp. 15–16.

so frequently throughout history that very few can claim pure European ancestry.

The composition and character of the upper class is changing in some of the Latin-American countries, however, where new economic and social forces are developing. These new forces have sometimes been brought to a focus by a political revolution, as in Mexico. Heeding the battle cry *Tierra y Libertad* ("Land and Liberty") among the common people, the leaders of the Mexican Revolution expropriated many of the large estates and redistributed them as *ejidos* among the peasants. Some of the dispossessed owners have invested what capital they could salvage into some sort of business or industry, with returns adequate to maintain them in their upper-class status. Others have slipped to a precarious middle-class position.

In many of the Latin-American countries a recent surge of business and industry is creating a new upper-class group consisting of businessmen who have risen from below. Moreover, ambitious politicians of humble origins have ridden the revolutionary crest of the new economic and social forces and have also joined the upper-class ranks. Although the newcomers to the upper class may not often qualify by lineage to their status, they certainly do by the criteria of wealth, power, and prestige.

A new middle class is also emerging out of industrialization and urbanization in Latin America. This middle class is still proportionately much smaller than its counterpart in Anglo America and it tends to wield much less influence in economic, political, and social affairs. Middle-class people in Latin America, moreover, appear to possess certain attitudes and aspirations that are not at all characteristic of middle-class people in Anglo America. One of the more prominent of these is the utter disdain which members of that class exhibit for manual labor. Anything approaching manual work tends to be regarded as a lower-class symbol and is generally to be avoided at all costs. In this respect, they have taken over the attitude of the traditional agrarian upper class.

The changes that are beginning to take place in the class structure of Latin America need close study. What are the various factors that have tended to deter vertical mobility, and to what extent are these barriers being dissolved? To what extent will the middle class continue to develop along different lines from that in North America? In what areas is the middle class beginning to exert an important influence on governmental policy?

Political sociology.—A vast field for study, for both the political scientist and the sociologist, is political sociology. Most of the countries of Latin America have modern constitutions, oriented toward liberalism, and all of them claim to be democracies. In most countries, however, one finds a wide discrepancy between law and practice. Federal or national government almost completely dominates local government, though the written constitution

theoretically provides for local autonomy. Dictatorships and one-party systems are common, individual rights are often violated, political opponents are exiled, and all too frequently the presidential incumbent either succeeds himself, in contradiction to the provisions of the constitution, or he names and controls his successor. There is considerable admiration for the "strong man" and usually he turns out to be a military leader.

Social scientists might well study the obstacles with which local government is confronted and try to identify a few practical solutions. How, for example, can the problem of *caciquismo* (the domination of the community by a local chieftain) be eliminated? What are the socio-economic conditions prevailing in many of these countries that permit or encourage political activity that runs contrary to the basic laws of the land?

Obviously, it is difficult to have democratic government where illiteracy is high and where geographical isolation makes communication among citizens difficult and ineffective, but there are also a great many other obstacles to democracy which should be identified and analyzed. It is heartening to note that in several countries notable progress has been made in recent years, both in the matter of orderly succession to the presidency and in the encouragement of initiative in the development of local government.

Urban sociology.—Of the ten great cities in the Western Hemisphere now having more than a million inhabitants, four are in Latin America;⁵ and three of these four are larger than any other city in the New World, with the exception of New York and Chicago. Mexico City and São Paulo rank among the fastest-growing large cities in the world.

The rapidly growing cities of Latin America offer tremendous opportunities for the urban sociologist. Generally speaking, there is more of a definite break between city and country than exists in the United States. In North America, the city usually grades into the country in such a gradual manner that it is almost imperceptible. Rural communities here are connected to the urban by a variety of means, including hard-surfaced roads, newspapers, magazines, radios, telephones, and television sets. Innovations are rapidly diffused. Rural people learn to appreciate and to acquire many of the modern techniques of living that have been developed in the cities, and many urban dwellers prefer to move to the periphery of the city in order to combine the advantages of country living with those of city employment.

Almost the opposite situation is found in Latin America. The city's edge usually marks a definite break between city and country, and one is impressed by the sudden transition from city culture to the folk cultures found in the immediate vicinity. Traditionally, in Latin America choice residential loca-

⁵ In 1950 Buenos Aires had 2,981,043 inhabitants; Rio de Janeiro, 2,303,063; Mexico City, 2,234,795; and São Paulo, 2,017,025.—*United Nations Demographic Year Book* (New York, 1955).

tions have been near the center of the city instead of at the outskirts. The suburban area is usually occupied by the poorer working groups and indigenous populations who have migrated to urban areas. There are exceptions to this, and certainly in Mexico City and Buenos Aires there are what might be called residential suburban developments somewhat like those in the United States. Generally speaking, however, the contrast is obvious.

Urban populations of Latin America, like others throughout the world, tend to have lower birth rates and, consequently, a smaller proportion of children than do rural populations. Cities, moreover, tend to have a larger proportion of young adults, a smaller proportion of old people, and a higher proportion of females than do rural areas. Nevertheless, the differences in the age-sex distributions of the city and the countryside in Latin America are less marked than those in Anglo America. The proportion of young children in Latin American cities is low in comparison with that of the rural areas, but is very high compared to that of cities in the United States. Actually, cities in Latin America have proportionately more children than are found on the farms of the United States. This is probably related to the fact that in Latin America familistic patterns persist to an unusually great extent in the cities as well as throughout the society as a whole. The process by which familistic patterns survive in an urban environment would certainly make a worthwhile project for further investigation.

Rural sociology.—Although urbanization has proceeded rapidly, the societies of Latin America, with the exceptions of Argentina and Uruguay, are predominantly rural. The vast majority of the inhabitants live in small rural communities. Widely differing types of settlement patterns in the various countries provide an abundance of research problems in rural-community organization. Among the types of communities that need study are: the closely-knit indigenous community governed and controlled by the village elders; the landholding village where various forms of collective agriculture have been practiced for centuries; the mestizo community of small individual landholders; and the plantation community where all are under the control and domination of the absentee landlord. All these offer attractive possibilities for research to the rural sociologist and the anthropologist.

In any rural civilization where the inhabitants must depend almost entirely on agriculture for a living, the relation of the people to the land is most important. This is reflected in the extent of land ownership, land-tenure relations, and the possibilities for making a living from the land. From this standpoint, the man-land relationships in Latin America offer challenging problems to rural social scientists.

The outstanding characteristic of landholdings in Latin America is that they consist to a considerable degree of two extreme types, both of which appear to be relatively inefficient as units for productive enterprises. These

are the large-scale holding—*latifundio*—on the one hand, and the diminutive holding—*minifundio*—on the other.

The *latifundio* usually contains several thousand hectares of land.⁶ The labor is performed by a large resident force that varies from a few dozen workers and their families to a total population of several thousand. All are under the control of the owner or the administrator—economically, politically, and, in many cases, educationally. *Latifundio* owners are often more interested in the prestige value of their large holdings than in running an efficient economic enterprise. They are not much interested in changing the antiquated farming methods practiced on their *latifundios*; they hold out of production large areas of unused land, and they keep operating capital inputs to a minimum. One student of Latin America has recently phrased the situation as follows:

Capital is used so sparingly that even the most rudimentary tools or implements, not to mention work stock or other sources of power, are largely lacking. Men and women work for the most part almost with their bare hands; and the amount of human toil that goes into the production of a ton of sugar, a bag of coffee, a sack of beans, a bushel of wheat or corn, or a unit of any other product, in most parts of Latin America is almost beyond belief. Thus, prevailing ideas and practices relating to labor and its role in the productive process insure that the volume of the product can never be large enough to divide into any substantial shares for all those who have a hand in producing it. Ultimately, of course, these ideas determine that the level of living for all except a few members of the elite must be very low.⁷

One of the principal criticisms of the *latifundio* is that it fosters economic and social stagnation. It does not encourage the use of efficient agricultural techniques or the development of skills on the part of its human resources. Its emphasis is on the stability and continuation of past practices rather than on the innovation or development of progressive methods. *Latifundio* is usually accompanied by poverty of its inhabitants and by inadequacy of social institutions.

At the other extreme is a type of landholding which Latin Americans like to call the *minifundio* because it is a plot of land so small that it will hardly provide a subsistence living for its occupants. Although most of the agricultural land is held as *latifundios*, the greater proportion of the farmers in Latin America are struggling to make a living on *minifundios*. The yield from these tiny holdings is so low that many farmers must seek employment on the outside; unfortunately, employment is often difficult or impossible

⁶ A recent study by the United Nations claims that about half of all the agricultural land in Latin America is held in units of more than fifteen thousand acres, even though holdings of this size amount to only about 1.5 per cent of the total landholdings.—See *Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation* (United Nations, New York, 1952).

⁷ T. Lynn Smith, "Values Held by People in Latin America Which Affect Technical Cooperation," *Rural Sociology*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (March, 1956), p. 72.

to find. To accentuate further the differences between the two types of holdings, the somewhat ironic situation prevails that in most countries the *mini-fundio* is found in the highlands, where the soil and topography are poorly suited for intensive agriculture, while the large holdings include the bottom lands and the level areas, where much of the best soil is found. In the latter case, land is so plentiful that it is used in wasteful fashion. In the former, it is farmed so intensively that it is literally mined.

Clamors for land reform are increasingly heard throughout Latin America, and agrarian uprisings will probably become even more frequent unless reform programs are introduced to limit land monopoly, to make larger farms available to the rural masses, and to encourage the introduction of more efficient farming techniques. Careful study needs to be made of land-reform programs that have been attempted in order to determine why some have failed, and why others appear to have succeeded. The question of how land monopoly can be broken up, without either disrupting the national economy or resulting in widespread uprisings or civil war, is a problem that confronts many of the Latin American governments. These questions interest not only sociologists but other social scientists as well.

Social engineering.—Finally, there are a great many other projects in Latin America which, though not strictly sociological in nature, could be greatly expedited through the use of a sociological approach to certain of their aspects. Let us consider a typical problem in public health, for example. Most of the inhabitants of Latin America live in small, isolated communities, with high death rates and extremely high infant-mortality rates. After the causes of the high rates have been determined and the remedies prescribed, how can the local inhabitants be persuaded to adopt the new practices? Certainly mere denunciation of the old practices will not suffice to get them discarded, nor will advocating new techniques be sufficient to get them adopted. In all probability, it will be necessary for public-health officers to work through the natural leaders of the community; and this involves determining which persons and families have the most prestige. Working through these natural leaders would multiply the efforts of the health officers and bring about the desired changes much more effectively. In some cases, the quickest way to get the support of the local inhabitants might be to enlist the services of the local witch doctor—*curandero*—as well as the services of the local village elders. At any rate, the point to be emphasized here is that it is fully as important to discover the most efficient methods for securing the adoption of the new techniques by the local inhabitants as it is to discover the new techniques in the first place. In other words, much more information is now available in all these countries than is being utilized. How to break down local resistance and secure widespread adoption of superior practices is one of the key problems in social engineering.

India's Economic Problems and the Second Five-Year Plan

ARTHUR A. WICHMANN
UNIVERSITY OF WICHITA

INDIA'S CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS are not unique to the subcontinent. All underdeveloped areas commonly share these problems. India is unique, however, with respect to the value system she has adopted as a framework within which her economic problems have been and are to be handled. As is commonly known, India's leaders have chosen to adhere to democratic ideals in their struggle for economic development. In China, on the other hand, totalitarian methods are being utilized in the quest for economic development. Throughout the rest of the world, leaders and citizens of the underdeveloped countries are carefully observing both India and China and are eagerly awaiting quantitative data which may permit a comparative study of the rates and absolute levels of economic development achieved under the two different approaches to the problem. Interest in the relative levels of economic development and the speed with which these levels are attained is not confined, it should be noted, to the underdeveloped countries. The entire Western world is, or at least should be, vitally interested in the economic experiments being conducted in China and in India.

It seems reasonable to assume that if India's method is more successful than China's, other underdeveloped nations will prefer to follow the Indian blueprint in tackling the problems of economic development. A corollary would then seem to be a closer alliance of the underdeveloped regions with the Western powers as well as an increasing tendency for the underdeveloped areas to identify themselves with the aims of the Western world. The opposite seems likely, if not inevitable, should India's experiment fail and China's succeed. In the event of the complete degeneration of international relations, the significance of the latter for the West should be obvious to all.

Nature and Determinants of Economic Development

Definitions.—To appreciate India's current economic problems, one must have some knowledge of the nature and the determinants of economic development generally. Although it is a bit hazardous to suggest that economists—

NOTE.—The substance of this paper was presented before the Economics Section, Southwestern Social Science Association, meeting in Dallas, Texas, on April 19, 1957.

or other social scientists, for that matter—can agree completely upon anything, it is highly probable that most economists would equate economic development with a persistent rise in per capita real income.¹ Certainly the Government of India Planning Commission has discussed economic development in terms which indicate unmistakably that it subscribes to the definition of economic development just presented.² Key factors in, or determinants of, economic development are population, natural resources, capital formation, and technology. Although other subsidiary factors may speed or retard the process of economic development, it is generally agreed that the primary determinants of economic growth or development are the four factors just enumerated.³

In highly developed countries certain techniques and public policies are available for promoting economic growth that are either not available at all to underdeveloped countries or can be used only so sparingly that meager returns, if any, can be expected from their use.

Role of capital formation.—In a country with a growing population a persistent rise in per capita real income requires a rate of increase in the national product in excess of the rate of population growth. For the national product to rise, not only must existing capital be replaced as it depreciates or is consumed but the supply of capital must be enlarged. That is to say, there must be net capital formation taking place at a rate sufficient to permit the physical product of the economy to grow more, relatively, than the population. For countries that are highly developed economically the net capital-formation requirement is rather easily met. For example, if full employment exists in the United States⁴ but it is desired to step up the level of capital formation, tax rates may be raised,⁵ thus reducing levels of consumption. The reduced level of consumption will release resources for capital formation while at the same time the higher tax rates have provided the federal

¹ If military prowess be the goal of development, as it might well be for a totalitarian state, then "national" might be substituted for "per capita" in the definition given above.—For discussion of this point, see C. Lowell Hariss, *The American Economy* (Homewood, Ill., Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1953), pp. 1020–1022.

² Government of India Planning Commission, *Second Five-Year Plan* (New Delhi, 1956), Chap. II. See also table on page 73 of same publication. This reference is cited henceforth as *Second Five-Year Plan*.

³ Cf., for example, W. Arthur Lewis, *The Theory of Economic Growth* (Homewood, Ill., Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1955), pp. 5–12; *Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan*, ed. Simon Kuznets, Wilbert E. Moore, and Joseph J. Spengler (Durham, Duke University Press, 1955), Chap. I; *Second Five-Year Plan*, pp. 6–7.

⁴ For a classification of countries by level of economic development, see Eugene Staley, *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1954), pp. 16–17.

⁵ One might argue that higher taxes destroy private investments; thus, on balance, no net capital formation results. It is not necessary to take sides in such an argument, however, for the tax rates might be raised regressively and, if so, it is unlikely that the high-taxes-destroy-investment-initiative group would utter a murmur of protest.

government with increased revenues which can be utilized for channeling the released resources into new investment.

Historically, the countries with a high level of economic development have not had to concern themselves with a deficient rate of capital formation during periods of full employment. Deficient investment outlays have plagued them, though, when underemployment and depression existed. If unemployment and depression pervade the highly developed economy, it is quite easy for the economist to prescribe the appropriate public-policy remedy. Per capita real income can be raised by re-employing the currently unemployed workers, capital, and other idle productive services. Government can readily accomplish this directly by hiring the unemployed resources itself and directing their activity, or it can achieve the same results indirectly by raising its level of expenditures for goods and services. In either case employment rises, output rises, per capita real income rises, and, with higher levels of income, savings will increase, thereby providing the resources necessary for net capital formation.

The savings dilemma.—Conditions confronting an underdeveloped economy attempting to raise per capita real income are such, however, that prescribing the techniques and policies appropriate to the highly developed economy either will fail completely or will produce side effects which may be wholly unacceptable. This is particularly true if, as is the case in India, the development program of the government is welfare-oriented and permits broad scope for freedom of consumer choice.⁶ Typically the per capita real income in underdeveloped countries is very low, so low, in fact, that increasing the current rate of saving is considered impossible. Indeed, in many such countries, saving is virtually nil. This should not be surprising since in underdeveloped areas per capita real income is frequently well below what is considered a minimum subsistence level. Where this is true, the dilemma posed is quite intractable. Per capita incomes can be raised only if net capital formation is stepped up, but to do this, resources now consumed must be released for capital formation. However, if consumption is reduced—savings increased—the less-than-subsistence level of living is made even lower.

Population, technology, and natural resources.—Although most underdeveloped countries have a substantial amount of unemployment and underemployment, idle resources are confined almost entirely to labor. Labor is, of course, essential to capital formation and to economic activity generally, but labor alone cannot create capital. Other productive services already existing—capital in particular—must be used in conjunction with it. Yet, in most instances, in India and other countries with a roughly comparable level of economic development, other productive services are not available since

⁶ See Wilfred Malenbaum, "India and China: Development Contrasts," *Journal of Political Economy* (February, 1956), pp. 1-24.

they are not unemployed. Stout hearts, great courage, and ingenious and fertile minds are required even to confront such a dilemma, to say nothing of solving it.

The combined impact of population growth and improved technology upon underdeveloped areas tends frequently to intensify rather than to mitigate the difficulties associated with attempts to achieve economic growth. The technology of death control is singularly acceptable throughout the world. Dissimilar societies and cultures accept and adopt the major technological advances in medical science and adapt rather readily to its requirements, it seems.⁷ The technology of birth control, on the other hand, for cultural, religious, and other reasons is much less acceptable. As a result, cases now abound of instances in which phenomenal reductions in death rates have been produced over relatively short periods, while birth rates have fallen only slightly and, in many instances, have not changed at all, or have risen.⁸

When to the above characteristics of underdeveloped areas is added the fact that most of the world's land area and known natural resources are in the hands of those countries possessing a high level of economic development, the magnitude of the tasks confronting India and similar nations is so staggering that it leaves one completely appalled.

India's Second Five-Year Plan

The foregoing discussion has indicated the general nature of the problems currently facing India in its efforts to achieve the objectives of the Second Five-Year Plan, formally launched on May 2, 1956. The remainder of this paper will focus attention upon some of the major economic goals of the Second Five-Year Plan, the specific problems associated with their attainment, and the probable successes or failures that may be expected.

Goals versus needs.—Although the Plan contains many specific objectives or targets, two major objectives tend to dominate: (1) to raise the level of national income in real terms by 25 per cent, and (2) to provide employment for all additions to the labor force during the five-year period.

To achieve these two major objectives, some of the targets are the follow-

⁷ See, for example, *Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan*, pp. 263-315 in particular; Kingsley Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1951), Chap. 6; Frank W. Notestein, "Problems of Policy in Relation to Areas of Heavy Population Pressure," *Demographic Studies of Selected Areas of Rapid Growth* (New York, Milbank Memorial Fund, 1944), pp. 138-58; George Kuriyan, "India's Population Problem," *Focus* (October, 1954), pp. 1-6.

⁸ Specific cases in point are provided by United States experiences in Puerto Rico and by the rapid population rise in Ceylon after 1946 when DDT was introduced for the control of malaria on the island.

ing:⁹ (1) Food production is to be increased by 10 million tons per year, a 15 per cent improvement; (2) 21 million additional acres are to be irrigated, an increase of nearly one-third; (3) iron ore output is to be increased nearly 200 per cent, bringing it to 12.5 million tons per year; (4) steel production is to be boosted to 4.3 million tons per year, an increase of 231 per cent; (5) in achieving the steel target, coal production is to be increased 58 per cent, bringing it to 60 million tons per year; (6) electrical generating capacity is to be doubled, bringing it to 6.9 million kw.; (7) production of fertilizer is to be more than tripled, raising it to 2.17 million tons per year; (8) cotton production is to be increased by about one-third; (9) jute production is to be upped 25 per cent. In addition to the goals just listed, the village-development program, which now reaches 80 million persons, is to be expanded to embrace all of India's half-million or so villages—thus reaching some 325 million persons. The targets, in absolute terms, are impressive, to say the least. Yet, viewed from the standpoint of India's needs, they are really very modest goals. For example, according to the Planning Commission, the 10-million-ton increase in food production will permit an increase in daily per capita caloric intake from the 2,200 at present to 2,450 in 1960/61. Yet, as the text of the Second Five-Year Plan indicates, the 2,450 daily per capita intake of calories must be weighed "against the minimum of 3,000 calories recommended by nutrition experts."¹⁰ Another measure of the modest nature of the goals can be obtained by translating into United States dollars the 18 per cent per capita real-income increase provided by a 25 per cent increase in national income. Using 1952 prices in India as the base, the Indian per capita income in 1955/56 was \$58.61.¹¹ Thus the 18 per cent increase set as the target in the Plan amounts to \$10.55 per capita per year, not an extravagant increase, it will surely be agreed.

Financing the Plan

Estimated expenditures and sources of financing.—Attainment of the goals depends, among other things, upon the accuracy of the Planning Commission's estimates of expenditure requirements, and the ability of the public and private sectors of the Indian economy to finance these estimated expenditures. According to the Planning Commission's estimates, outlays or expenditures of the central and state governments over the period of the Second Five-Year Plan must be 48 billion rupees, while the private sector of the economy is expected to make outlays of 24 billion rupees.

⁹ For a list of the specific goals and a brief discussion of them, see *Second Five-Year Plan*, pp. 51–76.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 260.

¹¹ The calculations here are based upon Wilfred Malenbaum's estimates presented in "India and China: Development Contrasts," p. 5. See also *Second Five-Year Plan*, p. 73.

The financing of the public outlays is to come from the following sources: (1) surplus from current revenues, 8 billion rupees; (2) borrowings from the public, 12 billion rupees; (3) other budgetary resources, 4 billion rupees; (4) external financing, 8 billion rupees; (5) deficit financing, 12 billion rupees; (6) unspecified domestic sources (referred to as the "Gap"), 4 billion rupees.¹²

One can deduce from the Planning Commission's statements that the 24-billion-rupee outlay in the private sector is expected to come from the following sources: ¹³ (1) 3 billion rupees from foreign sources; (2) 4 billion rupees from domestic commercial bank-credit expansion; (3) 3 to 4 billion rupees which may be lent out of increased commercial bank time-deposits; (4) the 13 to 14-billion-rupee balance must come from reinvestment of earnings and the flotation of new securities issues in the Indian capital market.

Balance-of-Payments Problem.—It will be observed that public outlays and private outlays combined depend upon obtaining 11 billion rupees from foreign sources. The 11-billion-rupee figure is the estimated deficit in the Indian balance of payments for the period 1956/57 to 1960/61 inclusive. It is proposed that 2 billion rupees of the deficit be met by utilizing existing foreign-exchange holdings of the central bank by this amount. It seems unlikely that private foreign capital will flow to India during the next five years at a rate in excess of India's needs in connection with repayments of past loans and interest charges on loans extended to her by the International Bank, by the United States, and by the U.S.S.R. Thus 9 billion rupees of the balance-of-payments deficit must come from external public sources. From undisbursed I.B.R.D. loans already granted to India, from unexpended prior appropriations of aid from the United States, Norway, countries participating in the Colombo Plan, and from special credits extended by Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. to finance new steel plants, it appears that 2 billion of the 9-billion-rupee deficit is already assured.¹⁴ If it is assumed that aid from the United States and Colombo Plan countries, as well as loans from the I.B.R.D., continue in the next five years at the same rate as in the past five years and that the funds are utilized at the same rate, perhaps another 2 billion rupees of the deficit will be covered. Granted all the preceding sources of foreign funds become available, a deficit of 5 billion rupees must somehow still be financed. From what sources a foreign-exchange balance of this magnitude is to be forthcoming is not at all clear from the Planning Commission's analysis of the problem of the balance-of-payments deficit.

In appraising the likely success of financing the balance-of-payments

¹² *Second Five-Year Plan*, pp. 72-92.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 92-94 and Chap. XIX.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 102-105; also *Eleventh Annual Report: 1955-56* (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Washington, D.C.), table on pp. 32-33.

deficit, a few observations seem relevant. First, to the extent reliance is placed upon private foreign sources, these may well prove unobtainable. Capitalism, whatever its vigor and vitality in its native environment, seems timid, extremely cautious, and singularly lacking in venturesomeness these days when placed in an alien environment. This is particularly true if the alien environment is controlled by a government dedicated to achieving the goal of a socialistic state. The distinction made by Nehru and the Congress party between things economic and things political is not a distinction made by Western capitalists. Socialism, for the capitalist, means nationalization and expropriation of property and as such is exceedingly repugnant.

The public sector has to expand rapidly . . . it has to play the dominant role in shaping the entire pattern of investments in the economy, whether it makes the investments directly or whether these are made by the private sector. The private sector has to play its part within the framework of the comprehensive plan accepted by the community. . . . Private enterprise, free pricing, private management are all devices to further what are truly social ends; they can only be justified in terms of social results.¹⁵

Such statements as the foregoing are almost certain to repel Western private capital. Should this be the case, as seems most likely, the foreign-exchange problem will be even more difficult to solve than previously indicated.

Second, it is possible that India's international policy of neutralism is motivated quite as much by economic as by political considerations. Although East and West agree on few issues, both extend aid to India. If the U.S.S.R. agrees to finance a steel plant, this is countered by similar proposals from the West and vice versa. It may well be that neutralism, properly exploited, will find both East and West vying for Indian favor during the next five years and that in doing so, an apparent balance-of-payments deficit will be converted into a surplus. For India's sake it can be hoped that this will be true. For the sake of the West it can also be hoped that it will be true, though one could wish that the aid were prompted by a somewhat more enlightened understanding of the stakes at issue in the Indian experiment.

Savings-investment problem.—If foreign resources become available to the extent of 11 billion rupees, 61 billion of the 72 billion rupees of planned outlay must still come from domestic sources. In other words, net savings of 61 billion rupees will be required to finance domestically the planned outlays.¹⁶ Savings of this magnitude will require that 12.2 billion rupees be

¹⁵ *Second Five-Year Plan*, pp. 22–23.

¹⁶ In connection with planned outlays amounting to 10 billion rupees and labeled "current developmental expenditure," the Planning Commission apparently subtracts another 10 billion rupees from the net-savings requirement cited above. Since the amount is not to come from foreign sources, however, it must be obtained internally, presumably by deficit financing; thus net domestic savings of 61 billion rupees must be obtained either through voluntary or through forced savings. For a discussion of the nature of "current developmental expendi-

saved per year as compared with current (1955/56) net savings of 7.56 billion rupees per year. For savings to reach an average of 12.2 billion rupees per year it will be necessary for them to grow at the rate of about 16.4 per cent per year. During the first five-year plan, savings increased at an annual rate of almost 10.7 per cent per year. By 1960/61 savings must reach a level of 16.15 billion rupees per year if the target is to be achieved. If savings can be made to grow at an annual rate of 16.4 per cent during the present five-year-plan period, then savings in 1960/61 (the last year of the plan) will exceed savings in the preceding year by 2.27 billion rupees. An increase in savings of 2.27 billion rupees during the last year of the plan will amount to 38.9 per cent of the 5.84-billion-rupee increase in national income for the same year.¹⁷ Since the actual level of national income in India increased during the first five-year plan by 18 per cent and savings grew at an annual rate of almost 10.7 per cent, it appears doubtful that a 25 per cent increase in national income, assuming it is achieved under the second five-year plan, will boost the growth rate to 16.4 per cent. It seems quite unlikely that increases in savings as a proportion of increases in national income can be stepped up to a level of 38.9 per cent. Such a marginal rate of saving is unusual even for a highly developed economy in which high marginal rates of saving may be expected. Unless rather stringent controls are imposed, which may well be at odds with the welfare objectives of the Plan, it is difficult to see how savings can be made adequate for the noninflationary financing necessary to reach the goals.

Deficit financing.—Even if funds from all other sources relied upon by the Planning Commission are in fact obtained, it will still be necessary for the government to borrow heavily from the Reserve Bank of India. It will be recalled that the amount of such borrowing (deficit financing) is estimated at 12 billion rupees by the Planning Commission for public-sector expenditures, whereas in the private sector expenditures totaling 4 billion rupees are to be financed through an expansion of credit by commercial banks. Thus new money in the amount of 16 billion rupees is to be created during the five-year period from 1955/56 to 1960/61. From this total of 16 billion rupees, 2 billion should be subtracted because of the planned utilization of foreign-exchange balances in that amount. This leaves a net addition to the money supply for the five years amounting to 14 billion rupees. Since the Indian money supply for the year 1955/56 totaled 21.8 billion

ture" and the apparent quandary of the Planning Commission concerning the financing and proper classification of such expenditures, see *Second Five-Year Plan*, pp. 56-57, 82.

¹⁷ The calculations in this paragraph are based upon a compound rate of growth in savings of 16.4 per cent per year and a similar rate of growth in national income of 4.53 per cent per year. Both rates are consistent with the goals and are implicit in them. See Tables 1 and 2.

TABLE 1

National Income, Investments, Savings, and Consumption
(in Billions of Rupees at 1952/53 Prices)

Item	1950/51	1955/56	1960/61
National income	91.10 ^d	108.0 ^d	134.8 ^d
Net investment	4.48	7.9	14.4
Net inflow of foreign resources	—07	.34	1.3
Net domestic savings	4.55 ^a	7.56 ^{a, b}	13.1 ^{b, c}
Consumption expenditure	86.55	100.44	121.7

^a The average annual rate of growth of saving during this period is calculated by the general formula $r = n \sqrt[n]{\frac{P_n}{P_0}} - 1$ where r is annual percentage rate of growth, P_n is the savings total at end of the period, P_0 is the savings total at beginning of the period, and n is the number of years involved. For the first five-year plan (1951/52 to 1955/56) the rate works out to be 10.69 per cent per year.

^b Using the formula in footnote ^a above, the average annual rate of growth of savings (voluntary) is 11.63 per cent. Total saving for the second five-year plan (1956/57 to 1960/61) may be calculated by the formula $S_n = \frac{A - Ar^n}{1 - r}$ where S_n is the sum of the geometrical progression, a is the first term in the series, n is the number of terms in the series, and r is the ratio obtained by dividing any term except the first by the preceding term. For the period of the second five-year plan, the total of savings amounts to 53.21 billion rupees.

^c Using the formula presented in footnote ^b and given an S_n of 61 billion rupees (the required total savings during the second five-year plan) rather than 53.21 billion rupees, r becomes 1.164 or an annual percentage rate of growth of 16.4 per cent.

^d Using the formula in footnote ^a above, the annual average percentage rate of growth of national income for the first five-year plan is 3.46 per cent and the planned annual average percentage rate of growth of national income for the second five-year plan works out at 4.53 per cent.

Source: Adapted from Government of India Planning Commission estimates and extrapolations.—*Second Five-Year Plan*, p. 74.

rupees,¹⁸ the 14-billion-rupee addition to it means an increase of 64.2 per cent by 1960/61, or an average rate of growth in the money supply per year of 10.5 per cent. The inflationary potential of such an increase in the money supply is readily apparent. When one adds to this the possible additional deficit spending which may be resorted to because of a failure to secure the expected amounts of revenues from other domestic sources, the magnitude of the problem is seen to be quite formidable indeed.

Some increase in the money supply is of course clearly warranted if national income rises during the Plan period by 25 per cent and prices are to be kept stable. Moreover, since Indians seem to prefer currency to bank credit, if per capita income rises, it is possible that some additional increase in the money supply may be appropriate to sate the penchant for cash balances (liquidity preference). It still seems unlikely, however, that a 64 per cent increase in the money supply is needed for these purposes. The notion seems implicit in the Planning Commission's statements that deficit spending will

¹⁸ *Second Five-Year Plan*, table on p. 4.

TABLE 2

Annual and Five-Year Totals, National Income and Savings for the Economy of India (in Billions of Rupees at 1952/53 Prices)

Year	First Five-Year Plan (1951/52 to 1955/56)		Year	Second Five-Year Plan (1956/57 to 1960/61)	
	National Income	Savings		National Income	Savings
1951/52	94.252	5.036	1956/57	112.892	8.799
1952/53	97.513	5.57	1957/58	118.006	10.242
1953/54	100.886	6.165	1958/59	123.351	11.921
1954/55	104.376	6.82	1959/60	128.938	13.876
1955/56	107.987 ^a	7.56 ^a	1960/61	134.778 ^b	16.151 ^b
Totals	505.014	31.151		617.965	60.989

^a ΔY for last year equals 3.61 billion rupees and ΔS for last year equals .74 billion rupees, thus $\frac{\Delta S}{\Delta Y}$ equals 20.49 per cent for last year of first five-year plan.

^b ΔY for last year equals 5.84 billion rupees and ΔS for last year equals 2.275 billion rupees, thus $\frac{\Delta S}{\Delta Y}$ equals 38.9 per cent for last year of first five-year plan.

^c ΔY Source: Table 1 above. Rates of growth used are those calculated in footnotes to Table 1.

be matched somehow by an offsetting creation of capital through the mobilization of idle resources.¹⁹ Of course, if idle resources complementary to labor can be found in amounts sufficient to necessitate the scale of deficit spending planned, little criticism can be launched on this score. There seems to be considerable disagreement, however, among Indian planners themselves concerning the availability of idle complementary resources.²⁰ In the absence of idle resources complementary to labor, deficit spending of the magnitude envisaged in the Second Five-Year Plan will undoubtedly create inflationary pressures which will tax the competence of the best minds that can be mobilized to meet the threat. The notion that deficit financing can make the same contribution to economic growth in an underdeveloped country that it can make in a highly developed economy suffering from depression is, at best, a risky one and may prove quite an obstacle to the attainment of India's economic goals in a manner consistent with its dedication to democratic ideals.²¹

There are at least two other factors that should give pause to the Planning Commission in its efforts to combat inflation. One of these factors involves the Commission's estimates of its volume of voluntary saving during the

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 83-87. For a discussion of the deficit financing, see *Second Five-Year Plan: The Framework* (Government of India, New Delhi, December, 1955), pp. 44-47; see also the dissent by R. B. Shenoy in the same publication, pp. 162-69.

²⁰ Shenoy, *ibid.*

²¹ If higher tax rates, allocations, priorities, rationing, price regulation and other direct controls must be instituted in wholesale fashion, there may be many (including Indian citizens) who will see little distinction between the Indian and the Chinese experiments.

period of the second plan.²² Presumably the Indian consumption function has been extrapolated through the years 1956/57 to 1960/61 on the basis of studies made during the first five-year plan. If this is the case, it would seem that the failure of savings to increase to the planned level during the years 1951/52 to 1955/56, despite a greater increase in national income than was anticipated, indicates the shaky nature of the savings estimate based on the extrapolation of a consumption function calculated for earlier years.²³

The other factor which may complicate and intensify inflationary pressures during the period of the second plan is the possible upward shift in the consumption function which may occur because of increases in the magnitude of welfare expenditures and the broadened coverage of social security and other welfare programs. Should the average propensity to save diminish, the severity and restrictive nature of direct controls necessary to prevent inflation must be correspondingly increased.

It is fairly evident that the Indian Planning Commission is not unmindful of the possibility of unexpected inflationary difficulties, as the following statement manifests, "No amount of prudence in financial management can by itself eliminate completely the risk of inflation in an economy attempting to develop rapidly." The courage and boldness with which the plan is to be pursued despite its inflationary risks are strikingly apparent in the Commission's observations that "the best defence against inflation is, in a sense, to keep clear of it, but a policy of 'playing safe' is not always conducive to development." One can only hope that in their anti-inflationary battle, the skill, competence, and success of the planning authorities will equal the courage and boldness with which they launch their campaign.

Population and Population Policy

Confronted with the problem of what to suggest to aid India in achieving economic growth, the Western economist, especially an economist from the United States, is likely to conclude that since there are so many Indians and so few other Indian resources the only answer is population control. Justifiably this answer tends to arouse the ire of an intelligent citizen of India, for he knows that his country is doing much in this regard. In fact the Indian knows that his is the only country that has officially recognized the existence of a population problem and has a government-sponsored population policy. The family-planning program under the Second Five-Year Plan is to be vastly expanded and may well reach the remotest areas through its mobile

²² The estimated total savings for the period are 53.21 billion rupees. See Table 1.

²³ Actual expenditure (investment) in the public sector during the first five-year plan was 3.5 billion rupees less than planned. Thus savings also fell short of the planned level by the same amount despite the fact that national income increased by 18 per cent rather than by 11 per cent as planned.—*Second Five-Year Plan*, pp. 1–5. See also Table 1.

and rural clinics.²⁴ The surprising thing is really not that India's population is growing by an annual increment of around five million persons but that, despite the marked improvement in economic conditions since partition and independence, the rate of growth has not surged markedly upward. In most underdeveloped areas, so-called population explosions have tended to accompany the introduction of development projects; in India, however, the rate of increase in population growth has not risen appreciably, if at all. The fact that it has not is in large part a tribute to the success and far-sightedness of India's leaders and the population policy inaugurated by them under the first five-year plan. But despite the praise due India for her family-planning program, it is nevertheless true that much remains to be done and that India's population must be stabilized in the not-too-distant future.

Socialism versus Democratic Ideals

One is also prompted to speculate at the philosophical level concerning the compatibility of a socialistic economic system in a democratic state committed to those principles of liberalism commonly associated with democracy and to which India's constitution pledges her government. This issue is especially relevant in view of the possible extent to which direct controls may be needed to ensure the attainment of the economic objectives of the Second Five-Year Plan. Countering the fears one might have concerning the compatibility of a socialistic economic system and a liberal democratic state, however, are the plans to extend the community-development projects to all of India's half-million or so villages during the next five years. The program in this respect is almost exclusively welfare-oriented and designed to bring the benefits of economic development, modern medical science, education, and so forth to 325 million persons. Certainly the objectives here are in the best liberal democratic tradition. Even if most of its goals are not achieved, it is possible the Second Five-Year Plan should be judged a success so long as the aims of the Community Development Program and the National Extension Service are even partially achieved. The task being undertaken to improve living conditions in India's villages is herculean in its proportions.

Summary and Conclusions

An effort has been made in this paper to examine the major economic goals of India's Second Five-Year Plan, to analyze the resources available to India in attempting to achieve these goals, and to determine the probability of success in attaining the goals in view of the apparent resources available. On the surface the goals seem fantastically large; yet, in terms of need, they are in fact quite modest. The resources available for carrying out the Plan appear to be singularly deficient in many respects and thus the

²⁴ *Second Five-Year Plan*, pp. 553-54.

probability of success is disappointingly low. In short, the conclusion is tinged with pessimism and gloom. For those who are by nature optimistic it may be noted that similar appraisements of India's problems were made upon the eve of the first Five-Year Plan.²⁵ According to many, the likelihood of success was small. Yet the modest goal of an 11 per cent increase in real national income was exceeded, and national income rose by 18 per cent.²⁶

The forecaster of India's immediate future might well ponder the following words of Jawaharlal Nehru:

What India is attempting today in regard to planning is something unique in history. While countries of Western Europe had built up a magnificent industrial civilization over a period of 200 years or so with the support, in some cases, of colonial possessions, and other countries like the Soviet Union had substantial achievements to their credit obtained at a tremendous cost, India is pursuing peaceful and democratic methods to raise the living standard of her people.

We can do this, and the basic reason for my saying so is my enormous faith in the Indian people.²⁷

²⁵ See C. N. Vakil and P. R. Brahmananda, *Planning for a Shortage Economy: The Indian Experiment* (Bombay, Vora & Co. Pub., Ltd., 1952). Though the authors are favorably disposed to the first five-year plan, they point out the criticisms and doubts of others.

²⁶ The pessimist will quickly point out, however, that a very important factor in the income gain was attributable to unusually favorable monsoons. "What," they may ask, "will be the case if the monsoons fail during the next five years?"

²⁷ *Second Five-Year Plan: The Framework* (inside cover page of publication).

A Note on John Dewey's View of History

LLOYD P. WILLIAMS
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

Our ears shall not be deaf to the voice of time. We will review the deeds of our fathers, and pass that just verdict on them we expect from posterity on our own.—Emerson

THIS PAPER is a brief attempt to systematize, analyze, and criticize John Dewey's conception of history. It is necessary to systematize Dewey because his references to history are generally miscellaneous, frequently casual, and are scattered throughout his voluminous writings; the analysis is intended to show the meaning of his references to the nature and significance of history; and finally, the criticism attempts to illuminate some of the inadequacies that appear inherent in his perspective. Perhaps a general justification for this endeavor is the fact that the change in our intellectual climate of opinion and the passage of time since Dewey formulated his insights demand that every phase of experimentalism be brought under the searching eye of scholars, who must study each of its facets for adequacy and validity.

I

Neither Dewey nor experimentalists in general permit what they feel are transcendent irrelevancies to impede an understanding of the function of history. For them the function of history is practical: it is to tell man about man. Its purpose is pragmatic: it is to facilitate life adjustment. Therefore, history can have no meaning in itself and cannot justifiably be taught as a discipline possessing intrinsic value. John Dewey's works are replete with observations to this effect. There is a pointed passage in *Democracy and Education*: "The past as past is no longer our affair" (p. 250). And from *The School and Society* comes an equally unequivocal observation: "If history be regarded as just the record of the past, it is hard to see any grounds for claiming that it should play any large role in the curriculum of elementary education. The past is the past, and the dead may be safely left to bury its dead. There are too many urgent demands in the present, too many calls over the threshold of the future, to permit the child to become deeply immersed in

what is forever gone by" (p. 155). Study of the past finds its justification in so far as it is a lever for manipulating the future (*Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, p. 239); when it provides an account of social life (*School and Society*, p. 155); when its center of gravity is the cultural history of man (*Democracy and Education*, p. 249); and when we begin historical studies with the problems of the present (*ibid.*, p. 251). Perhaps the experimentalist's final word on the subject comes from a sharp statement in *Liberalism and Social Action*: "Knowledge of the past is significant only as it deepens and extends our understanding of the present" (p. 74). The meaning of history for Dewey is found in the immediately functional quality of the subject, whereas the purpose of history is elucidation of the present status and predicament of man.

A particularly interesting aspect of Dewey's perspective of history is found not only in his general rejection of absolutes *within* the historical process but in his equally vigorous suggestion that history based upon, or directed toward, an absolute is in fact speculative and is thereby beyond history (*German Philosophy and Politics*, p. 113). Hegel, specifically, he finds guilty in this respect, for he fails to penetrate to the heart of the past experiences of the human spirit when he makes the national state the focus of history; he is equally guilty for being oblivious to the rich and productive possibilities of internationalism rather than those of nationalism, of international co-operation rather than international competition. There is also a logical corollary to this: nationalism, by its inevitably limited perspective and its inherently expansive tendencies, tends to sanction war as an instrument of national policy (*ibid.*, pp. 134-35). Immanuel Kant, saint that he was in Dewey's eyes, comes in for a proportionate share of criticism for contributing to the German historical perspective the notion that history is continuous, thereby underpinning the idea that history is a continuous process of unfolding. Fichte's intensification of a metaphysical emphasis in history, taken in conjunction with his nationalism and his introduction of the concept of a "divine Ego," is also censured. Likewise Houston Steward Chamberlain's grand fiction that the Semitic peoples represent an embodiment of a metaphysical principle that is in its essence an impediment to the full flowering of the "Germanic principle" is relegated to the category of presumptive history rather than to that of factual history. Whatever else history may or may not be, it is not the spirit of God and his cohorts marching from the beginning to the ending of time (*ibid.*, pp. 120-22, 135).

Out of the unique configuration of American civilization can come a philosophy of history adequate to our present and future needs as well as one that is adequate in a sociological and in a psychological sense. Such a view cannot, in the nature of the case, come from an uncritical importation of Hegelian absolutes, Fichtean egos, or Chamberlainian fictions; it will come,

if it comes at all, out of the very texture and fabric of American civilization. A philosophy of history congenial and relevant to America must be one oriented to its future and must be conceived in terms of freedom and fellowship. The method by which such a view can be obtained is by the use of intelligent foresight and by the use of controlled experimentation, so that we may know both where we begin and where we end. A genuinely American philosophy of history would help us clarify the ideas to which we are committed and would serve as a guidepost to show us the most fruitful and productive alternative for the future (*ibid.*, pp. 145, 143).

II

What is it that gives direction to the course of history? What force keeps the human drama in motion? The experimentalist, being a naturalist, is inclined to place considerable responsibility upon social and economic (material) factors. But ideas as a factor are dismissed summarily, as Dewey's following observation indicates (*ibid.*, p. 54):

I do not believe that *pure* ideas, or pure thought, ever exercised any influence upon human action. I believe that very much of what has been presented as philosophic reflection is in effect simply an idealization, for the sake of emotional satisfaction, of the brutally given state of affairs, and is not a genuine discovery of the practical influence of ideas. In other words I believe it to be aesthetic in type even when sadly lacking in aesthetic form.

That he believes fundamentally in naturalistic direction is equally clear: "Nature is the medium of social occurrences. It furnishes original stimuli . . ." (*Democracy and Education*, p. 247).

A caution is in order. To assert that "pure" ideas do not give direction to history is not to say that ideas as instruments of adaptation emerging from conflicts in human experience have failed to influence history. To the contrary. In conjunction with force, technology, and numerous other factors, ideas in the latter sense have had a prodigious influence upon man's individual and collective destiny. Such ideas comprise the essence of intellectual history. For Dewey, such history is neglected by contrast with political and military history, but its proper treatment is liberal and liberating. In *Democracy and Education* (pp. 253-54) he suggests two functions of intellectual history properly conceived: first, it will diminish the role of the politician and the militarist in history, while simultaneously enhancing the role of the intellectual worker—the artist, the writer, the scientist; and second, it will demonstrate the dynamic rather than the static nature of human intelligence.

Although not approving the substitution of force for intelligence, Dewey notes in *Liberalism and Social Action* that force plays a major role in directing affairs: "It is true that the social order is largely conditioned by the use

of coercive force, bursting at times into open violence" (p. 83). But force in history, whether incorporated into, and sanctioned by, a dogmatic philosophy of history, or whether used without the benefit of theoretical sanction, cannot produce a historical end that is good in the best sense of that word (*ibid.*, p. 86):

It requires an unusually credulous faith in the Hegelian dialectic of opposites to think that all of a sudden the use of force by a class will be transmuted into a democratic classless society. Force breeds counterforce; the Newtonian law of action and reaction still holds in physics, and violence is physical. To profess democracy as a means to the ideal may be possible in a country that has never known any rudimentary democracy, but when professed in a country that has anything of a genuine democratic spirit in its traditions, it signifies desire for possession and retention of power by a class, whether that class be called Fascist or Proletarian.

III

Although Dewey is clearly no economic determinist, a few passages in *Democracy and Education* suggest he considers the economic aspects of history as paramount. Throughout his work Dewey shows concern with the significance and nature of industrialization, and in the chapter "The Significance of Geography and History" (*Democracy and Education*), he points out that it is the industrial history of primitive man, rather than the sensationalistic aspects of undeveloped societies, that is the proper focus of attention. In fact, the mention of primitive history suggests industrial history. To understand the problems of the present, we should consider this phase of man's historical development. Particularly should we note how man has procured his food, clothing, and shelter, how he has invented and improvised, and how he has turned nature to his own purposes. All of this sheds a cold, clear light on how long and how tortuous is the road from the historical past.

Economic history, without getting itself involved in the logomacy of dialectical materialism, can show us two things that no other phase of history can reveal: it can show the processes of industrial evolution, and it can bring the student into contact with things that are of intimate concern to all mankind. Political history is less likely to liberalize the perspective of students than is economic history; the latter manifests both humanistic and democratic qualities absent in the former. The history of man's efforts to wrest a living from the soil, to protect himself from the elements, and to make and to distribute goods is the approach to history that eliminates—or at least minimizes—romantic, mythological, or purely rhetorical concern with history (*ibid.*, pp. 252–53).

If history is to be vital, if it is to permeate and enrich experience, it must never lose its socio-economic focus. History is the record of man acting in

the arena of experience, and to lose the sociological viewpoint in history is to kill its vitality. The ineffectiveness of history is in no small degree to be explained on the basis of an inadequate perspective. We must "treat the past as if it were a projected present" (*Moral Principles*, pp. 36-37). Segregating history, putting sections of it into compartments, divorcing it from the present interests and problems of life, is further explanation of why the vital spark of animation is frequently lost in history (*Democracy and Education*, p. 250). An integrative perspective on history reveals that history and geography are mutually reinforcing; to learn one is to enrich the other. Just as mastery of geography facilitates a grasp of spatial relations, so does mastery of history facilitate the ability to see the connections existing in human institutions and activities. Failure to see the connections between these bodies of data reduces history to mere chronology, to phantasy, or to a type of history that takes place on an artificial stage—a stage without connection to the play (*ibid.*, pp. 246-48).

IV

Carlyle and Emerson extol the hero, the great man, the dynamic individual in history. He may be good or bad, poet or Philistine, thinker or doer—the important thing is that he be a personality charged with ideas or the power to initiate and redirect affairs. Dewey has reservations. Approaching history biographically has its merits, he argues, but it also has its dangers. Specifically, Dewey notes three dangers inherent in this approach: the danger of dealing with too few individuals; the danger of taking the individual out of his social matrix (*Democracy and Education*, p. 251); and the danger of reducing history to an entertaining or exciting narrative (*Moral Principles*, p. 40). Caution against the same hazards is also found in *The School and Society* (pp. 158-59):

It is possible to use biographies so that they become a collection of mere stories, interesting, possibly, to the point of sensationalism, but yet bring the child no nearer to comprehension of social life. This happens when the individual who is the hero of the tale is isolated from his social environment.

Indirectly rather than inherently, history has a moral quality. As Dewey will have no commerce with absolute or metaphysical realities, so with parallel logic he rejects any suggestion that specific moral values inhere in the universe—that moral values are objectively real and independent of perception. From this view it follows, for the experimentalist at least, that moral values are not something preserved in historical data, among other places, by the historian for his contemporaries and his successors. Rather, the moral dimension of history is revealed (emerges) when historical discourse impinges upon the contemporary predicament of man. History that has social-

ized the human intellect has moral significance (*Democracy and Education*, p. 254); history that has enhanced an understanding of the present has ethical value (*Moral Principles*, p. 36). Thus no bundle of facts, no chronological table, no narrational account of the past has a necessary moral quality about it. That quality, if it exists at all, grows out of the way man uses history; it grows because by definition Dewey and his school assert that moral conceptions are social, not transcendental, in their origin.

V

Making historical judgments is a ticklish business. Dewey notes this in his *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*. At the crux of the logical problem of historical judgment is the burden of ascertaining the connection between propositions relating to the past and propositions relating to the present and to the future. The problem of logical judgment in history is further complicated by the necessity of determining the conditions that must be understood before any proposition can be said to possess validity. Furthermore, the logical problem is that historical judgment also confronts us with the necessity of understanding that some propositions may possess high probability and yet be false; other propositions may possess low probability and yet be true. The determination of standards to ground judgments between these extremes is the relentless task of the historian. It would be a mistaken notion to believe that history is factually a science, for the complexity of the subject, its infinite variables, and its vast area of the unknown and the unrecoverable, in the nature of the case, prevent its being a science. Nor does the logic of historical judgment demand absolute certitude for propositions about past events. It is sufficient that contemporaneous evidence exist with any judgment made and that we accept the fact that where there is no ascertainable evidence the past is in so far irrecoverable. Acutely attuned to the intricacy of the problem of historical knowledge, Dewey suggests that no discipline and no field of intellectual endeavor makes more of a demand upon precise judgment than does history (*ibid.*, pp. 230-31, 236).

Conclusions and Criticisms

1. Properly speaking, we probably should refer to Dewey's *view* of history rather than to his *philosophy* of history. This assertion seems warranted from the fact that Dewey did not write a systematic analysis of history and its meaning, and that what he had to say is frequently random and miscellaneous, only sometimes constituting a coherent whole. Hence, he has a view of history, not a philosophy of history. This same conclusion might be reasoned from another direction. He attempts to reflect upon history without metaphysics, a process which necessarily restricts his field of vision. He comes out with a circumscribed perspective, a *view* of history rather than a *philos-*

ophy of history. The metaphysical free play of the rational and speculative faculties can appropriately serve by definition as a precondition of a philosophy of history.

2. It is this deliberate disavowal of transcendent orientation, spiritual meaning, and absolute standards of value that render Dewey's insights so limited that he sees only the circumscribed, partial, time-encompassed, and secular pattern of human history. Virtually all philosophers of history from Plato through St. Augustine to Berdyaev—those who have permanently enriched the minds and imaginations of men—have been metaphysically minded; they not only have sought the meaning of history in the processes of secular evolution, but they have searched the heavens for a key that would give them insight into the pathetic drama of human existence. Karl Marx would perhaps be the principal exception, but even he saw the culmination of the historical process, and hence, was building a metaphysics in site of himself.

3. In addition to the absence of a philosophy of history in the works of Dewey, it should be specified further that he was not a historiographer. There is a sustained passage in the *Logic* (pp. 230–39) which is his closest approximation to a detailed analysis of the "logic of history" and the problems of historical method. However, there is nothing in the *Logic* or anywhere else in Dewey that approximates the systematic and exhaustive analysis of Ernst Bernheim's *Lehrbuch der Historischen Methode* or Charles Langlois and Charles Seignobos' *Introduction to the Study of History*—the old and new testaments of historical method. It is to these latter sources rather than to experimentalism that the serious student of historical method has turned, turns, and quite probably will continue to turn for years to come. However, Dewey was an able student of history. References to historical problems and implications permeate his work. That he should have selected Kant as the subject of his doctoral dissertation is further evidence of his serious interest in history, as is his awareness of the meaning of technology as a formative force. Perhaps the most conclusive point in this connection is the fact that *Democracy and Education* could not have been written by anyone incapable of making a sharp analysis of Aristotle, Herbart, Froebel, among others, within their historical matrix.

4. In its own right the philosophy of experimentalism does not have a theory of time. When questions arise as to the nature or meaning of time, the experimentalist is understandably silent, for he has no underlying theory of reality. In his essay "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy" (1917), Dewey not only disavows concern with problems of reality but affirms positively that "pragmatism is content to take its stand with science" (*Creative Intelligence*, p. 55). Therefore unlike the idealist or realist, the experimentalist seeks to answer basic questions by one of two devices: (1) the assumption

that such questions do not exist—that they are meaningless, or (2) deduction from current scientific thinking. Dewey suggests that chronologically theological problems gave rise to ontological problems, and that the latter can appropriately be ignored. "If the basic concept is a fiction, there is no call for the solution" (*ibid.*, pp. 31, 27). If he depends upon science for his answers, the experimentalist's notion of time must undergo frequent modifications. For presumably, when the theory of absolute time was respectable, the experimentally inclined would have believed in a time that was infinite, homogeneous, and continuous. Today, presumably, the experimentalist would go to Einstein and modern science for an interpretation of the meaning of time. Here time becomes relative—every event has its own co-ordinate system carrying with it its own particular time. Therefore time has no knowable beginning, no knowable end, and exists in innumerable particular systems interwoven with space. Even simultaneous events become relative (*The Meaning of Relativity*, p. 32).

5. What is the use of history? Apparently for the experimentalist, particularly as typified by Dewey, the use is pragmatic—i.e., functional, practical, or problem-solving. But surely there is something shallow in the idea that history as a discipline, a body of knowledge, and a critical method must forever be solving problems to justify its existence. History can be justified by its intrinsic merit as well as by its pragmatic consequences. The study and writing of history as an end in itself is both a legitimate and a moral activity. Rather than relentlessly dealing with history to save the universe, some deal with history because they like it, because for them it is an end in itself, and demands no justification outside itself. Thus, history is both means and end. So conceived, history possesses intrinsic vitality, a dynamism, and value all its own. Teaching history so that its qualities thus conceived are shared with others, particularly the young, is neither a violation of the rights of the learner nor a ceremonial procedure devoid of meaning.

6. Dewey's treatment of history is equally vulnerable for neglecting the esthetic qualities of history. There can be, and frequently is, beauty in the language of history, in the ideas of history, and in the form of history. Reading Berdyaev or Augustine, Tolstoy or Burckhardt, or frequently a modern like Reinhold Niebuhr, is a rich esthetic and emotional experience as well as an intellectual one. Here is a sweep, a grandeur, a beauty that transcends the grossly pragmatic, that provokes sensitiveness, and that enhances imagination and understanding in man beyond all anticipation. Both the mediocre and saintly potentials of man are revealed; truth and beauty become one.

The Interstate Compact, Water, and the Southwest: A Case Study in Compact Utility

RICHARD H. LEACH
DUKE UNIVERSITY

AFTER A LONG BUT UNSPECTACULAR CAREER, the interstate compact device is currently in vogue in the United States. The earlier wave of enthusiasm for compacts that followed the publication of Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis' pioneering study of compacts in 1925¹ was succeeded by an era of disillusionment when it was discovered in the mid-thirties that compacts were not generally applicable as panaceas for the social and economic problems then plaguing the nation. For a while it even appeared likely that compacts would once again be assigned to the "narrow perch atop disputed boundary lines"² where they had long been relegated. But the tremendous wave of enthusiasm for compacts since the Second World War seems to have dispelled any likelihood of that happening. In the twelve years since V-J Day, forty-one compacts have become effective,³ more than all those which became operative in the preceding forty years, and almost a dozen other compacts are now in the process of being formulated. The recent tendency for hard-pressed states to turn to interstate compacts to solve their joint problems has been furthered by the demonstrated success of an increasing number of compacts now in operation. In recognition of the ever larger role being assigned to compacts by the states, predictions are being made that in the near future compacts will become a major device "for the administration of multi-state functions and activities."⁴ In any case, compacts promise to remain in vogue for a long time to come. For many years one of the problems that compacts have been relied upon to solve is the interstate water

¹ Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, "The Compact Clause of the Constitution: A Study in Interstate Adjustments," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 34 (April and May, 1925), pp. 685-758.

² The phrase of Frederick L. Zimmermann and Mitchell Wendell, *The Interstate Compact Since 1925* (Chicago, 1951), p. 2.

³ This figure excludes a multitude of bilateral and multilateral civil-defense compacts formulated since 1949.

⁴ This particular prediction was made by Zimmermann and Wendell, *op. cit.*

problem. And one of the areas where water compacts are the most common is the great Southwest. An analysis of the water compacts in operation in that region provides a case study of compact operation from which may be drawn conclusions about the usefulness of compacts in general. An increasing number of such studies would seem to be necessary in the years ahead if both the advantages and the deficiencies of the compact as a governmental device are to be understood.

Purposes and Duties of the Water Compacts

The Southwestern states are now parties to four water compacts: the Rio Grande Compact between Texas, Colorado, and New Mexico; the Pecos River Compact between Texas and New Mexico; the Canadian River Compact between Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico; and the Sabine River Compact between Texas and Louisiana. In addition, Congress has acted favorably on a Red River compact between Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, and negotiations leading to its formulation are now under way. Congress has also granted its consent in advance to the negotiation for two Arkansas River compacts—one between Oklahoma and Texas, the other between Oklahoma and Kansas. It is a safe assumption that both the growing scarcity of water in the Southwest, with the resultant need for fair apportionment of existing supplies as well as for the development of new supplies, and the spread of the idea basic to the report of President Eisenhower's Advisory Committee on Water Resources Policy that river basins are natural units for the development of water-resources programs will exert pressure for still more water compacts in that area. The federal government itself may even exert such pressure if it takes the advice of the Presidential committee that "every encouragement should be given to the formation of interstate compacts by which the respective States undertake to adjust between themselves the fair and equitable distribution of water and the other problems related thereto."⁵

Despite the growing necessity for the development of new sources of water supply in the Southwest, however, the primary concern of all four water compacts now in operation is apportionment. The Rio Grande Compact,⁶ indeed, has no other declared purpose. The problem the Compact tackled was that of protecting existing water rights in the three states against the construction of any additional storage facilities anywhere in the basin, rather than that of developing new sources of water supply. Thus the Compact amounts to little more than a formal guarantee regarding stream flow through the party states, and the function of the commission created therefor is limited to determining whether or not the states are meeting their obliga-

⁵ H. Doc. No. 315, 84th Cong., 2d sess. (1956), p. 22.

⁶ 53 Stat. 785 (1939).

tions under the terms of the Compact for the delivery of water into the river. Although in fact the resources of the Rio Grande need to be augmented, and need it badly, the Compact does nothing to augment them. Instead, the rules and regulations adopted for the administration of the Compact by the Rio Grande Commission declare that each state is free to develop its water resources at will.⁷ Both the Compact itself and the rules and regulations of the Commission were formulated in recognition of the fact that the Rio Grande is a fully appropriated stream and all three parties were eager to protect their portion of its flow. They recognize also that no party state was willing to delegate or surrender its own power to undertake water-resources development. Thus the Compact omits the subject altogether and confines the Commission to assuring fair and equitable apportionment.

The Commission was not, however, endowed with enforcement powers of its own. The administration of the Compact is left entirely with the participating states. Although the Commission exists to enforce the Compact, if it finds that a party state is violating the terms, the Commission can only report the matter to the proper official of the state concerned and rely on him to take whatever action is necessary to correct the situation. The Commission has no more power to force that state official to take action than it does to take action itself. Nor can it even rely on the courts to enforce its decisions, for the Compact specifically states that none of its findings are to be held "conclusive in any court or tribunal which may be called upon to interpret or enforce the Compact."⁸ The Commission is thus forced to work through state agencies and to depend on their voluntary co-operation for the successful fulfillment of the Compact's purposes. The only power the Commission has, other than that of reporting violations of the Compact's terms to the appropriate state official, is the power to make recommendations on matters within its sphere of interest to the legislatures of the party states or to Congress.

Nine years later, when the Pecos River Compact was drawn up,⁹ the party states had somewhat broader purposes in mind for both the Compact and its administrative agency, the Pecos River Commission. The Pecos Compact provides not only for the preservation and equitable apportionment of the waters of the Pecos River and its tributaries between Texas and New Mexico but also for the development of the water resources in that basin as well. Thus its interest is declared to be also in "the construction of works for (a) the salvage of water, (b) the more efficient use of water, and (c) the protection of life and property from floods."¹⁰ Although the Pecos is also a fully

⁷ Rules and Regulations, Rio Grande Compact Commission.

⁸ Rio Grande Compact, Art. XII.

⁹ 63 Stat. 159 (1949).

¹⁰ Pecos River Compact, Art. I.

appropriated stream, it was recognized when the Compact was drawn up that there were other problems in the Pecos River Basin that had to be solved if the equitable apportionment of existing waters was to be made possible. The Pecos Basin is characterized by a lack of good reservoir sites, sedimentation is extreme, quality of water is poor, there is an encroachment of salt cedar, and the problem of flood control is complicated. "At the same time the River needs flood control, it is the type of stream that has to survive on its flood waters, which in turn means adequate control for conservation where there is little chance for the necessary reservoir space to accomplish this."¹¹ All this meant that in developing the Compact, these problems had to be tackled also and a means provided by which the party states could work together for their solution.

At the outset, the Pecos Commission limited its activities to enforcing the flow allocations set forth in the Compact and to recommending to the states and to Congress action it deemed necessary. Gradually, however, it began to activate a program to implement the broader purposes of the Compact. First, a series of ground-water studies was planned and undertaken by the Commission to provide data on which to build a Water Salvage and Salinity Alleviation Program for the Pecos Basin. At various times, agencies of the party states and of the U.S. Departments of Agriculture, Defense, and Interior co-operated by collecting and preparing data. A director of the program was hired to co-ordinate the studies and to prepare a draft of the program for Commission consideration. The Commission accepted the draft, and recently its chief efforts, as well as those of the program director, have been devoted to obtaining Congressional action on the proposed program. A bill to accomplish this purpose has been prepared and approved by the Commission and seems assured of passage during the Eighty-fifth Congress. The Commission does not visualize a larger role for itself growing out of the adoption of the program by Congress. It regards its function as that of studying the problems involved in salvaging water now being lost and in attacking the salinity of the lower Pecos and of preparing recommendations for action by the party states and Congress on the basis of those studies. When the salvage-and-salinity program has been launched, the Commission expects to study other problems which stand in the way of the accomplishment of the Compact's objectives and to prepare recommendations for their solution. It does not intend to become an operating agency. It believes the actual construction and operation of new facilities in the basin is properly the function of the states and/or the federal government. Its own role it conceives to be that of a catalytic agent.

¹¹ John H. Erickson, Interstate Stream engineer, New Mexico, in personal communication to author, October 8, 1953.

The Canadian River Compact¹² is also broader in scope than the Rio Grande Compact. Its major purposes are declared to be "to promote interstate comity; to remove causes of present and future controversy; to make secure and protect present developments within the States; and to provide for the construction of additional works for the conservation of the waters of the Canadian River."¹³ The bulk of the Compact is devoted to the third purpose, which, put more bluntly, provides for the apportionment of stream flow in exactly the same manner as do the Rio Grande and Pecos compacts. Articles IV, V, and VI define and guarantee the existing rights of each of the party states to use and store the waters of the Canadian Basin and do so explicitly in order that action against violators of the specific terms of the Compact may be taken. No procedure for taking such action is authorized, however. The Compact declares that the states' rights to the use of Canadian River water may not be abridged except by the Canadian River Commission, established as the administrative agency of the Compact. Article VI grants the Commission power to permit New Mexico and Texas the right to impound more water than is allowed in Article IV for New Mexico and in Article V for Texas, provided certain conditions are met.¹⁴

So far as apportionment is concerned, therefore, the Canadian River Commission has more discretion than either the Rio Grande or the Pecos commissions. Nothing further is said in the Compact with regard to the other three purposes. No doubt the framers assumed that the first and second objectives, which can hardly be construed as authorizing action programs, would be accomplished by the successful fulfillment of the third and fourth. Action to fulfill the fourth purpose—that of construction of additional works for water storage—has actually occupied most of the Commission's attention since its formation. To date, the Commission has discussed and agreed upon the construction or reconstruction of a number of dams as necessary to an adequate water supply from the Canadian River and has requested the states in which the work is needed to undertake it. Acting upon Commission recommendations, New Mexico has constructed a dam at Seneca Creek, Texas has agreed to rebuild a dam on Wolf Creek, and negotiations are now under way with the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation to construct a dam on the Canadian River proper near Amarillo. Since the Commission was not given specific authority in the Compact to undertake the construction of works itself, it has introduced the practice of studying basin-wide needs and recommending to the party states the construction of specific works which it deems necessary. If the suggestions of the Commission continue to receive

¹² 65 Stat. 74 (1952).

¹³ Canadian River Compact, Art. I.

¹⁴ Namely, that no state shall by such a release be deprived of water it needs for beneficial use, that no release shall be for longer than twelve months, and that the release shall not be construed as granting either state a permanent right to the additional amount of water.

the favorable action by the states that they have so far, it will be able to guide the basin's development to a very great extent. It will not, however, become a much stronger commission as a commission than its sisters on the Rio Grande and the Pecos.

The Sabine River Compact,¹⁵ the most recent of the water compacts to become effective in the region, is in the pattern set by its predecessors. Its primary concern is with fair apportionment but it also proclaims its interest in encouraging "the development, conservation and utilization of the water resources of the Sabine River and its tributaries" and in establishing "a basis for cooperative planning and acting by the States for the construction, operation and maintenance of projects for water conservation and utilization purposes . . ."¹⁶ It does not, however, project a larger role for its administrative arm, the Sabine River Compact Administration, than those assigned the other water-compact commissions. Indeed, the Compact says twice that "this Compact is limited to the equitable apportionment of the waters of the Sabine River" and in so many words disclaims any concern with the abatement of pollution and salt-water intrusion, pressing problems in the Sabine Basin.¹⁷ Thus while the Compact seemingly lays the groundwork for a broader program of action than the other three water compacts, the power of the Administration to bring such a program into being is limited to encouraging action by, and establishing bases of action for, the party states; the Administration itself plays no larger a role than its sister commissions.

Articles IV and V are therefore the heart of the Sabine Compact, inasmuch as they set forth the agreed-upon apportionment of the waters of the river, which the Administration is dedicated to preserve. The chief activity of the Administration is to collect data on how the water is being used, information on which to base judgment as to the states' adherence to the Compact's terms. A number of official gauging stations have been established, some in conjunction with state water-authorities and others in co-operation with the U.S. Geological Survey. The Administration studies their reports, and if a violation or deviation is discovered, it recommends action by the state concerned. Like the other water commissions, the Sabine Administration has no enforcing power. That was left with the states by Section H of Article VII of the Compact which declares that "the execution and enforcement of the Administration's orders shall be the responsibility of the agents and officials of the respective States, charged with the administration of water rights therein." Sabine River Authorities have been established in both states, so that there is close co-operation between the state agency and the Administration. Members of the former attend the meetings of the

¹⁵ 68 Stat. 690 (1954).

¹⁶ Sabine River Compact, Preamble.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Preamble and Art. IX.

latter, and in other ways co-operation is being developed and encouraged. It is to be expected that one of the first fruits such relationships will bear will be the effective enforcement of the Administration's recommendations.

The proposed Red River Compact would concern itself with both the apportionment of water and control of pollution, as would the two proposed Arkansas compacts. If they materialize, their administrative agencies may be expected to be considerably more active in operation than are those of the existing commissions because of the inclusion of pollution control as one of their program responsibilities.

Organizational Structure

As stated above, the administration of the Rio Grande, Pecos, and Canadian Compacts is entrusted to multimembered commissions. All three commissions consist of one representative from each party state, and, since national interests are involved, a representative of the federal government as well. In each case, the federal representative is designated as chairman. The Rio Grande Compact specifies that the commissioners for Colorado and New Mexico shall be the state engineers of those states, and that the commissioners for Texas and the United States shall be appointed, the former by the governor of Texas and the latter by the President of the United States. The Pecos and Canadian Compacts merely require that commissioners be designated or appointed in accordance with state law. None of the compacts set any qualifications for membership or specify a term of office for commission members. All require that any salary for their services and all their expenses be borne by the government they represent. The Sabine River Compact, however, created the Sabine River Compact Administration, composed of two members from each of the party states and one from the federal government, the latter to serve as chairman. The members of the Administration from Texas and one of the members from Louisiana are appointed by their respective governors at their discretion. The director of the State Department of Public Works is automatically the other member from Louisiana. The Texas members serve two-year staggered terms, and the appointed member from Louisiana serves a four-year term. Salaries and expenses are paid by the governments represented.¹⁸

None of the water commissions do more as commissions than to review data and make recommendations for action. None of them collect themselves the data on which their recommendations are based. In the case of the Rio Grande Commission the working agent is the U.S. Geological Survey, which services the Commission on a yearly contract basis. The U.S. Weather Bureau also contributes information on evaporation losses. In effect, the Dis-

¹⁸ Texas provides \$15 per day of service plus actual expenses for the two Texas commissioners.

trict Office of the U.S.G.S. in Santa Fe is the secretariat of the Commission and its staff arm. The federal representative on the Commission, an employee of the U.S.G.S., combines his duties as chairman with duties as secretary. Although the Compact permits the employment of engineering and clerical aid, within the limit of funds provided for that purpose by the states, none is presently employed. The cost of U.S.G.S. services, as well as all other expenses incurred in carrying out the Compact except those borne by the United States, is borne equally by the states. Since the U.S.G.S. performs secretarial functions for the Commission, it prepares the agenda for Commission meetings and keeps Commission members informed of the monthly status of water delivery and storage throughout the basin.

The Pecos Compact makes specific provision for the appointment of a secretary, and arrangements have been made, again with the U.S.G.S., for a staff engineer to serve as secretary of the Commission. His duties are intermittent, since the secretarial work of the Commission does not require daily attention. He prepares the agenda for Commission meetings, issues calls for meetings when instructed by the chairman to do so, prepares and distributes minutes of the meetings, keeps the Commission's papers, handles some of the Commission's fiscal work, and prepares the annual report of the Commission under its direction. As stated above, the director of the action program is concerned solely with the water salvage and salinity program and not with the entire range of the Commission's activities. In a sense, he serves as a public-relations and contact man for the program as well as its engineering staff. The data used by the Commission are collected chiefly by the U.S.G.S. and other state and federal agencies, especially the Bureau of Reclamation. Some of the work is contributed; other work is performed on a contract basis. The Pecos Commission has also developed the practice of working through three standing committees—the Engineering Advisory Committee, the Legal Committee, and the Budget Committee. The rules of the Commission do not require that members of these committees be members of the Commission itself; most are not. The chairman of the Commission serves *ex officio* as a member of all three committees. The Engineering Advisory Committee has been very active in the formation of the Water Salvage and Salinity Program, contributing much of the data on which the program is based. In reality, it serves as the technical arm of the Commission. The Budget and Legal committees are not concerned with program activities, though the Legal Committee did draft the bill which will be submitted to Congress.

The Canadian River Compact also permits the employment of staff for engineering, legal, and clerical purposes, as well as for the performance of any other functions the Commission might decide to undertake. No such staff has been employed, however. The Compact also authorizes the Com-

mission to contract with "appropriate Federal agencies" for the collection and presentation of data and for the maintenance of records and the preparation of reports, but no arrangements with the U.S.G.S. (presumably the agency whose services the Canadian Commission would utilize, as the other commissions have done) have yet been made. As stated above, the Commission has thus far relied solely on state action to make its work possible. Presumably the party states would even be required to discipline themselves should they violate Articles IV, V, or VI. And presumably they would rely on state action if they should plan to build any additional works that have been recommended. Although the rules for the internal organization of the Commission permit the creation of the three usual standing committees—engineering, legal, and budget—none have been established, and it was decided at the second annual meeting of the Commission, held April 19, 1956, that for the immediate future no standing committees would be required for the operation of the Commission.¹⁹ The fact that no Commission budget has been set up emphasizes the reliance the Commission places on the states.

The Sabine Compact places primary emphasis on state-furnished personnel for the performance of its functions. Although it too authorizes the Administration to employ needed personnel, no staff except a part-time secretary has been employed. The Administration has contracted with the U.S.G.S. to operate some stream-gauging stations; others are operated by the states. Forms requiring a report about how water has been used are distributed annually to all users of surface water in the part of the Sabine Basin covered by the Compact. On the basis of the data compiled from these reports and from the inventories of water use submitted at the outset and kept up to date by the states, plus data from the stream-gauging stations, the Administration is able to ascertain whether the provisions of the Compact are being adhered to. If they are not, it recommends corrective action. The by-laws provide for the creation of the standard three advisory committees—engineering, legal, and budget—and all three have been appointed. They have functioned for only little more than a year, however, and it is too early to tell whether they will assume the same importance their counterparts have assumed. Should construction ever be undertaken as a part of the Administration's program, individually or in co-operation with the United States, the states would no doubt handle it. The Compact specifically declares that "each State shall provide such available facilities, supplies, equipment, technical information and other assistance as the Administration may require to carry out its duties and functions."²⁰ This hardly constitutes authorization for the Administration to undertake a building program of its own.

¹⁹ Canadian River Commission, *2nd Annual Report, March, 1956*, p. 1.

²⁰ Sabine River Compact, Art. VII, § H.

Limitations Imposed by Budgetary Bases

Something of the nature of the operations of the Rio Grande, Canadian, and Sabine Compacts can be gleaned from an analysis of their budgets. The total budget of the Rio Grande Commission is around \$18,000 per annum, slightly more than 75 per cent of which goes for the operation of the stream-gauging stations from which the basic data for the enforcement of the Compact is collected. The bulk of the remaining 25 per cent goes to pay for the services of the U.S.G.S. The federal government contributes about one-third of the total amount; the rest is shared equally by the states. No budget at all has yet been established for the Canadian Commission. When expenditures become necessary, however, and appropriations are made for its support,²¹ the Compact provides that a revolving fund, "to be known as the 'Canadian River Revolving Fund' . . . shall be initiated and maintained by equal payments of each state into the fund."²² No suggestion was provided to guide the states in contributing to the fund, however, and in fact it has not been set up. The Sabine Compact does not discuss the finances of the Administration in detail. It merely provides, as the other Compacts do, that those expenses not paid by the United States shall be borne equally by the states and that a biennial budget shall be submitted to each state legislature, specifying the amount payable by each state for the biennium. The assumption seems to be that each state will accept the budget as submitted and make the suggested appropriation. The budget for the 1955-57 biennium was \$5,565, each state bearing an equal share of \$2,782.50. Except for small expenditures for capital outlay (file cabinets, map cases, seals), administrative expenses (supplies, printing, stationery), and miscellaneous items, the entire amount was pledged to the U.S.G.S. for the operation of the stream-gauging stations. The limitations imposed by such budgets are obvious. It is equally obvious that in the case of none of these compacts did the party states wish the interstate agency to become powerful or to conduct a very extensive program. With such slim budgetary bases, none of them can.

The Pecos Commission's budget was initially smaller than that of the Rio Grande, but with the determination to develop an action program, it has been greatly expanded. For fiscal 1956 and 1957, the total budget was \$42,250 per annum, \$13,000 going for personal services (the salaries of the secretary, the treasurer, the director of the action program, and clerical assistance), \$4,000 for travel expenses, \$21,600 for contractual services (to the U.S.G.S. for studies and stream-gauge operations), \$2,850 for the continuation of ground-water studies, and \$800 for printing. Like those of the Rio Grande and the other water compacts, funds for the Pecos Commission

²¹ As is the case with the Rio Grande and Pecos Compacts, those expenses of the Commission which are not borne by the United States will be shared equally by the party states.

²² Canadian River Compact, Art. IX.

come from both state and federal governments. The degree of co-operation achieved in budgetary matters between the two states is remarkable. At one time, New Mexico bore what seemed to be a vastly disproportionate share of the Commission's expenses until Texas was able to assume her rightful share, and this entirely without difficulty or hard feelings. Neither state has been unwilling or hesitant to meet increased budget requests, as the expanded activities of the Commission attest. The U.S.G.S. and other federal agencies have also contributed to the support of the Commission's activities, but as has been the case with the Rio Grande Commission, their contributions have not constituted a major portion of the Commission's income.

The work of the Rio Grande Commission has been limited not only by budgetary considerations but also by a long train of litigation over the water rights covered by the Compact between the party states. At present, a suit is pending between Texas and New Mexico involving an alleged violation of the Compact's terms by New Mexico. Until the bitterness engendered by these suits dies down, and a better basis for understanding is arrived at between the compacting states, the success of the Rio Grande Commission will of necessity be hampered. Both the Rio Grande and the Pecos commissions have been restricted too by the attachment of the party states to the principle of states' rights and their consequent reluctance to allow any control over any of the appropriated waters within their own boundaries to pass to a compact commission. The Pecos Commission has been spared the background of bitterness that has plagued the development of the Rio Grande Commission. It is still young, and if the developmental program which is now under way is successful, its long-term record of accomplishment should be considerably better than that of its sister commission. It is still too early, of course, to make any assessment of the success of either the Canadian River Commission or the Sabine Compact Administration.

Conclusions

It is interesting to note how little these water compacts have moved in the direction of water-resources development. The interstate compacts themselves preclude movement in that direction by the Rio Grande, Canadian, and Sabine agencies, and the Pecos Commission, as a commission, is not authorized to go very far. Even the proposed Red River and Arkansas compacts do not propose much advance in that direction, even though they do include pollution control within the scope of their interest. Despite the growing conviction of students of the problem that interstate compacts are the best means of "administering the development of river basin water resources when two or more states are involved,"²³ the Southwest water com-

²³ A resolution of the Western Forestry and Conservation Association, passed at its San Francisco meeting, December, 1954, quoted in *State Government*, Vol. 28 (February, 1955), p. 35.

pacts have not been utilized for that purpose. But if water shortages become more critical, as they may, the Southwestern states may become increasingly aware of the possibilities of compacts in solving the problem. If they do, they will discover that they already have experienced agencies, personnel, and methods which should be of considerable assistance as they move to undertake the new responsibilities. If the water compacts have provided nothing else, they have at least built a base from which easier and undoubtedly more successful attacks on broader water problems can be attacked.

But the water compacts have not been unsuccessful in the more limited area cut out for them. Water is being fairly apportioned under all of them, and slowly interstate jealousy and ill will are disappearing under their aegis. Interstate comity has been considerably advanced. The success of the Rio Grande Compact can be measured only in these terms, for it was given no other duty. To date, neither the Canadian nor the Sabine agency has tried its wings in areas other than apportionment. But the Pecos Commission has, and it must be accorded a great deal of credit for its work. For the first time, considered action is being taken by all the parties concerned with the Pecos Basin and is being taken jointly. Every indication is that within the next few decades, the entire water picture in the basin may be changed; if it is, the credit will belong almost entirely to the Pecos River Commission. This is no mean accolade, and the pattern it sets may become the model for greatly expanded compact activity not only in the Southwest but elsewhere in the nation where water is becoming an increasingly menacing problem.

The Entrepreneur as Cultural Hero

DAVID HAMILTON
UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO

MUCH CONTROVERSY once raged over the role of myth in culture. Today there appears to be some general agreement that myths are associated with rites. Claims that myths are valid but vague recollections of a heroic past are not to be taken too seriously. Nor are they any longer held to be rather crude first approximations toward a scientific explanation of natural phenomena.¹

As the anthropologist has probed into cultures all over the world he has found an elaborate mass of myths and associated ceremonial rites. These myths purport to explain the status-mores complex and are re-enacted in the rites through which status and mystic properties are conferred on things as well as individuals. In all these myths, much prominence is given to a recounting of the doings of the fabulous tribal ancestors. By virtue of the chicanery, deceit, cunning, stealth, and wisdom of these heroes the tribe came to have its "way of life." By exercising creative genius these original cultural heroes gave to the community its peculiar set of mores and differential gradings and ratings which the mores define. The rites performed are supposedly dramatic re-enactments of the doings of the tribal founders. As it was in the beginning, it is now, and ever shall be . . .

Within the cultural framework, an individual acquires stature and virtue in accordance with how closely he adheres to the mores which prescribe proper behavior for one of his station in life. He who adheres rigorously to the mores defining his role is said to be "virtuous"; he who is neglectful of the mores is said to be "unworthy." As sociological and anthropological inquiry advances our knowledge of social structure, it is becoming clearer that each institutional structure is made up of a complex of roles. Each individual plays, of course, several of these. But what is more important for present purposes is the fact that these roles are ranked. Related roles are higher or lower relative to one another. The mores prescribe how one should act with his peers, with those above, and with those below. This is the dramatic aspects of social structure and is what has been called "ceremonial." Myths authenticate these ways of behavior by giving to them what is sup-

¹ For a fuller discussion of this question, see Lord Raglan, *The Hero: A Study in Tradition, Myth, and Drama* (New York, Vintage Books ed., 1956).

posedly a rational origin but which on examination turns out to be a product of group mythopoeic imagination.

Although such a myth-rites complex has been found in all "primitive" cultures to which the ethnologist has given his attention, there is a general feeling among the more advanced cultures that they are relatively free of any such mental legerdemain. Contemporary Western culture, in which science and technology have been elaborated, are looked upon as "secular"—meaning that they are free from such cherished myth and ritual. In fact, among students of the social sciences there is a general tendency to look upon Western cultures as having been distilled from some kind of teleological secularization process, whereby cultures pass by stages from the sacred to the secular.

However, this is a deceptive bit of conceit. No culture recognizes, readily and unaided, its own myth for what in fact it is. Were it not for the uninitiated foreigner who, owing to his lack of initiation, is at an advantage in differentiating cultural fancy from fact, it would be almost impossible to identify those elements of a culture which are mythopoeic from those which are history. Since Western culture believes itself to be uniquely secular, and since members of a culture are at a disadvantage in recognizing such fancies in their own culture anyway, the idea that Western culture is free of myth, or at least free of anything serious along this line, is readily believed. But that which is myth may be imbedded in a matrix of what is highly regarded as the distillations of matter-of-fact science.²

In Western culture, economics, compared to the other social sciences, is often looked upon as having reached a high degree of scientific preciseness and abstraction. In fact, some of the other practitioners of social science seem to be envious at times of the scientific heights reached by the economist. The Euclidean diagrams and systems of simultaneous equations present to the uninitiated an appearance of scientific rigor that the more evolutionary social sciences seem to lack. Certainly there is considerable reason for this view. The economist has applied mathematical techniques and definitions—in what is called "equilibrium theory"—to an extent which no other social science can pretend to have reached. By working from the basis of two general forces—demand and supply—the economist has worked out a formidable paraphernalia, the elaboration of which seems to be infinite. The mathematical exploration of an infinite number of demand-and-supply conditions would seem to be limited only by the finite human imagination—and the economist seems never to reach the end of those possibilities of imagination. This scientific appearance has removed economics from any taint of social myth or legend.

² E. A. Burtt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science* (New York, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954).

But on examination of that which underlies the mathematical façade, the case is not quite so clear. Beneath the geometry and the calculus there lies something which has some of the appearance of what Lord Raglan called "dramatic myth." When all the mathematical abstractions are swept away, what is called "demand and supply" can be seen as consumers and entrepreneurs. Consumers have the role presumably represented by the demand curve. Entrepreneurs and others in productive roles lie back of the supply curve, chiefly the entrepreneurs, as economic theory makes clear. In the total demand-and-supply situation, the character of the consumer is rather vague; that of the entrepreneur is much more clearly drawn.

On this level of generalization, economics takes on the characteristics of a drama. Consumers desire certain products. They make their wants known through bids in the market place. Entrepreneurs, ever alert in pursuing the main chance, respond to the wants by producing goods in just the quantity and quality that consumers desire them. The entrepreneur takes on the qualities of a cultural hero who performs miracles of production. He is a creative genius and a master of ceremonies. Although never on the panegyric level of the popular discourse, still the entrepreneur has, in the passages of staid economic treatises, a certain color and flair not granted to any of the other characters in the economic drama. He has a creative role denied to any of the others, including labor.

These entrepreneurs are gifted with the powers of "foresight," "initiative," and "enterprise." By virtue of these extra powers they are able to foresee the economic future, the sweep and advance of technology, in a fashion denied to the populace at large. The economic significance of population growth and shifts, of new lands, and of changes in sentiment is all revealed to these captains of industry. The heroic proportions of the entrepreneur are outlined in the following passage by Joseph Schumpeter:

We have seen that the function of entrepreneurs is to reform or revolutionize the pattern of production by exploiting an invention or, more generally, an untried technological possibility for producing a new commodity or producing an old one in a new way, by opening up a new source of supply of materials or a new outlet for products, by reorganizing an industry and so on. Railroad construction in its earlier stages, electrical power production before the First World War, steam and steel, the motorcar, colonial ventures afford spectacular instances of a large genius which comprises innumerable humbler ones—down to such things as making a success of a particular kind of sausage or toothbrush. This kind of activity is primarily responsible for the recurrent "prosperities" that revolutionize the economic organism and the recurrent "recessions" that are due to the disequilibrating impact of the new products or methods. To undertake such new things is difficult and constitutes a distinct economic function, first, because they lie outside of the routine tasks which everybody understands and, secondly, because the environment resists in many ways that vary, according to social conditions, from simple refusal either to finance or to buy a new thing, to physical at-

tack on the man who tries to produce it. To act with confidence beyond the range of familiar beacons and to overcome that resistance requires aptitudes that are present in only a small fraction of the population and that define the entrepreneurial type as well as the entrepreneurial function. This function does not essentially consist in either inventing anything or otherwise creating the conditions which the enterprise exploits. It consists in getting things done.³

These are rather broad claims, but not nearly so broad as those when the entrepreneur or captain of industry was combined with the role of capitalist. Since the rise of the modern corporation the entrepreneur has become addicted to working his feats of entrepreneurship with "other people's money." But as late as the second-half of the nineteenth century, the capitalist-entrepreneur was extolled for his capital accumulation as well as his business acumen. It was because he stinted his own consumption that he was able to save the capital funds which by some mystic transformation became "capital," meaning tools and machines. Although in the large corporation the management has become separated from ownership, the entrepreneur is still a man of large means and a large view. He is familiar with the manipulation of sizable amounts of capital funds—albeit they are those which he has collected from the modern-day version of the capitalist who has lost suzerainty over their usage. However, there are still those who do combine both roles. One need only mention the DuPont, Mellon, and Rockefeller dynasties as cases in point in which fund accumulation and entrepreneurship are still combined, as well as a multitude of small firms, particularly the proprietorship and partnership type.

Economic history reinforces economic theory concerning the heroic scale of entrepreneurial efforts. According to the usual recounting of the rise of capitalism, there developed in Western man of late feudal times a kind of rational faculty which led to pursuit of the pecuniary main chance. Men suddenly awoke to a new "spirit of capitalism."⁴ The actual details and the time of this awakening are conflicting and vague. Some, such as Weber and Tawney, place much emphasis on the Protestant Reformation. Still others, such as Henri Pirenne, date the awakening much earlier than this, claiming that it first came among those sturdy vagabonds unloosed from the soil by a rising population in the tenth century.⁵ Others have speculated along other lines, such as the chance accumulation of a large mass of money capital.⁶

³ J. A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1943), p. 132.

⁴ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950); R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (New York, New American Library ed., 1953).

⁵ Henri Pirenne, *Medieval Cities* (New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 80 f. See especially the account of St. Godric of Finchale. See also Pirenne's *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe* (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., n.d.), pp. 46 ff.

⁶ J. A. Hobson, *The Evolution of Modern Capitalism* (New York, Charles Scribner's

There is, however, general agreement that the product of this new-found pecuniary faculty was the source from which came all economic progress. These early captains of commerce and industry are the prototypes of the latter-day entrepreneur. As a result of their foresight and new-found zest for profits, there was a steady technological advance. In fact, the usual method of historical treatment is to precede the Industrial Revolution by what is called the Commercial Revolution, clearly implying that the development of a penchant to buy cheap and sell dear was a necessary prior condition to the development of technology. But what is of primary importance to the present paper is the fact that this technological advance is looked upon in origin as the product of these early captains of industry. The present-day entrepreneur is merely carrying on in the footsteps of these legendary heroes. In seeking his own self-interest, he works "to promote an end which was no part of his intention" as though "led by an invisible hand."

Even to imply that all this economic theory and economic history incorporates a certain amount of myth and legend may seem irresponsible in an age that prides itself on its secularism. Certainly standard economic theory, particularly equilibrium theory, has all the outward appearance of being the product of scientific endeavor. It is equally certain that the economic history accounting for the origin of capitalism is the product of prodigious scholarly effort. Yet there are disturbing facts concerning both the entrepreneurial theory and history that more than hint that there is here an origin legend and a myth which have as their aim to present the entrepreneur in heroic proportions—to rationalize what is essentially a ceremonial role.

It is becoming increasingly apparent that the development of technology is a product of invention and discovery and that both of these are dependent on the prior state of the industrial arts. In a sense, this is circular, for the fact of the matter is that the advance of science and technology does depend upon the prior state of development of science and technology: invention is a process of combining previously existing technical traits in a new way. The automobile was a combination of the internal combustion engine and the buggy; Watt's steam engine, of a separate condensing chamber and the Newcomen engine; and printing was a combination of the wine press, separately cast metal types, oil-based inks, and rag paper. Thus the process of invention has been from the beginning of time. Heroes may come and go, but new technology does not arrive until the state of the industrial arts is such that innovation is possible. And this state is a cultural product, not one of heroes. All the pecuniary incentive and rational pecuniary calculation imaginable could not have achieved the automobile at the time of Leonardo. In fact, it is generally realized that the Industrial Revolution did not sud-

Sons, 1908); Maurice Dobb, *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (New York, International Publishers Co., Inc., 1947).

denly begin in 1760, but that the quickening of invention which is frequently called the Industrial Revolution had been continuous with the whole stream of technological development at least from Paleolithic times.⁷

However, the entrepreneur does play a social role, and it is this role which seemingly obscures the simple origin of technology in that previously existing. Entrepreneurs are those who turn good things to account; they are pursuers of the main chance. But in a pecuniary society the fruit of the industrial arts can be engrossed by ownership and thereby turned to private or corporate gain. Although the sum total of technology is the product of the sum total of human invention and thus is a social heritage, it has always been possible to engross some part of it and utilize it for personal aggrandizement. This has been true of all cultures.⁸

The entrepreneur sits astride a strategic pass along the stream of technological development from which position he allows or disallows the further development and application of already-available new technological possibilities. Since he is a controller of money funds, he acts as master of ceremonies at investitures and divestitures of ownership. He creates ownership equities, such as stocks and bonds, which overlay all the material embodiments in which the advance of science and technology makes itself manifest. In fact, much more than this may be overlaid by ownership claims when these are extended to such intangibles as trade names, patents, etc. Veblen long ago made all this clear:

The inventors, engineers, experts, or whatever name be applied to the comprehensive class that does the intellectual work involved in the modern machine industry, must prepare the way for the man of pecuniary affairs by making possible and putting in evidence the economic and other advantages that will follow from a prospective consolidation. . . . His [the entrepreneur's] furtherance of industry is at the second remove, and is chiefly of a negative character. In his capacity as business man he does not go creatively into the work of perfecting mechanical process and turning the means at hand to new or larger uses. That is the work of the men who have in hand the devising and oversight of mechanical processes. The men in industry must first create the mechanical possibility of such new and more efficient methods and correlations, before the business man sees the chance, makes

⁷ For discussions of the thesis mentioned in this paragraph, see William F. Ogburn, *Social Change* (New York, The Viking Press, Inc., 1952); S. C. Gilfillen, *Inventing the Ship* (Chicago, Follett Publishing Co., 1935); V. Gordon Childe, *Man Makes Himself* (New York, New American Library, 1951), and Childe's *What Happened in History* (New York, Penguin Books, 1946); Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization* (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1934). For discussion of technological innovation immediately preceding the Industrial Revolution, see John U. Nef, *The Rise of the British Coal Industry* (London, George Routland & Sons, Ltd., 1932), and S. Lilley, *Men, Machines, and History* (London, Cobbett Press, 1948).

⁸ For an example of property and ownership among a Neolithic people, see Raymond Firth, *Primitive Polynesian Economy* (London, George Routland & Sons, Ltd., 1939), Chap. VII.

the necessary business arrangements, and gives general directions that the contemplated industrial advances shall go into effect.⁹

It is conceivable that at one time the entrepreneur had also the ability to apply the industrial arts. Take the famous case of James Watt and the Soho works, for example. But as modern technology advanced and became more complex, carrying business along on to a larger scale, the two attributes of the earlier entrepreneurial role—business and industry—were separated; thus the entrepreneur came to concern himself almost exclusively with pecuniary matters. Since invention and technological development by an individual is dependent on intimate familiarity with that part of the industrial arts in which the advance is to take place, the latter-day entrepreneur has been barred from any abilities along these lines because of technological inadequacy. Therefore he not only does not develop the industrial arts but he is devoid of any ability to do so.

Nevertheless, the myth lingers on. To the present day the entrepreneur is looked upon as a "captain of industry." This goes as well for the corporate manager in the large corporation in which there has been a clear separation of ownership from control. Thus, during the Second World War, the feats of industrial output, by conglomerations of technology and instrumental organization, were often attributed to the personal perspicacity of the corporate head—usually head of the business ledgerdomain only. In a society in which pecuniary transactions, the conglomeration of money capital, the creation of stocks and bonds, and the determination of ownership, with all of the concomitant rights pertaining thereto must precede any large technological undertaking, it is easy to attribute a causal role to the pecuniary manipulation and to the manipulator of that pecuniary activity—the entrepreneur. Thus, to his activity is attributed all economic progress. Nevertheless, the facts are obdurate. Technological advance is a product of the continuous stream of technological development. Ownership and coercive control are the products of pecuniary activity. As Veblen so frequently pointed out, the latter endeavor may even be at the expense of the former if a profit can be enhanced by suppressing the advance of technology.

In other words, the entrepreneur or present-day corporate manager is a permissive, but not a creative, agent. Exercising pecuniary control, he simulates, by his concomitant pecuniary activity, technological endeavor, the *sine qua non* of effective production. In one sense he is analogous to the magician of the Trobriand society, through whose ceremonial performance ownership is invested and success is assured.¹⁰

⁹ Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of Business Enterprise* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904), Chap. III, pp. 36 f.

¹⁰ Bronislaw Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1922), Chap. V.

At least since the revelations of Veblen, all these facts concerning the ceremonial role of the entrepreneur have been apparent. Yet the myth persists without too much question. One has but to examine the popular versions of this belief as expounded in the public press to perceive its widespread acceptance. In fact, this popular version gives a clue toward understanding the role that the academic version plays. Despite its formidable-looking mathematical notations and seemingly abstract matter-of-fact presentation, the part of economic theory concerning the entrepreneur appears to be a scholarly or sacred version of a popular folk myth. All societies at all times have had their rites and their myths which explain these rites. Pecuniary rites concern the present-day acquisition and removal of status. The entrepreneurial myth purports to explain why it is so and how it all came to be.

Capitalism is differentiated from other modes of economic organization as a system of status and distribution by status. It is a system of social organization in which the manipulators of capital play the primary role. The whole process of production is explained in dramatic terms, with social-status groups, land, labor, and capital being treated as productive factors. But the first of these is capital, the directive and coercive agent in the actual system of production. It is also the agent that has claim to the first fruits through a scheme of distribution over which it also has primary control. The sentiment and belief of the community reinforces this whole social structure.

In a sense every market transaction is a rite. The seller is divested of ownership of goods and is invested with ownership of money. The buyer is divested of ownership of money and invested with the ownership of goods. In each case, certain duties, the rights of the other party, are complied with. The transaction is hedged in and rigidly prescribed by a complex of mores. Any violation of these or failure to comply with them may be cause for declaring the transaction illegal or lacking in authenticity. Much time is spent in the courts of law determining whether one party to a transaction has been damaged by the failure of the party of the second part to comply with the prescribed ritual. In this process of trading, traders, or entrepreneurs, are able to enhance their holdings of money and property. By taking full advantage of some new technological concatenation, they are able to secure a differential advantage and a differential gain. Any new advance in the technology of the culture will work itself out in the market place by giving an advantage to the group that is able to acquire ownership and control over that new technology.

Both the theory of the present-day role of the entrepreneur and the conjectural history of the entrepreneur are firmly held to by a community that is by sentiment committed to such belief. This is the myth by which the mores-status complex of capitalist society is justified. To challenge the belief, to ask

questions about it, to probe, is, if not dangerous heresy, at least a serious impertinence. As George C. Homans stated:

That the distribution of wealth is never described as it really is, but only as it is conceived to be according to a traditional mythology is as much true of our own times as it was of the Middle Ages, though most of us, very properly, will be irritated if we are asked to admit this fact. The only myths are the myths of other people.¹¹

In Western capitalism, the entrepreneur is a cultural hero; in paying deference to him we are presumably doing nothing more than recognizing that he is the prototype of the fabulous capitalist ancestors who first began to calculate rationally (pecuniarily) and thereby set us on the road of modern science and technology. Under the circumstances it is felt to be only right and good that we contribute a large portion of the usufruct of this technological heritage to their present-day counterparts. Supposedly from their efforts alone comes all progress. Likewise these latter-day captains of industry should put in public view the fruits of their extraordinary cunning so that all may then enjoy them, if not directly, at least vicariously.¹²

The myth of the entrepreneur assures us that buying and selling is of great social significance. By virtue of pecuniary accumulation, not only are fortunes acquired, but society is advanced. Since fortunes are made by taking advantage of some differential gain made possible by some new advance in the industrial arts, it is simple enough to attribute to fortune-making the cause of the technological advance. That is, since all new embodiments of scientific and technological advance must be owned, rites investing ownership are performed prior to use and production. Thus it is logically an easy step to assume that the rite, the pecuniary transaction itself, is the cause of the advance. The entrepreneur, being the master of pecuniary ceremonies, is held to be the catalytic agent. In this way a society in which all economic linkage is symbolized by pecuniary obligations is provided with a rationale and a cultural hero.

¹¹ *English Villagers of the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1941), p. 340.

¹² Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York, New American Library ed., 1953), Chap. I.

Book Reviews

Edited by

H. MALCOLM MACDONALD

T. B. MASTON: *Christianity and World Issues*. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1957. 374 pages. \$5.00.

Maston has written an introductory text in Christian social ethics for seminaries and college departments of religion. To apply the Christian social ethic to "major issues or problems of the contemporary world" is the objective of his book.

Utilizing data and selected theoretical constructs of the social sciences, sociology in particular, he defines major issues relating to the family, economic order, communism, Church and State, and war and peace. He then evaluates these problems from the viewpoint of an eclectic Protestant social ethic having its major orientation in the free-church tradition.

Apart from the social teachings of the ecumenical movement, which are ignored because of a sectarian bias, the author is entirely at home in the field of Protestant ethics. Roman Catholic insights are effectively utilized and reported in the chapters on communism and Church and State. A bias against Rome, however, makes for an occasional irresponsible misrepresentation. For example, in discussing the relationship between means and ends, Maston warns against the danger "common to many Protestants . . ." of "justifying methods that admittedly do not measure up to

Christian standards." Such methods he finds ". . . closely akin to the Jesuit and communistic view that the end justifies the means, any sort of means." This bracketing of Jesuitic casuistry and Communistic relativism evinces an ignorance of Roman Catholic moral theology—at best an oversimplification; at worst, a smear tactic unworthy of a Christian moralist. This slip, however, is by no means representative of the tenor of a book which on the whole demonstrates a remarkably disciplined objectivity in presenting not only conflicting secular and Christian viewpoints but also in elaborating diverse Christian interpretations.

Since the application of the Christian ethic to world issues presupposes a strategy of relating the church to the world, this problem is discussed in an introductory chapter, "The Church and the World." The author's theology of the church is vague and noncommittal. He does not say whether the church is *essentially* a local body or the visible body of Christ on earth. He does emphasize that it is both human and divine and interprets its history from a cycle point of view. By this he means "that organized Christianity tends to go through a regular cycle in its relation to the world. There is a period of withdrawal for revival and renewal, followed by a gradual adaptation to the world, which means an infiltration by

the world. The world so completely permeates and dominates the church that another period of withdrawal from the world for renewal is necessary." Optimistically viewing this process he writes: "... the inner heart or nucleus which comes from original Christianity is never lost. It is this inner core, which has lived through the centuries, that gives to the Christian movement its remarkable power of survival and renewal."

Apart from references to New Testament Christianity, this "inner core" of the church is not systematically defined. Rather, throughout the book sociological concepts of the church, such as the "Christian movement" and "organized Christianity," are used as operational definitions and to some extent as a substitute for a precise theological definition of the church.

On the other hand, the discussion relating the church to the world is precise. After reviewing the various classical relations of the church to the world—withdrawal, identification, assimilation and the transformation of culture—the author comes out roundly for the transformation or conversion of the world. In applying this strategy to world issues, he emphasizes Christian love, self-denial and sacrifice, vocational responsibility of the laity, and the periodic renewal of the spiritual life of the church. Occasional references are made to law, but the emphasis is axiological (Christian ideals), not deontological.

In utilizing the social sciences, the emphasis is on the social-problem approach. The discussion of the world crisis, however, is informed by theoretical concepts borrowed from Pitirim Sorokin and Arnold J. Toynbee, and a major theoretical concept underlying

the discussion of the family is Burgess and Locke's debatable thesis that the family in transition from institution to companionship is attaining a new level of stability. Maston makes little use, if any, of theoretical value-constructs, most relevant to Christian social ethics, formulated by contemporary sociologists like Howard Becker, William L. Kolb, Robin M. Williams, Jr., and Talcott Parsons.

In using the social-problem approach and ignoring value constructs of theoretical sociology, a nominalistic understanding of social institutions evident throughout the book is underscored. Consequently Maston's Christian answers to world issues are not informed by a normative and definable concept of a Christian society, his discussion of the kingdom of God notwithstanding.

In the light of the complexity of the problems he discusses, one can understand the reluctance of a Christian moralist to draw the blueprints for a Christian order in detail. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, ethics, as Aristotle would remind us, is a *practical* discipline. The Christian moralist ought not to remain in the dark cellar of existential despair, where positive pronouncements and programs of action are paralyzed by an almost sadistic dialectical negation which, in trying to balance "either/or" says "never." To do so is to equivocate, as does Maston in discussing the scandal of class churches. This is not to suggest that Protestants should set forth with the dogmatic certainty of Roman Catholics the minute details of a Christian society, but it is to say that the basic outlines of Christian society must be set forth and that sermonic exhortations to live by ambiguously-defined Christian ideals will not rally the intellect, will, and loyalties of humanity

for the march across the wastelands to the city of God.

That Maston does not make explicit the concept of a Christian society as a cardinal norm for his evaluation of world issues is not a criticism of his competency in, and devotion to, the field of Christian ethics. Rather it is to be attributed to the fact that Protestant social ethics has yet to recover from the disillusionment that followed the collapse of the Social Gospel. Although by far superior to recent texts in Christian social ethics, e.g., Albert Terrill Rasmussen's *Christian Social Ethics* and Georgia Harkness' *Christian Ethics, Christianity and World Issues*, it does, like these books, point up the contemporary impasse of Protestant social ethics. Maston, however, breaks no new ground in the field, nor does he set directions for Protestantism to recover a normative concept of a Christian society.

*The Reverend Das Kelley Barnett
Episcopal Theological Seminary
of the Southwest*

EDWARD MCWHINNEY: *Judicial Review in the English-Speaking World*. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1956. 201 pages. \$8.50.

It is a commonplace that the sovereign omniscience of Parliament bars the British courts from reviewing legislation with a view to determining its validity. But "indirect judicial review" is, on McWhinney's showing, nevertheless exercised by British courts, and with considerable effect. By this he means that the court, in applying a statute, must determine its meaning and may in effect say that the legislature, in the statute under

scrutiny, has not exercised the power in question or that it has intended by the statute something less than is claimed by the parties to the controversy. This more limited kind of judicial review clearly has a decided effect on the scope and meaning of statutes and places the judiciary in a position to wield a significant influence on policy. The technique is not, of course, restricted to countries in which the courts are barred from holding a parliamentary act to be *ultra vires*; it is extensively used in Canada, America, and elsewhere as well.

Using the term in both these meanings, then, the author seeks to analyze and evaluate the impact of judicial review on the constitutions and laws of the principal English-speaking nations, namely, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Eire, and the new Asian dominions. His book is careful, sound, and thoughtful; it is always vigorous and interesting; in places it is brilliant.

His analysis inevitably confronts the difficulty that courts in different countries (and even in the same country at different times) do not represent or seek to accomplish the same things; they move from different principles and they employ differing techniques. Thus his attention is mainly devoted to the criteria used by judges in arriving at their interpretations and decisions. He finds here two principal schools of thought: (1) the legal (or judicial) activists, who are willing to look behind the wording of the statutes to consult the intention of the framers, the historical background of statute and constitution, and the sociological implications of the alternatives, and (2) the legal positivists, who would restrict the court to an examination of statute and

constitution, barring all consideration of background, implications, or supplementary opinions.

This controversy he sees in virtually every country he examines, and indeed he argues that, though some judiciaries are supposed to be committed to one or the other technique, most have actually followed both on occasion. He finds activism, for example, even in many decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which, perhaps more than any other "court," has insisted on the strict interpretation that accompanies legal positivism.

The author is personally willing to reject positivism as a crippling restriction on creative lawmaking. He doubts, moreover, that pure positivism is possible and suggests that judges who strive for it are most likely to allow their judgments to be determined by "inarticulate major premises," uninformed by any investigation of the facts and implications surrounding the problems with which they deal. If there is a thesis in his book, it is that courts should strive consciously for a greater, more dynamic, and more creative role in policy-making. It is a thesis unlikely to be well received, for in the English-speaking world we like to maintain the fiction that our courts are strictly courts of law. But McWhinney is as much interested in policy formation and legal philosophy as he is in public law or jurisprudence (which is not surprising in an Australian who taught four years in the Yale Law School before going to the University of Toronto). Indeed his discussion sometimes ranges so broadly that one is led to question its relevancy, as, for example, with his lengthy discussion of the electoral mandate in Britain as a manifestation of what he calls "political sovereignty,"

which in turn he conceives as a limitation on the "legal" sovereignty of Parliament.

This is by no means a systematic treatise; it is, rather, a collection of essays on aspects of judicial review in various English-speaking countries. One suspects that it was originally written as a series of articles rather than as a book. The chapter on Australia is devoted largely to the controversy over positivism, that on South Africa to race relations, and that on Eire to the reflection of Catholic doctrine in the constitutional development. But the thread that ties it all together is the concern with the criteria of judicial decision and the examination of the impact of judicial review on policy and constitution. The argument itself is clear enough, although it would doubtless have been clearer still if the style of expression were less turgid and laborious. There are excellent bibliographical footnotes but no systematic bibliography (which may help explain the omission of any reference to such a book as Fred Cahill's *Judicial Legislation*). Finally, the index is far less than adequate.

But these are small weaknesses in an excellent book. McWhinney is to be congratulated on a real comparative analysis of a highly significant governmental process; his portrayal of the similarities and differences in the system of judicial review in these several countries is competent and stimulating. One is left now to wonder whether it would not be profitable to extend the scope of the study beyond the English-speaking world, for, as David Deener has shown, the principle of judicial review has many other forms and is by no means confined to these areas.

William S. Livingston
University of Texas

LOUIS WINNICK: *American Housing and Its Use: The Demand for Shelter Space* (for the Social Science Research Council in Co-operation with the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census). New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957. 143 pages. \$5.50.

A volume in the Census Monograph Series, this study is an economic analysis of the utilization of American housing. The basic data are derived from published census materials, particularly the 1950 Census of Housing. Rooms rather than dwelling units are taken as a point of departure in the measurement of housing space, and the principal gauge of utilization employed is the persons-per-room ratio, referred to throughout as the PPR ratio.

The analysis is tightly and simply organized. Chapter 1 introduces the subject and summarizes the findings. Various measures of housing space are discussed in Chapter 2, and the substantive analysis gets under way in Chapter 3 with a consideration of the housing utilization patterns of different income-groups. Chapter 4 is devoted to the relationship between the size of the household and PPR ratios, whereas Chapter 5 is concerned with the influence of the cost of housing (rent and value) upon utilization. Chapter 6 deals with the factors of location and race in the use of housing space, and Chapter 7 concentrates upon the trend toward smaller housing-units. In the concluding chapter the changing size and composition of the household in relation to space requirements are explored. Included in the Appendix is much material of interest to technical readers, and some—as the statement on census errors in reporting the number

of rooms—which nontechnicians will appreciate.

Our knowledge of how we use our housing space is increased substantially by the numerous significant findings of this analysis, only a few examples of which can be cited here and these without elaboration or discussion: "The long-run improvement in space standards has been modest, certainly less than the advance of other living standards." "... household size emerges as a strategic determinant of the rate of utilization at any particular time, and changes in household size seem to be the key to understanding historical changes in the rate of utilization." "The distribution of housing space in 1950 was remarkably even, far more so than the distribution of income and probably more equal than is the case of any other major economic asset."

This study brings a new aspect of housing utilization under the analytical scrutiny of the economist. Heretofore, the economist has limited his efforts in this general field primarily to a consideration of vacancies and the possible distorting effects of rent control. By and large the matter of studying space utilization has been left to the sociologist and the public-health official. Both of these last-named specialists, as well as other social scientists, will welcome this major contribution to our understanding of the utilization of American housing.

Homer L. Hitt
Louisiana State University

EMIL LENGYEL: *Egypt's Role in World Affairs*. Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1957. 147 pages. \$2.50.

Egypt's Role in World Affairs begins

geopolitically: "Great Powers have been irresistibly drawn to the banks of the Nile. Those that took root blossomed forth as world powers, while those that failed to imbed their roots in the verdant delta of the Nile were destined to perish." Reading this, Mr. Churchill will not die peacefully. The rest of the book purports to contribute to a better understanding of the critical situation in the Middle East. Although written historically, it is not scholarly, being in a Sinbad-the-Sailor vein; many statements either are erroneous or highly debatable; much information is slanted to reflect discredit upon Egypt's people and leaders.

The book is, however, replete with interesting shots of local color, some of which this reviewer himself missed. Thus we learn that Farouk was a habitué of the "super-sumptuous Gezireh Sporting Club." We did not recognize it as such while playing tennis there. When Naguib went among the people, "had he not been well protected, he would have been torn to shreds." Within inches of him on some of these occasions, we failed to recognize our danger. We are told, inferentially, that former Nazi leaders helped prepare the Naguib-Nasser coup. We had heard some Americans helped it along, too.

The British first occupied Egypt because "in the very streets of Cairo and Alexandria foreigners were slaughtered." American Consul-General Farman in his *Betrayal of Egypt* gives a far different account.

Although the Aswan and Suez affairs are recounted, it is unfortunate that the real Middle-Eastern problems and realistic solutions are slighted. True, Lengyel thinks a basic question is the Arab-Israeli conflict, but he naïvely suggests

that we need to learn the real reason why Israel is hated by the Arab governments. He mentions the Arab refugee problem but, apparently never having heard of events like Deir Yasin, thinks the Arabs simply ran away. His answer is to resettle them in Syria and Iraq because he thinks, contrary to Israel's Defense Minister, that Israel is dangerously close to overpopulation.

His real solutions seem to be more technical aid through the U.N. and a *pax Americana*. This presumably will keep 80,000,000 Arabs happy. It won't.

John Paul Duncan
University of Oklahoma

MARVIN HARRIS: *Town and Country in Brazil*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1956. 302 pages. \$4.50.

This monograph focuses upon a rural town and the surrounding villages in the mountainous region of central Bahia. In analyzing material acquired from a one-year residence in that region, the author adheres to the pattern of ethnological writings known as "community studies." As such, his work supplements previously published studies on Brazilian communities written by Charles Wagley, Donald Pierson, and Emilio Willems. It also is the first of a series of doctoral dissertations to be published which were written at Columbia University under the guidance of Wagley. Three other as yet unpublished works resulting from research in the state of Bahia analyze community life in the Recôncavo, in the *sertão*, and in the cacao areas.

Ever since Robert Redfield pioneered the analysis of rural Latin-American communities, many cultural anthropologists have selected remote and iso-

lated settlements for their own study. This work is no exception. Minas Velhas, the community chosen by Harris, is a two-to-five-day journey from Salvador, Bahia. The closest railroad is fifty miles away. Trucks and horses are the only links with larger settlements. The author notes the effects of this isolation upon economics and politics. However, it is the sociological factors—those concerned with class and race differences, folk beliefs, and family life—where the effects of this isolation are most pronounced. These are the subjects which provide the substance of the author's discourse.

Exhibiting a penetrating insight, Harris outlines the problems manifest in the Brazilian cultural mosaic. The heterogeneity present in the racial situation, the predominance of individualism, and the secularization of community life provide strong contrasts generally with early North American colonization and settlement. Couple these conditions with climatic and physiographic adversities around Minas Velhas and in other parts of Brazil and one has the basis for the underdeveloped character of that country's economy.

Carl L. Donald
University of Texas

ROBERT BIERSTEDT: *The Social Order: An Introduction to Sociology*. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1957. 577 pages. \$6.00.

Intended as an introduction to systematic sociology, this textbook is exceedingly well written, a quality that to this reviewer is its refreshing uniqueness and the merit which deserves emphatic mention. Neither in emphasis

nor approach, however, is it a statement of a system of sociology much different from the varieties found in most other beginning textbooks.

The sixteen chapters are divided into six logical parts: in addition to the introductory chapter, there are two chapters dealing with the geographical and biological conditions of human society, two on culture, four on social organization, six on social differentiation, and one on social change. Included in the section on social differentiation is a chapter titled "Women and Men," an oddity in the contemporary introductory text, but a welcome one. A special consideration of cultural patterns affecting and derived from the biological conditions of maleness and femaleness will probably become a staple in texts of the future. The author has done a fine job with this tricky subject, and makes a good case for its inclusion in a systematic sociology, though there may be some objection to his stress upon the differing physiological capacities of men and women and a corresponding de-emphasis of trends which have blurred and confused the division of labor because of sex.

My guess is that this is not the sort of text that claims the bulk of introductory adoptions these days. It has a minimum of charts and tables and no pictures. Nor are there references, problems, guides to study, etc. at the end of each chapter. It is all text, a fact that may be frightening to some college students; perhaps this consideration has a marginal influence upon instructors' preferences, though illustrations in texts usually are not particularly valuable for interpreting basic concepts and principles.

But the central question likely to

arise in connection with the thought of adopting the book is this: Shouldn't the introductory text in sociology attempt to use and cite a sampling of the vast body of empirical research which has been presented in the professional sociological journals and elsewhere? The author in this case is prone to call upon novelists, *New York Times* articles, and cultural anthropologists for authority or data in support of his arguments, while the recent and pertinent research of sociologists is almost completely neglected. He does not vigorously concern himself with the processes by which validated knowledge is obtained. Such a neglect can be regarded as a serious shortcoming in this otherwise sound text. After saying this, I should add that in this book there are numerous quotations, sometimes lengthy, from a variety of sources. And yet with all its diversity it reflects throughout the steady grip and enjoyable style of an author rooted firmly in the main trends of general sociology.

Leonard G. Benson
North Texas State College

CLARK E. VINCENT (ed.): *Readings in Marriage Counseling*. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1957. 500 pages. \$4.00.

This volume is a selection of fifty-two readings covering basic methods, principles, techniques, and case histories in marriage counseling. The selections show the varied origins, different theories, trends, and widespread application of present-day marriage counseling.

The editor's purpose is "to serve the needs of those who are now either full-time or part-time marriage coun-

selors . . . [and] those who look forward to marriage counseling as an adjunct to another profession." Authors of the selections include ministers, educators, psychiatrists, psychologists, physicians, sociologists, social workers, and professional counselors. The readings are organized into seven general topics: "Marriage Counseling as an Emerging and Interdisciplinary Profession," "Premarital Counseling," "Definitions, Methods, and Principles in Marriage Counseling," "Marriage Counseling with Individuals, Couples, and Groups," "Theories of Personality Formation and Change Applicable to Marriage Counseling," "Research in Marriage Counseling," and "Questions Related to Marriage Counseling as an Emerging Profession." Vincent's introductions to each part, and his succinct comments preceding each, will be of considerable aid to the reader. He discusses the possible uses to be made of the specific selection, points out relationships among the various articles, and suggests bases for their evaluation. In these respects the editor has tied the selections together quite well, employing such means as referring his case materials to various theories and principles discussed in earlier readings.

The variety of viewpoints brought out in the first five parts will probably leave the reader feeling that much needs to be done in this profession in the way of drawing together and integrating prevailing ideas about the functions and techniques in marriage counseling, and relating these to a body of principles based upon sound theory. Vincent's treatment of this and related problems (in Part VI, "Research in Marriage Counseling") is especially recommended to the prac-

titioner who is inclined to devote all his energies "to the pressing needs" of the client.

The value of the volume would have been enhanced had the editor included more selections on the various "culture contexts" within which specific problems in marriage relations arise in present-day American society. He has seen fit to include only one such selection.

The book has considerable merit, however. It brings together under one cover many fine selections which will be of interest and value to anyone concerned with problems in marriage relations, whether practitioner or academician.

Everett D. Dyer
University of Houston

JOHN A. HOWARD: *Marketing Management, Analysis and Decision*. Homewood, Ill., Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1957. 429 pages. \$6.00.

This book is a welcome addition to the growing body of literature concerned with marketing management rather than with the narrower concept of sales management. It is oriented around the activities performed by the company's chief marketing executive, who is seen as responsible for two functions: the solution of marketing problems, and the control of marketing operations. Howard's position is that problems can be solved either by the application of qualitative criteria to various marketing alternatives or by the use of marginal analysis. Most of the book deals with problem-solving, and, by intention, the analysis of quantitative data necessary for control of operations is minimized.

Howard has organized his material carefully. In the Introduction he discusses the nature of marketing management and the significance of profit as the criterion for making marketing decisions. Chapter II, "Profit and Marketing Strategy," sets the stage for everything that follows. It is particularly well written and is the type of chapter all too often missing from other texts.

In Part II it is pointed out that the marketing executive must accept the particular social, political, and economic environment that exists. This means that all decisions must be made within a framework which cannot be controlled by the marketing manager. Each element of this framework—competition, demand, cost, distribution structure, and the law—is analyzed in a chapter, with a single exception: three chapters relating to demand are presented: "Economic Theory of Demand," "Consumer Behavior," and "Sales Forecasting."

Part III is concerned with the alternatives at the command of the marketing manager, through whose decisions are controlled such things as product variation, marketing channels, price, advertising, personal selling, and the location of the company's operations.

Throughout, Howard consistently maintains that the essence of marketing management is the creative adaptation by a company to its changing environment, since that framework is constantly changing. As the marketing manager has no control over this, he responds by choosing marketing strategy designed to maximize long-term expected profit.

Howard has written a scholarly book. All the better-known sources in

the field have been used, and the book is well documented. An attempt has been made to incorporate recent developments in the behavioral sciences, mainly economics, psychology, and sociology. In Chapter V, for example, an interesting discussion of consumer behavior, based largely on sociology and sociopsychological research, is presented. While the attempt to integrate related disciplines with marketing management is to be commended, economics is still the basis of most of the analysis.

Teachers who would like to see a closer relation between marketing management and economic theory should be pleased with this book. It makes liberal use of charts, figures, and graphs. The "standard" terminology of economics is used throughout. "Cost Analysis," for example, employs the usual cost curves found in the beginning course in economics and attempts the transition to managerial decisions with regard to marketing. "Promotion Decisions" develops a highly theoretical approach to the ideal method of allocation of promotional effort. An appendix on this same topic is included for those who are mathematically inclined.

The author states that his book is "intended to be used as a text for advanced undergraduate marketing courses, the introductory graduate marketing course, and executive development programs." He also suggests that it be supplemented by cases or additional descriptive material. The reviewer agrees with him on both counts. Certainly teachers of these courses owe it to themselves to examine the book. Howard has succeeded in putting more academic substance into his book on marketing man-

agement than most of those now on the market.

Donald L. Shawver
University of Missouri

FLOYD HUNTER, RUTH C. SCHAFER, and CECIL G. SHEPS: *Community Organization: Action and Inaction*. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1956. 268 pages. \$5.00.

This is a report of an interdisciplinary study centered on Salem, Massachusetts. The research was made possible by a grant from the Health Information Foundation of New York to the Institute for Research in Social Science, of the University of North Carolina. The objective was "to locate a community in which people were active in relation to health needs and to observe systematically and record the processes by which decisions were reached," plans made, and programs initiated and carried out. It is "a study of a self-study."

Approximately half the book is devoted to the presentation of an interesting and adequate exposition of the history of Salem, the power structure of the community, public-health services, the physician and his community relations, and the general pattern of action of three types of groups: industrial-commercial, political, and civic. There follow chapters concerned with the organization and work of the self-study committee and its subsequent action. Two chapters of analysis and comment conclude the report.

The variety of material contained in this work, as well as the general nature of the study itself, will be of interest, I should think, to many social

scientists. For example, some will find the research plan of value to them in similar undertakings; others will be interested in the discussion of power structures in the community and the decision-making process; and still others will be interested in the frank discussion of the problem of hypotheses in relation to community organization.

On first reading, my impression of the conclusion to this study was not favorable. It seemed to me that a considerable sum of money and a great amount of work by able researchers and scholars had resulted in very little. This impression, I now believe, is not a correct one. The research team has been honest in its treatment of material and the social scientist is indebted to them for it. As I view it, therefore, we have here a study report containing a variety of insights and suggestions of value to those interested in the many facets of community organization and process.

Wilfred D. Webb
University of Texas

WILHELM HENNIS: *Meinungsforschung und Repräsentative Demokratie*. Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1957. 65 pages. \$1.00.

German politicians, as a result of the increasing centralization and deideologization of German political parties and also the increasingly indirect interest in political life in Germany, are turning more and more to public-opinion polls as a necessary device of their trade. In fact, many Germans, eschewing direct participation in the political process, consider them indispensable to the proper functioning of democratic

institutions. At the most recent Social Democratic party national convention, the delegates, for the first time in many a year, held a secret session at which they heard an analysis of the public-opinion polls during the past two years.

The chief merit of Hennis' little book is that it places in proper perspective the polls' limitations as a support for the democratic process. Even if the accuracy of the polls is granted, politicians are, and ought to be, on their own when it comes to making political decisions, though they may draw some profit from polling surveys. This truism is particularly apparent in countries such as Germany, where the limits of political polls are stronger than elsewhere, since "participation in the political life takes place in a subsidiary way, through social activities pertaining to other societal, not primarily political, spheres" as noted in a UNESCO-sponsored study on modern German society. This is also borne out by the pollsters themselves: in a recent poll, only 7 per cent of the adult population expressed interest in politics; 50 per cent, "disinterest." Among young people, 39 per cent expressed no opinion on Nazism; 35 per cent found nothing bad about it.

The notion, prevalent in certain German circles today, that polls can play the role of a foolproof transmission belt between the will of the people and political action is effectively dispelled by Hennis. This does not, however, force one to underwrite his further implication that we return to a nineteenth-century era, where, while retaining representative institutions, all the decisions will be made by informed

rational leadership supported by "a public opinion of the informed."

Pollsters do, in fact, perform some valuable services. The main value for election forecasts is less in their predictive value than in the opportunity offered to political scientists for studying the importance of political issues and campaign devices, and for providing evidence in support of this or that thesis about what determines voters' reactions. This service is extremely well utilized by members of the Berlin Institute of Political Science in their recently-published exhaustive analysis of the 1953 elections. While the election polls used here supply at best only a short-term forecast of general trends, they unquestionably also provide a great deal of pertinent data illuminating the basis of electoral support of the various parties and the relative importance of pressing political issues.

All this need not imply that the German public lacks ideas, vague and general though they may be, about how current issues ought to be resolved. In fact, such ideas are expressed, if somewhat primitively, through the choice of candidates, or more accurately, the choice of parties.

The relative absence of the public in political life (such as its lack of control in the nominating process) leads the parties to look for improvement in the situation through having specific issues submitted to the public by way of unofficial polls. This is considered a counterweight to the domination of the German party system by interest groups which often provide its financial and organizational basis but cannot assume a role in the parties' contests for voters, which, in the twentieth century, is after all their primary function. The importance of the Hennis

book is that it points up the failure of the polls as a result of the public's lack of experience and interest and its failure to relate the issues to individual patterns of political preferences. It thus provides a valuable tool for discouraging such pipe dreams among German political thinkers. The solution is not more polls but more direct participation at the grass-roots level in Germany in political party action. This can and ought to be encouraged by suitable reforms in the political party system, such as encouraging internal democracy in the parties and moving away from proportional representation schemes.

It ought to be added that these problems are not exclusively German. They are, like the over-all aspects of present-day German political and social institutions, duplicated in every industrialized country in the world. As a connoisseur of the German political scene recently wrote: "For better or for worse, the Federal Republic has effectively joined the Western community and thus is plagued, by and large, by the same problems that plague all of us."

Charles R. Foster
Washington, D.C.

JOHN C. BOLLEN: *Special District Governments in the United States*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1957. 280 pages. \$4.50.

Since that pioneering work of William Anderson's, *The Units of Government in the United States*, was first published in 1934, considerable material dealing with special districts has made its appearance, but it has ranged widely in value and availability. More

often than not, the works have been descriptive and statistical rather than analytical—for example, two publications of the United States Bureau of the Census, *Local Government Structure in the United States* and *Governments in the United States*. Other works have been of a more popular nature, usually stressing the more glaring defects of special districts (often from the viewpoint of a taxpayers league), and, while not without value, failed to look at the problem as a whole in a strictly objective manner.

Now Bollen has given us the first full-length, scholarly treatment of that vastly important and rapidly growing type of governmental unit, the special district, which provides our cities, urban fringes, metropolitan areas, and rural regions with so many services. Usually created to supply a single service—varying from education and roads to housing and water—these special districts are independent governments, not merely parts of other governmental units. Yet with the exception of the school district, there is a widespread lack of knowledge and understanding of these special districts. As the author puts it, the special district now constitutes the “new dark continent of American politics.”

Bollen gives us several reasons for the tremendous importance of special districts, not the least of which is their number. Of the approximately 116,000 governmental units in the United States, some two-thirds, or 79,000, are special districts. They are also quite widespread geographically. These two characteristics—their number and extent—are shown in the fact that in thirty-five states special districts are more numerous than any other class of government.

Another reason given for their importance is that, unlike other governmental units in the United States, special districts are in a state of flux. From 1942 to 1952 the number of special districts declined by about one-third. Actually, however, there were two countermovements. While the school district was decreasing by about 38 per cent, the nonschool district was increasing by almost 50 per cent. The number of school districts has been decreasing faster and the number of nonschool districts increasing faster (both in numbers and varieties) than any other type of governmental unit.

This development has been accompanied by a growth in expenditures, and the author tells us that now the expenditures of special districts exceed those of counties, towns, and townships combined and are rapidly approaching those of cities. Their total indebtedness is more than that of all the forty-eight state governments combined.

Bollen examines the causes of the development and growth of the special district, and, though he finds no all-inclusive cause, the major factor revolves around the general deficiencies of the regular local governments.

The real heart of the book, which will be of more interest to the specialist than the layman, is a study of the methods of formation and the operation of the different types of special districts, with examples drawn from all parts of the United States. Relationships between special districts and the state governments, sources of funds, and methods of control and administration are given consideration. This reviewer, having once spent the better part of a year on a study of special districts in only one state, was over-

whelmed by the thought of the amount of research this section must have entailed.

The special district is criticized on several counts—especially the methods of selecting many government boards (which remove these districts from effective popular control) and the governmental jungle resulting from the overlapping of so many units. The author argues that the expanding use of special districts has also been detrimental to general local governments in that it has reduced their effectiveness through by-passing them or stripping them of particular functions.

Since the author maintains that the governmental system of the United States should be accountable, understandable, and effective, he advocates a series of changes which would substantially lessen the expanding district problem. Viewing the problem realistically, he is convinced that the drastic solutions advocated by some earlier students of the problem are completely impractical. We have special districts and probably always will have. Yet certain things appear to be within the realm of the possible.

Area reorganization of school districts has been under way for some time and should be continued and accelerated. The main recommendation concerning nonschool districts is that many of them should be absorbed by other types of governments. Many of the remaining single-purpose districts should be brought into multipurpose ones.

A number of less important suggestions are made, including increased state supervision, broadened county-government control over smaller districts, and revised state laws so that there will be greater uniformity in the

basic characteristics and procedures of special districts. But, as the author concludes, the real key to special-district reform lies with the state legislatures that bear the responsibility for an adequate system of local government.

This book (it has an excellent bibliography) is important in the field of American government and our thanks are due the author for making his "new dark continent of American politics" considerably less dark.

Dick Smith
Tarleton State College

ROBERT ENDICOTT OSGOOD: *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957. 315 pages. \$5.00.

Osgood here challenges the American postwar strategy of "nuclear retaliation." He insists that this position may force the United States to choose between "total war, non-resistance, or ineffective resistance" when confronted with Communist aggression against targets whose importance is not commensurate with the risks involved in an atomic holocaust. His thesis is that "the only rational course is to develop a strategy of limiting warfare and fighting limited wars successfully. Such a strategy is within America's material and spiritual resources, but it demands revision of the country's traditional approach to war and to the use of military power."

The author analyzes the moral, theoretical, and practical dimensions of limited war, appraises the evolution of American strategy since the Second World War, and outlines a strategy of limited war. His key concept is the realist "principle of political primacy,"

which insists that "military power should be subordinate to national policy, and that the only legitimate purpose of military force is to serve the nation's political objectives." From this principle the justification for limited war at every dimension flows, and upon its acceptance depends the development of a strategy of limited war.

The concept of limited war is most relevant in the present-day context of international politics. Osgood argues that both logic and experience demonstrate its feasibility and even necessity. The deep conflict of aims and interests which divides the United States and the Soviet Union, coupled with the capacity for mutual destruction, makes limited war almost inevitable and total war improbable. Moreover, postwar experience demonstrates the correctness of this assessment. The American policy of "containment," viewed realistically, postulates resistance to aggression at local levels by limited means, and its implementation has involved the United States in limited engagements in the Greek Civil War, the Berlin Blockade, and the Korean War. Despite the logic of theory and experience, however, American policy-makers continue to be preoccupied with total warfare; they reject or ignore the practical requirements of containment; and, when circumstances have necessitated limited war, their responses have been *ad hoc* rather than the product of calculated policy. Thus, the author's task is ultimately one of persuasion. In the final chapter, he presents the general principles of a strategy of limited war "capable of achieving national security objectives under contemporary military and political conditions."

This book is of significant value in

many respects. Operating without the detailed technological knowledge available only to the policy-maker, Osgood has utilized the tools of logical and historical analysis to postulate cogent principles to guide the statesman in his efforts to formulate and execute effective military strategy. In so doing, the author has demonstrated one level at which the scholar and statesman can profitably meet. He offers no panaceas, but neither does he despair. He believes that if American policy-makers and the American people face the realities of contemporary international politics, reason and the primacy of will can combine to enable man to escape the destructive potentialities of the nuclear age.

Robert Franklin Smith
Southern Methodist University

INTERNATIONAL AFRICAN INSTITUTE
(under UNESCO auspices): *Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization in Africa South of the Sahara*. Lausanne, Switzerland, UNESCO, 1956. 799 pages. \$9.00.

The consequences of urbanization and industrialization have only recently arisen to plague European administrators in African dependencies. With the exception of the old market towns of West Africa and the Arab slaving centers of the East African littoral, urbanization in Africa has been largely a result of the European mining, agricultural, and commercial activity which followed the partition of Africa at the end of the nineteenth century. Moreover, apart from the extractive industries, the processing of agricultural commodities for export, and the few industrial complexes that

have existed in the Union of South Africa and the Rhodesias, industrialization has been an even more recent phenomenon than urbanization. For most territories, industrialization has been limited largely to the present postwar period and stems from the vast expenditures undertaken through such programs as the British Colonial Development and Welfare Act. The tapping of the hydroelectric potential of the various river systems and the recent discoveries of high-grade iron, coal, and oil deposits shatter the myth that Africa lacks the ingredients for industrial economies.

Urbanization and industrialization have contributed substantially to the dynamic transformations taking place in sub-Saharan Africa. They have served to intensify multiracial and multiracial contact and hostility. They have helped undermine such traditional social, economic, and political units as the clan, the village, and the tribe, which have been only partially replaced by such institutions as the trade union, the co-operative society, and the various ward and municipal councils introduced by the Europeans. These twin forces have led to the alteration of the African economy from one which was predominantly subsistence in character to a cash economy; and in the process they have altered the traditional systems of land tenure, the class structure, and the customary social roles.

The present study by the International African Institute is the latest volume in the UNESCO "Tensions and Technology" series. It presents the findings of over fifty sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists from the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and the Union of South Africa, who have studied at firsthand

the problems of industrialization and urbanization in Africa. The book is divided into four parts, with the first section consisting of an introductory survey by Daryll Forde, the director of the Institute. In the second section Merran McCulloch has performed a masterly task of abstracting thirty-one recent field studies and monographs on labor migration, town planning, the influence of urbanization on tribal structure, juvenile delinquency in urban and rural slums, and the efficiency of African factory workers.

The third section consists of the preliminary findings by an Institute team (a Belgian anthropologist, a South African sociologist, and a French psychologist) who carried out an intensive study of Stanleyville in the Belgian Congo. Using a common approach and a joint questionnaire, and engaging in continuous intellectual exchange, the three scholars individually examined the historic growth of Stanleyville, the composition of the various racial elements, the conditions of labor, the aptitudes and training of African workers, and the social patterns of urban life.

The final section presents the texts of research papers read at the Abidjan Conference of 1954, which was attended by fifteen scholars who had recently completed demographic, social, and economic studies of various urban communities in tropical Africa. Among the dominant themes of the papers was the problem of cultural assimilation and resistance to culture change under urban conditions. It was demonstrated quite effectively that the African is not a passive factor in the African milieu but rather is quite capable of frustrating the "best laid plans." The conference's recommendations for future

research in this area are listed in Forde's introduction.

The compilers of the present volume may perhaps be criticized for having concentrated on the African component in the urban and industrial situation while giving only cursory attention to the European, Asian, and Arab elements. Moreover, the studies selected have only touched upon such political considerations as the policies of the colonial governments which have brought about rapid industrialization, mass population movements, and the centralized direction of the economy and social-welfare schemes. Finally, we might note adversely the omission of any material on the Portuguese territories or the independent countries of Liberia, Ethiopia, and the Sudan. Such criticism, however, would detract but slightly from the impression that this constitutes a job well done. The Institute has brought together in one volume most of what is known about the problems of African industrialization and urbanization. Its contributors have sought to dispel many of the hasty assumptions that had been made about African urbanization, assumptions based almost entirely upon the experience of urban settlement in Europe and America.

The special value of this volume, however, lies in the manner in which the researchers have laid bare their methodological scaffolding. To the advantage of present and future field investigators, the studies included here contain frequent comments on the worth, as well as the limitations upon the use, of sampling techniques, the standardized questionnaire, the open interview, participant observation, case histories, and culturally-loaded intelli-

gence and aptitude testing in the study of current African problems.

J. Gus Liebenow, Jr.
University of Texas

TIMOTHY W. STANLEY: *American Defense and National Security*. Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1956. 202 pages. \$3.25.

The Second World War revealed the serious inadequacy of United States governmental machinery for formulating a national-security policy. In the past decade, with the establishment of the National Security Council and the Department of Defense, much has been done to attempt to correct this. Yet the success of these endeavors and the adequacy of the new machinery remains moot. By describing the structure for decision-making in this area and the history of its development during the past ten years, this book, a product of the Harvard Defense Studies Program, enlarges our capability to analyze the contending claims and counterclaims.

The study is in two sections. The first surveys the governmental machinery for co-ordinating national-security policy. The description given here of the development of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is particularly welcome. This increasingly significant office (about which little has been written) is responsible for military-aid programs, the political and economic aspects of foreign military matters, and National Security Council affairs in the Department of Defense. The second section describes the organization of the Department of Defense, its growing authority over the service departments, and the progress of unifi-

cation at this level. The final chapter, in which the author presents his conception of the principal present and future problems of unification, is perhaps the most interesting part of this section.

On occasion, one wishes that the author had been more analytical. For example, he describes the struggle between the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the service departments for control of the military-aid programs, but he makes no estimate of the effects and implications of the decision in favor of the former. And while several hints are given about problems concerning the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these are never fully developed. It may be that the author felt his position as an official on leave from the Office of the Secretary of Defense precluded critical analysis. Without it, unfortunately, the book does not completely equip us to answer the pressing questions raised by Henry A. Kissinger in *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* and by others concerning the allegedly harmful effects of our present pattern of decision-making on the development of a strategic doctrine appropriate for the present era. But Stanley's work is nonetheless a significant and necessary first step toward our gaining such competence.

Harold Karan Jacobson
University of Michigan

BERNARD ROSENBERG: *The Values of Veblen*. Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1956. 127 pages. \$2.50.

In the Foreword, Max Lerner tells us that this "is a book for mid-century America. . . . And the remark-

able fact that emerges from this study is that the figure has shrunk so little. Veblen is still one of the giants to reckon with." On the obverse side, he says, "it is not an easy grilling that Veblen gets" from Rosenberg.

The book is undoubtedly too critical to please the Veblen devotee. Yet the author's treatment is sympathetic, and he gives to Veblen a stature too great to please those who look upon him primarily as an iconoclast. There is a refreshing treatment of Veblen's *The Higher Learning*, "the fiercest discourse written by Veblen," and originally subtitled *A Study in Total Depravity*. Veblen felt that colleges had become places almost solely for "gentlemen" and "playboys," where sports, fraternities, and clubs multiply, and the slight instruction attempted is "slanted to the adolescent mind."

It is at this point that Rosenberg reveals a basic characteristic of Veblen. After the "fierce" criticism of American educational institutions, what were Veblen's proposed remedies? He proposed that professors be placed in "protective quarantine," hermetically sealed away from alumni, businessmen, politicians, and the public, so that they could teach the unfettered truth. But Rosenberg says that Veblen's suggestions were made with "tongue-in-cheek" and with a firm conviction that "nothing whatsoever can be done."

This trait of destructive criticism without constructive remedy is further revealed by Veblen's most famous works, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, and *The Theory of Business Enterprise*. Here again Rosenberg portrays Veblen as the brilliant, discriminating critic, but when we look for his remedy, he has none. He gives an oblique hint that the proper course might

be the destruction of capitalism and the establishment of a new order, à la Marx, but we cannot be sure.

The content of *The Values of Veblen* is excellent and challenging. It is unfortunate that the form is marred by numerous errors and careless editing. Both author and publisher should be criticized for such careless work.

Harlan L. McCracken
Louisiana State University

SAMUEL B. RICHMOND: *Principles of Statistical Analysis*. New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1957. 483 pages. \$6.50.

This textbook is designed for a one-semester beginning course in statistics. It is written at a level that requires no knowledge of mathematics beyond elementary algebra. Clarity of exposition and emphasis on the assumptions underlying the different statistical techniques described are its distinguishing characteristics.

The first of the four parts into which the book is divided is concerned with probability and probability distributions. The definition of the median given on page 19 should be amplified to cover the case of an odd number of observations when the data are ungrouped.

Part II, the strongest section of the book in my opinion, is devoted to statistical inference. The illustration on page 55 of what is meant by probability statements concerning a confidence interval is very good. Regions of acceptance and rejection are clearly explained. The material on sampling procedures in Chapter 9 might better have been placed at the beginning of Part II.

Part III treats standard topics in

descriptive statistics. This is an unusual arrangement; these topics are usually considered prior to a discussion of sampling. As a result, it is necessary to explain the computation of the mean and standard deviation in Part I and again in Part III. Logarithms and graphic analysis are both covered rather sketchily. No examples of interpolation for the values of logarithms are given. No warnings about the effects of changes of scale on charts are voiced.

Part IV presents time-series analysis and simple linear correlation in the context of business forecasting. No example of fitting a logarithmic straight line is given, nor is there any mention of the fact that seasonal variation apparently is still present in the last three years of the "seasonally adjusted" data plotted on Figures 16-4. A helpful glossary of equations and an unusually complete assortment of tables appear among the appendices.

This is a good textbook for a beginning course in statistics. None of the criticisms offered detract seriously from its many merits.

Francis B. May
University of Texas

ROLAND B. SMITH: *Advertising to Business*. Homewood, Ill., Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1957. 392 pages. \$5.50.

Although the big money in advertising is still directed toward the consumer, advertising directed toward business is becoming increasingly important.

Many schools now have courses in industrial advertising, and this volume would make an excellent textbook for these courses. Even schools with no

such specific course would do well to use this as supplementary material to overcome the bias toward consumer advertising shown in most of the "principles" texts.

The book, written in "down to earth" fashion, is enhanced with many illustrative examples. Numerous good check lists sprinkled throughout would be useful to any advertiser and especially helpful to the college student. The chapter "Preparing the Budget" is especially informative, with its clear illustrations of the use of break-even analysis.

With one exception the organization of the book is excellent for a college course: the real introduction to the subject is Chapter 3, "What Business Advertising Does." The material in Chapter 1, "Business and Business Papers," would possibly fit better in about Chapter 15, "Media—Business Publications."

The author's dilemma is quite understandable: the heart of industrial advertising is in the business press and a study of this press immediately differentiates business advertising from consumer advertising. Nevertheless, it should be possible to have an efficient business-advertising program without using the medium of the business press at all. This initial emphasis on the business press could conceivably mislead the student as much as enlighten him.

Chapter 2, "The Development of the Business Press," is a more serious problem. The plethora of historical facts certainly shows the erudition of the author, but placing it so early in the book is likely to frighten the student. Although it is chronologically reasonable to start with the history of the business press, for pedagogical rea-

sons it would probably be better to place this material later in the book—perhaps, indeed, in an appendix.

Two suggestions for possible inclusion in a future edition would be (1) material about the advertising agency and agency-client relationships, with special emphasis on the problems in this area peculiar to industrial advertisers; and (2) some case materials to aid the teacher who likes to use discussion techniques.

From the standpoint of the student, the book is easily read and well organized. Liberal use of italics and bold-face type helps the student use this as a study guide as well as a text.

H. B. Stellmacher
North Texas State College

GEORGE W. TAYLOR and FRANK C. PIERSON (eds.): *New Concepts in Wage Determination*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1957. 335 pages. \$6.50.

Wage theory is the least satisfactory part of economic analysis. Wages, in formal theory, are based on the concepts of maximization, equilibrium, and static analysis. The first assumes that buyers and sellers of labor strive to maximize their relative net advantages; the second, that their efforts will tend toward adjustments at the margin until no unit of labor can improve its position; the third sets the limiting conditions and provides the framework in which the other concepts function. This formal theory has been so severely modified in the last twenty-five years that little remains of its rigorous simplicity. The modifications were due to (1) the great depression of the thirties; (2) the development of aggregate-in-

come analysis and employment theory; (3) the work of Chamberlin and Robinson on imperfect competition; (4) the rise of powerful trade unions covering large sectors of the economy; (5) the New Deal or welfare-state type of political intervention in economic affairs, with its minimum wage and other legislation; (6) the Second World War, with its wage-price controls and the postwar inflation, with attempts for a time to regulate wage increases.

The effect of the above six factors, and others, on wage theory is considered in this important book of essays. The book, like Gaul, is divided into three parts: "Viewpoints and Perspectives," "Structural Characteristics and Changes," and "National Wage Movements." Of the eleven essays the two outstanding are by John Dunlop and Clark Kerr. Dunlop begins by outlining three stages in the development of wage theory—the classical (wage-fund) period, the marginal productivity period (roughly from 1870–1930), and the modern period, with its institutional and political upheavals. Dunlop sees wage theory as a study of structures rather than one of fluids. He uses two concepts: job clusters, and wage contours. A job cluster is a "stable group of job classifications or work assignments." Wage rates within a job cluster are determined partly by market forces, but in the short run they are strongly influenced by technology, administrative organization, and social custom. A wage contour is a "stable group of wage-determining units . . . [with] common wage-making characteristics." The contour concept can be applied to a number of industries, such as steel, rubber, meat-packing, and autos, whose wage negotiations ripple through related industries and affect

costs and wages. This, then, is a theory of industrial wage-setting in distinctive submarkets rather than a general theory of one national labor market, with employees moving readily between industries in response to wage changes.

Kerr considers "Labor's Income Share and the Labor Movement," dealing with six types of union policy, which he classifies under the following headings: pure and simple, wage policy, managerial, New Deal, Labor party, direct controls. Each exercises a different pressure on wages, by firms and industries, by political or economic action, according to the possibilities open to its group. From these policies Kerr turns to labor's share in the national income and concludes that, generally speaking, trade unions have not had much influence on distribution. This conclusion is a doubtful one, even though Kerr views the function of the economist at times much as Samuel Butler viewed life—"the art of drawing sufficient conclusion from insufficient premises." We need to know a good deal more about trade-union influence on wages before we can say that wages would have been much the same had there been no trade unions. If 16,000,000 American workers have been paying dues for many years in a mistaken belief that their organization helps to raise their wages, then one of our greatest social scientists, Phineas T. Barnum, was wrong.

It is a pity that this, one of the best recent books on wages, makes no reference to modern consumption theory. After all, the market-demand curve is made up of individuals who are, in the main, working to earn money to buy goods and services. The consumption function is one of the weak links in Keynesian theory, while work motiva-

tion related to spending patterns is something that economists assume without testing. Economics will have to cross into neighboring disciplines if it is to develop a workable theory of wages. This book is a stepping stone but the river is still unforded.

Campbell Balfour
University of South Wales

ANDREAS DORPALEN: *Heinrich von Treitschke*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1957. 345 pages. \$6.00.

KARL W. MEYER: *Karl Liebknecht*. Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1957. 180 pages. \$3.25.

Heinrich von Treitschke's name has become a byword synonymous with all that is undesirably associated with the growth of German nationalism. In the period preceding and following the First World War, and then again with the rise of Hitler, he has been charged with being one of the intellectual instigators of the movements within Germany which launched that country on two attempts to conquer and dominate Western Europe. To what extent is Treitschke guilty of these charges?

While the author has not specifically directed his efforts to answering this question, the result of his work is to place Treitschke in historic perspective, and thus to evaluate his position and influence in history. What emerges is the picture of a devoted German nationalist concerned primarily with the creation of a strong nation state under the auspices of Prussia. In reality, Treitschke's work was completed with the creation of the German Empire under Bismarck. It was with the struggle for the unification of Germany that

he was most concerned, and it was during this struggle that his influence was most constructive. With the spirit of the Wilhelminian era, he was not in accord. Deploring the rise of materialism, alarmed at the brash irresponsibility of the young Emperor, he sought in his last years to create for Germany a sense of moral purpose and aim with which to fill its spiritual void. In this attempt, he was unsuccessful and, at his death, he had ceased to be more than a respected symbol of a past era.

As a historian, he vitiated his work by a basic Prussian mania and an innate bias in favor of aristocratic social concepts incompatible with the new Imperial Era. As the author notes, his multivolume, incompleted *History of Germany*, though owned by all who had any intellectual pretensions, was read by few. The tragedy of Treitschke's life was not his deafness but the fact that he lived too long. His popularity as a teacher in his later years rose more from the appealing peripheral aspects of his lectures—his Anglophobia, anti-Semitism, monarchical predilections, and intense nationalism—than from the fact that his audience appreciated or comprehended the basic theme of his lectures. To the extent that his more intemperate utterances found welcome hearers, he may justly be saddled with responsibility for encouraging the growth of a climate of opinion in Germany conducive to the cultivation of the strange fruits of Hitlerism. That he intended such a result or would have favored Nazi policies is to malign his memory unjustly.

Dorpaleen has given us the first comprehensive English biography of the remarkable figure. In doing so, he has displayed a depth of scholarship and an objectiveness of view which places

us in his debt. Well written and admirably printed, the work deserves attention by all scholars in the field.

In comparison, Meyer's biography of Karl Liebknecht reminds one of Kipling's comment in *Stalky and Co.* about "how desire doth outrun performance." Here again, we are dealing with an important German figure whose biography was previously unavailable in English. Unfortunately, this book lacks the depth of scholarship that Dorpalen brought to his work. What we have is a rather prosaic account, factually correct but lacking in interpretive analysis and in a feel for the significance of its subject and period. In short, there is more to Karl Liebknecht than his biographer has been able to produce for us. Within these limitations, however, the work is still deserving of attention. It does give us in English the basic chronology of Liebknecht's life and introduces us to the bibliography and source materials in the field. That the book is marred by poor printing and typographical errors is not the fault of the author. Meyer deserves commendation for his honest attempt at an unbiased presentation of his subject, but it is regrettable that he failed to vitalize either Liebknecht or the Social Democratic movement, in which he played so interesting and significant a part.

H. Malcolm Macdonald
University of Texas

HERBERT AGAR: *The Price of Power: America Since 1945*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957. 200 pages. \$3.50.

This work, one of Chicago's "History of American Civilization" series,

is an attempt by a distinguished author and journalist to interpret the decade that, in his opinion, marked America's coming of age in the field of international diplomacy. His explanation of these first ten years of the atomic age frankly emphasizes the international aspects of American policy, for, as he says, "are not all politics foreign politics today?" He has his heroes and villains, but the stage directors are confused Americans—singly and en masse.

Their confusion resulted from America's facing a new era—one for which she was not psychologically ready. Though having just "won" a war, she had to learn that peace could not be gained through battle and that there was no security for the powerful. Her "safe" world was no longer safe. Russia and the physicists had seen to that. The blunders of the period are largely explained not by malevolence or treason but by ignorance and reluctance. The nation did learn, and, in the author's words, there are grounds today for a "sober hope" if Americans will "attempt new thoughts for our new world."

Among the most interesting aspects of this volume are the characterizations and conclusions: Harry Hopkins was "bewildered"; there were "three Mr. Trumans"; Dulles was "presumably" afraid of McCarthy. Eisenhower, at least at the start of his term, was more than "a good Kansas Republican"—he was a Whig! There was no "sell out" at Yalta; nothing good came out of Potsdam; MacArthur deserved to be removed; Hiss was a symbol of his era; and the Bandung Conference marked the end of the great colonial age. Although many will not agree with his evaluations and admitted internationalist viewpoint, Agar's im-

pressive logic and efforts at fairness must be admitted. He frankly states that definitive judgments are not yet possible, since all the evidence is not in.

The book, often based upon the author's personal acquaintance with the leaders involved, is well written and, though without footnotes and formal bibliography, contains a good index and a bibliographical note listing titles for further study. This interpretation, brief though it is, should appeal to both the lay reader and specialist. It will have to be seriously considered in future study of this decade.

John S. Ezell
University of Oklahoma

FREDERICK H. HARTMANN: *The Relations of Nations*. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1957. 637 pages.

VERNON VAN DYKE: *International Politics*. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1957. 483 pages.

International relations was a new subject of inquiry after the First World War. The circumstances that brought the subject to the fore were reflected in the character of the textbooks devoted to it in the interwar period. The First World War had been a double shock to Americans. It reminded them, and it reminded Europeans as well, of the grim potentialities still present in international politics. It also posed the serious question of whether the United States should—indeed, could—return to a studied indifference toward European politics. Foreign-policy debate reflected this state of shock; it was polarized around isolationist and internationalist. Yet the preoccupation of each pole was the same: as Hartmann

remarks, peace was deemed to be man's fundamental desire. The object of policy was to carry out this human longing. Isolationist and internationalist, each according to his lights, made peace the uncomplicated criterion of policy.

The two texts under review are far removed from so simple a view of man's nature. Nor are they so optimistic and confident as to be deceived into advancing on the dove of peace by the most direct and shortest route. Van Dyke sees the struggle for power as the central object of policy, a theme that he develops with depth and subtlety. Thus, he argues, law reflects the ordering of things in accordance with the desire of the dominant grouping in a society—whether its dominance is determined by ballots or, in the case of international society, by less regular and more primitive means. Hartmann designates the national interest as the policy-maker's central concern. Like Van Dyke, he accepts the struggle for power as a normal and inescapable feature of the political process. Both authors explore with skill the differing patterns of accommodation to the power aspect of international politics. Neither believes that nations have a wide range of choice, though within the narrow limits of discretion available to them the authors would readily grant a vast difference between folly and wisdom. Both authors conclude that collective security, as visualized by the makers of Covenant and Charter, is beyond the attainable. Van Dyke's analysis of this concept is the more systematic, but by a somewhat different route Hartmann comes to the same result.

Yet neither author flaunts his "realism" in disdainful rebuke of the

"idealist." Each in fact denies incompatibility between the two views—properly defined. This reviewer welcomes these attempts to talk sense about a dichotomy which, though less distracting than that of isolationism and internationalism, has tended to the same kind of arid polemics as those of the earlier postwar debate.

The similarities of outlook and analysis to be found in these texts are remarkable. Van Dyke's volume is the more complete theoretical statement. Hartmann's, on the other hand, incorporates a great deal of historical material and treats as well the postwar policies of each of the leading nations. This is done with enough detail to make the presentation meaningful and with such acuteness and originality as to make the book highly rewarding. Hartmann's judgments on American policy are bold and stimulating.

Both books surpass the ordinary text. Each does great credit to its author, and together they constitute gratifying evidence that the foreign-policy debate of this postwar period adds up to considerably more of substance and maturity than that of the earlier period.

The reviewer believes that students of international politics should read these books. Teachers of the subject would do well to examine them before choosing a text.

Edward H. Buebrig
Indiana University

ROBERT E. BROWN: *Charles Beard and the Constitution*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1956. 219 pages. \$3.50.

Brown has undertaken a detailed

and critical analysis of Charles A. Beard's epoch-making *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution*. With ample documentation and minute attention to detail, he has demonstrated that many of Beard's generalizations are unfounded, that his use of primary sources is woefully weak, and that his conclusion that the Constitution was the result of a conspiracy of undemocratically-minded guardians of personality is untenable. In short, the author implies that a great hoax has been perpetrated on the American public for the past forty years and that Charles Beard should be drummed out of the company of honest historians. With Brown's scholarship one cannot quibble, though his methodology lays him open to the same attack he brings against Beard. Given his frame of reference, he utterly routs his opponent and causes us gullible ones who have referred our students to Beard's work to hide our heads and murmur a *mea culpa* over our academic sins.

When, however, we change our perspective, is the picture so dark? Admitting that Beard belonged to that school of historians concerned more with schematic interpretation than with the recitation of uninterpreted facts, is the conclusion to be that such an approach is without merit? Likewise, as the author indicates, Beard himself never claimed that his interpretation was the only one; nor is it reasonable to believe that the many instances cited in Brown's introductory chapter of persons who have accepted the Beard thesis and incorporated it into their own work demonstrate that these same persons considered it to be more than one of many approaches to an understanding of the Constitution.

The important fact is that prior to

Beard's economic generalizations few, if any, historians or political scientists in the United States acknowledged that economic factors had any bearing at all on the formulation of the Constitution. Many of them, indeed, tended to view the motives and aims of the founding fathers as so highly idealistic as to be beyond reproach. Beard's contribution was in reality not to degrade the founding fathers, nor even to deny that a considerable amount of democratic idealism motivated their actions, but to invite attention to the overlooked economic factor in the formulation of the Constitution. That Beard was wrong to have defined this economic motivation as exclusively "personality" Brown has demonstrated beyond doubt. That Beard deliberately overemphasized the economic factor, he himself would probably have admitted and certainly most of his readers recognized.

On the other side, the fact that Beard's "thesis," inadequately supported or not, served to introduce into the study of Constitutional history a new and pregnant point of view likewise cannot be gainsaid. Brown's own conclusions as to the motivating forces behind the drafting and adoption of the Constitution contain themselves many economic factors. He admits that the Constitution was jealous of the rights of property, that it represented a complex of economic interests, and that the majority of the people of the new nation were "middle class" and interested in protecting the economic interests of that group. Beard was instinctively right when he probed into the economic basis; he was wrong if he assumed that *one* specific economic interest dominated or that the economic interests actually represented in the

Constitutional and ratifying conventions were those of a small minority. To the extent that Brown's research results in a modification of the Beard thesis a useful and commendable task has been performed. Certainly his work will be reflected in future editions of history and government texts, and the pursuit of objectivity, accuracy, and truth will be furthered thereby. To minimize, however, either the beneficial effect of Beard's approach on our analysis of the Constitution or its worth as a general method of analysis would be equally grievous errors. Certainly the proper estimation of the development of our Constitution must take into consideration more than the economic motivations involved, but Beard's respected reputation as the foremost American historian who insisted that the economic must be one of the elements to be considered will remain secure. Brown's work is assured of a permanent place in American historiography and, by affording an antidote to Beard's generalizations, has performed a distinct service to American scholarship. But it has not disproved the basic Beard assumption that political scientists and historians must keep their weather eye open for economic factors in their analysis of any historic situation. Let us hope that in so doing, they may be gifted with the painstaking search of sources characteristic of Brown's work as well as with the insight of a Beard, for the combination is essential to the creative work of the scholar.

H. Malcolm Macdonald
University of Texas

PAUL M. GREGORY: *The Baseball Player: An Economic Study*. Wash-

ington, Public Affairs Press, 1956.
213 pages. \$3.75.

For the past several years it has not been uncommon to find news of professional sports trespassing on front pages, pre-empting columns normally reserved for accounts of murders, the latest crisis in international politics, or other important events. That professional sports are operated for profit and that, like any other businessman, the owner of a professional baseball or football team may violate the antitrust laws has not escaped the notice of lawyers representing clients who, for one reason or another, have grievances against the owners. The courts have been importuned to rule on such matters, and the nation's newspapers have duly reported in banner headlines the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court: both professional boxing and football are businesses in interstate commerce and are, therefore, subject to the antitrust laws, while, curiously, professional baseball is a sport, hence not in interstate commerce. If the newspaper reader is confused by the logic of the Supreme Court, it is probably because he has not been enlightened by the testimony of prominent baseball figures this year before the Celler Committee of the House of Representatives on such esoteric subjects as the reserve clause, the waiver system, or the draft.

Here is a book that will explain the reserve clause and waiver system as well as provide the reader with a potpourri of information about professional baseball players. Gregory reports on the average and median salaries of major- and minor-league players, the salaries of the stars, the history of players' unions, the source of play-

ers' income during the off-season, the ballplayer in retirement, the occupational hazards of baseball, the bonus system, gifts to players. And many other things. Baseball fans will relish these bits of information and feel a nostalgic pang for the good old days when they are reminded of Babe Ruth's quip on being chided for demanding a higher salary than President Hoover in the first year of the Depression, "What the hell has Hoover got to do with it? Besides, I had a better year than he did."

Social scientists, however, will find very little analysis, and economists in particular are likely to be annoyed by the crude application of marginal-productivity theory to the explanation of the salaries of ballplayers. The author addresses himself to the question of whether or not ballplayers are exploited, using as his criterion the probability of their receiving the value of their marginal product. But it is hard to conceive of an industry that is further removed than baseball from the competitive equilibrium conditions upon which the marginal-productivity theory depends; consequently it is difficult to see how he can come up with a valid answer to his question.

However weak the analysis, the book does provide the reader with the background material essential to his understanding the reasons why some people allege that baseball ought to be subject to the antitrust laws. The book is at its best when dealing with straight historical narrative.

Karl de Schweinitz, Jr.
Northwestern University

W. EUGENE HOLLON and RUTH LAPHAM BUTLER (eds.): *William Bol-*

laert's Texas. Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1956. 423 pages. \$5.00.

William Bollaert, an English soldier of fortune, was a chemist, a geographer, ethnologist, antiquarian, occasional writer, and world traveler. As a part of his meanderings over the world he traveled to Texas in 1842 as the agent of the Englishman William Kennedy, who had visited Texas in 1839 and who had been offered a considerable tract of land southwest of San Antonio. Bollaert was in Texas from 1842 to 1844, and while traveling through the country he kept diaries, journals, and notebooks which give an accurate record of his journeys. Six diaries, two journals, and several notebooks have withstood the ravages of time and are safely deposited in the Newberry Library. The journals, never before printed, constitute the heart of the first fourteen chapters of this fascinating book, while the notebooks furnish the material for Chapters 15 and 16.

Conditions were unsettled in Texas at the time of Bollaert's arrival in 1842, the Vasquez expedition having raided San Antonio in March of that year. It was considered too dangerous to make an exploring expedition into the San Antonio region, and he turned his attention to other parts of Texas. He visited (and in some instances revisited) Galveston, Matagorda, New Orleans, Austin, Columbus, Guadalupe River Valley, Huntsville, Trinity River Valley, and finally, in the summer of 1844, the Kennedy grant at Bexar.

Bollaert's journal, here printed for the first time, is fascinatingly replete with brilliant descriptions of the social and political life of the Republic of

Texas. He parades before his readers the chicanery of political rallies, the hazards and satisfying rewards of the hunting trip, the romance and conviviality of weddings, the sadness of funerals, the joys of travel in the river valleys and on the rolling prairies. His descriptions and observations are always graphic, sometimes humorous, and frequently very conservative. He is quite often guilty of English understatement. For instance, in comparing rainy east Texas with dry west Texas he says, "It seems that more rains fall in eastern than in western Texas."

This book is a most fascinating travel account, unprejudiced, clear, concise, and all-inclusive. An outstanding feature is the illustrations, drawn by the author and never before printed. "The Texan Squadron" (Navy), "Galveston Harbor," "Doctor's Office," "The President's House," and "The Broken Bridge over the San Antonio River" are among the most interesting. The format is attractive, the type is readable, footnotes are copious and valuable, the index is complete, the bibliography is adequate, and the editorial comments are informative. This is a genuine contribution to the history and literature of the Southwest.

Claude Elliott
Southwest Texas State
Teachers College

MEXICO CITY COLLEGE: *Antologia MCC 1956*. Mexico, D.F., Mexico City College Press, 1956. 445 pages.

This is a collection of studies, essays, and poems by faculty members of Mexico City College. The contents, comprising fourteen items printed in both English and Spanish, are grouped

under the headings Humanities, Social Sciences, and Natural Sciences. It is with articles in the social-sciences division that this review is concerned: "The Mexican Liberals and Their Struggle against the Díaz Dictatorship: 1900-1906," by Lyle C. Brown; "Veracruz and the Veracruzanos as Seen by English and American Travelers," by Paul V. Murray; "Notes on G. C. Vaillant's *The Aztecs of Mexico*," by John Paddock, and "The History of Free Trade as a Study in *Realpolitik*," by John M. Ryan.

The contribution by Brown, which is well documented with recently published materials, deals with the struggle of Mexican Liberals against the Díaz regime during the period 1900 through 1906, when a series of uprisings occurred but failed to spark a general rebellion against the dictatorship. The central conspirator working for political changes and socio-economic reforms was Ricardo Flores Magon. Although Flores Magon is remembered as an anarchist who suffered imprisonment in the United States, according to Brown he became an anarchist later, and the Liberal Plan of 1906 was even more moderate than the eventual Constitution of 1917. This article adds to our information concerning the precursors of the Mexican Revolution.

In the article on Veracruz, Murray traces from Thomas Gage (1648) to Ambassador Josephus Daniels allusions made by English and American visitors to the port city. These cannot be said to contribute much information, but they often make interesting reading.

The work by Paddock is designed to reconcile Vaillant's *The Aztecs of Mexico* with present-day Mexican anthropological scholarship. In the very

year (1941) the Vaillant volume was published, much of it was rendered obsolete because of certain findings concerning the pre-Aztec cultures. It is Paddock's purpose, therefore, to put the Vaillant volume, a highly regarded work, back in use with a set of notes and comments. It is an interesting venture and skillfully accomplished.

The theme of Ryan's article is that the cornerstone of free-trade policy is dominant industrial power. For example, when English industry no longer needed political and military assistance to dominate its markets, free access was enough. In conclusion the author attempts to show, without much conviction, that for identical reasons the United States is shifting away from protectionism.

J. Lloyd Mechem
University of Texas

Other Books Received

December, 1957

AFL and CIO: *The Shorter Work Week*. Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1957. 96 pages. \$2.50.

Adair, Aileen: *The Moon Is Full*. New York, Philosophical Library, Inc., 1957. 200 pages. \$4.75.

Barton, Sam B.: *How Texas Cares for Her Injured Workers*. Denton, Texas, North Texas State College, 1956. 81 pages.

Beals, Ralph L., and Norman D. Humphrey: *No Frontier to Learning: The Mexican Student in the United States*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1957. 148 pages. \$3.25.

- Beckman, Theodore N., Harold H. Maynard, and William R. Davidson: *Principles of Marketing*. 6th ed., New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1957. 798 pages. \$7.00.
- Bixley, William: *The Guilty and the Innocent: My 50 Years at the Old Bailey*. New York, Philosophical Library, Inc., 1957. 176 pages. \$6.00.
- Bowlby, Sylva M.: *An Economic Survey of Denton County, Texas, in Its Centennial Year*. Austin, University of Texas, Bureau of Business Research, 1957. 88 pages and appendices.
- Bromage, Arthur W.: *Introduction to: Municipal Government and Administration*. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1957. 579 pages. \$6.50.
- Byrd, James A.: *A Selected and Annotated Bibliography of Estate Planning*. Austin, University of Texas, Bureau of Business Research, 1957. 41 pages. \$.50.
- Chute, A. Hamilton: *Planned Buying and Controlled Merchandising for Retail Furniture Dealers*. Austin, University of Texas, Bureau of Business Research, 1957. 45 pages. \$.50.
- Clarke, Helen I.: *Social Legislation*. 2d ed., New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1957. 665 pages. \$6.90.
- Dodd, James Harvey, and Carl W. Hasek: *Economics: Principles and Applications*. 3d ed., Cincinnati, South-Western Publishing Co., 1957. 817 pages. \$6.00.
- Easton, Stewart C.: *The Heritage of the Past*. New York, Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1957. 845 pages.
- Eley, Lynn W., and Seymour D. Greenstone: *A Directory of State Technical Services Available to City and Village Governments in Michigan*. No. 22. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, Bureau of Government, 1957. 32 pages.
- Gordon, Cyrus H.: *Hammurapi's Code: Quaint or Forward-Looking?* New York, Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1957. 28 pages. \$.50.
- Greene, Theodore M.: *Liberalism: Its Theory and Practice*. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1957. 219 pages. \$4.50.
- Grimes, Marcene: *Government & Natural Resources in Kansas: Minerals*. Lawrence, Kansas, University of Kansas, Governmental Research Center, 1957. 57 pages.
- Howard, L. Vaughan: *Civil Service Development in Louisiana*. Tulane Studies in Political Science, Vol. III. New Orleans, Tulane University, 1956. 190 pages. \$2.00.
- Kentucky Legislative Research Commission: *Kentucky Judicial Structure: Governing Provisions of Constitution and Statutes*. Informational Bulletin No. 14. Kentucky, 1957. 112 pages.
- Kohn, Hans: *American Nationalism: An Interpretative Essay*. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1957. 272 pages. \$5.00.
- Laughton, Charles: *Staffing Social Services in Texas: The Problem and the Challenge*. Austin, University of

- Texas, School of Social Work, 1957. 84 pages. \$.50.
- Lee, T. Hoyle: *Mathematics of Finance*. Homewood, Ill., Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1957. 335 pages. \$6.00.
- Leroi-Gourhan, Andre: *Prehistoric Man*. New York, Philosophical Library, Inc., 1957. 119 pages. \$4.75.
- McDonald, James T.: *Municipal Finance in Kansas 1953-1955*. Lawrence, Kansas, University of Kansas, Governmental Research Center. 51 pages.
- McKie, James W.: *The Regulation of Natural Gas*. Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Association, Inc., 1957. 49 pages. \$1.00.
- Magee, John H.: *General Insurance*. 5th ed., Homewood, Ill., Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1957. 952 pages. \$6.50.
- Mosse, George L.: *Calvinism: Authoritarian or Democratic?* New York, Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1957. 25 pages. \$.50.
- Neustatter, W. Lindesay: *The Mind of the Murderer*. New York, Philosophical Library, Inc., 1957. 232 pages. \$6.00.
- Noble, Howard S., and Rollin Niswonger: *Accounting Principles*, 7th ed., Cincinnati, South-Western Publishing Company, 1957. 742 pages. \$6.00.
- Povlovich, Charles A., Jr.: *Senate Qualifications and Contested Elections*. Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1957. 14 pages. \$.50.
- Proceedings of the Third Governmental Accounting & Finance Institute*. Austin, University of Texas, Institute of Public Affairs, 1957. 57 pages.
- Rowland, John: *Mysteries of Science*. New York, Philosophical Library, Inc., 1957. 214 pages. \$6.00.
- Runes, Dagobert D.: *A Book of Contemplation*. New York, Philosophical Library, Inc., 1957. 149 pages. \$3.00.
- Stavrianos, L. S.: *The Ottoman Empire: Was It the Sick Man of Europe?* New York, Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1957. 60 pages. \$.75.
- Texas Retail Lumber Dealers: Survey of Cost of Doing Business, 1956*. Austin, University of Texas, Bureau of Business Research, 1957. 18 pages. \$.50.
- Thompson, Ralph B.: *A Selected and Annotated Bibliography of Marketing Research*. Austin, University of Texas, Bureau of Business Research, 1957. 41 pages. \$.50.
- Walters, Raymond: *Albert Gallatin*. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1957. 461 pages. \$7.00.
- Wheeler, Harvey: *The Conservative Crisis: England's Impasse of 1931*. Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1956. 48 pages. \$1.00.
- Woofter, Thomas J.: *Southern Race Progress*. Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1957. 180 pages. \$3.50.
- Wright, Louis B.: *Virginia Heritage*. Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1957. 50 pages. \$1.00.

News and Notes

CALEB PERRY PATTERSON

At the end of the last school year, Caleb Perry Patterson, professor of government at the University of Texas, retired from active teaching and became Professor Emeritus. This event marked the culmination of a long and distinguished teaching and research career that began at the University in 1919. Rising from the rank of instructor to that of full professor within a relatively brief period, Dr. Patterson left a lasting imprint upon his department, the University, and the state. Author of numerous articles and several books, he maintained his scholarly interests throughout his career, and these have not abated even in retirement.

Dr. Pat, as he was affectionately known to his many students and colleagues, developed that sort of uniqueness that leaves lasting impressions and brings lasting friendships. Personable and friendly, he loved to tell about the thirteen degrees, including two LL.B.'s, that he had received during the course of his academic work. He captivated lay audiences as well as his students by his booming voice, his ready wit, and the enthusiasm which he always had for his message.

Dr. Patterson was one of the founders of the Southwestern Social Science Association and was for several years the editor of its *QUARTERLY*. Many years ago he conceived the idea of a national honorary political-science fraternity, and today Pi Sigma Alpha has eighty-three chapters in the leading educational institutions in the United States.

Freed from the routine of class meetings, Dr. Pat can now devote all his time to the study of his idol—Thomas Jefferson. We who were his students and his colleagues particularly wish him *bon voyage*.

J. Alton Burdine

Accounting

The third Annual Petroleum Accounting Conference will be held on April 25, 1958, at the University of Wichita. Speakers and panels will explore topics of interest to oil producers at morning and afternoon sessions. A luncheon and a banquet, which a nationally-known speaker will address, complete the program.

Attendance in 1956 was more than 250, including representatives of various universities in the region.

Business Administration

LEROY E. BAKER has been appointed instructor in accounting at the University of Kansas.

WILLIAM M. BROWN has been appointed an assistant professor of marketing, University of Texas.

JAMES A. BYRD has accepted appointment as assistant professor of finance, University of Texas.

GILBERT BYTHEWOOD, formerly at Louisiana State University, has taken a position as assistant professor of management, University of Houston.

BUFORD CASEY has been appointed assistant professor of marketing, University of Texas.

ROBERT E. ELLSWORTH has been appointed instructor in business law at the University of Kansas.

JOHN EWING has been made associate professor of business administration at the University of Kansas.

MAX E. FESSLER has been promoted to professor of business administration at the University of Kansas.

VIRGINIA H. HUNTINGTON has been appointed instructor in accounting at the University of Kansas.

RALPH M. KING, JR., has taken a place as instructor in business law at the University of Kansas.

ARNO F. KNAPPER has been promoted to assistant professor of business administration and made director of the Business Placement Bureau, University of Kansas.

Z. WILLIAM KOBY, formerly with private industry in Houston, has been appointed instructor in marketing and advertising, University of Houston.

JANICE MADER is now an instructor in secretarial training, University of Kansas.

JAMES W. PADDOCK has been made an instructor of business law at the University of Kansas.

JEROME PESCHKE has become associate dean of the College of Business, University of Houston.

PAUL H. RIGBY, director of the University of Houston Bureau of Business and Economic Research, and WARREN I. CIKENS co-authored a monograph, "A Public Utility Plans for Expansion," published by the University of Alabama.

CHARLES B. SAUNDERS has been promoted to associate professor of business administration, University of Kansas.

TOM W. SCOTT, formerly of the University of Arkansas, has been appointed assistant professor of transportation, University of Houston, to replace J. EDWIN BECHT, who resigned to join a private research organization.

BEN D. SIMPSON has been appointed instructor of accounting at the University of Kansas.

JOHN R. STOCKTON, University of Texas, has been elected president of the Associated University Bureaus of Business and Economic Research.

JAMES R. SURFACE has assumed his new duties as professor of business administration and dean of the School of Business, University of Kansas.

Economics

The Executive Development Program of the University of Missouri, op-

erated in Kansas City by the School of Business and Public Administration in co-operation with the Adult Education and Extension Service, completed its third year in June and awarded certificates to twelve graduates.

LEWIS N. AMIS has been appointed instructor in economics, University of Arkansas.

TROY J. CAULEY, University of Indiana, was a visiting professor at the University of Texas for the past summer.

DONALD S. HOLM, JR., associate professor of business management, University of Missouri, spent part of the summer with the Missouri Division of Employment Security in Jefferson City, extending his earlier study of the Missouri labor force.

WAYNE LEEMAN, associate professor of economics, University of Missouri, will spend the year traveling in Europe and the Middle East in his study of the pricing of crude oil.

WILLIAM McLAUGHLIN has been appointed instructor in economics, University of Arkansas.

ROLAN T. MULLINS has been appointed instructor in economics, University of Arkansas.

JOHN C. MURDOCK, associate professor of economics at the University of Missouri, spent part of the summer with the Gulf Oil Company, Houston, in his study of petroleum transportation.

JOHN P. OWEN, chairman of the Department of Economics and Finance, University of Houston, has been appointed director of Graduate Studies

for the College of Business. He is a recent co-author, with ERVIN K. ZINGLER, University of Houston, of a study entitled "The Determination of Economic Feasibility of Multiple-Purpose Dams," authorized by the Brazos Valley Authority and published by the University of Houston Bureau of Business and Economic Research.

MURRAY E. POLAKOFF has been promoted to associate professor of economics at the University of Texas.

ROBERT A. ROBERTSON has accepted appointment as assistant professor of economics at the University of Arkansas.

LLOYD TAYLOR has been appointed instructor of economics, University of Arkansas.

HARRY WILLIAMS and JOHN N. FRY, University of Houston, are co-authors of a study entitled "Galveston Island Oceanarium: An Economic Appraisal."

Government

WILLIAM B. DUNN, formerly of the University of Chicago, has been made an instructor in government at East Texas State College.

JOHN W. SCHWADA, associate professor of political science at the University of Missouri, has taken a leave of absence to accept appointment as consultant and senior analyst, Division of Budget and Comptroller, State of Missouri, to aid in preparing new budget procedures and analysis processes.

LORIMER E. STOREY has been promoted to professor of political science, Louisiana Technological Institute.

History

GEORGE ANARKIS, formerly at Texas Christian University, has joined the staff of the University of Texas as an associate professor, effective in September. During the summer he was a lecturer at Oklahoma State University.

OSWALD P. BACKUS, associate professor, University of Kansas, spent July and August in the Soviet Union on research supported by the Carnegie Foundation. He will spend the 1957-58 academic year in Helsinki on a Fulbright award.

SIDNEY D. BROWN, assistant professor, Oklahoma State University, has resumed his duties after a year in Japan as a Ford Foundation fellow, where he began a biographical study of Okubo Toshimichi.

BERLIN B. CHAPMAN, professor of history, Oklahoma State University, is extending his leave until September, 1958, to remain in Washington and continue research on the Otoe, Missouri, and Creek Indians.

ROBERT G. COLDONY, of the University of California (Berkeley), has been made visiting assistant professor of history at the University of Kansas during the absence of OSWALD P. BACKUS.

PAUL K. CONKLIN, formerly of Vanderbilt University, has been made an assistant professor at Southwestern Louisiana Institute.

ANGIE DEBO has returned to Oklahoma State University as a temporary assistant professor during the absence of BERLIN B. CHAPMAN.

W. MAGRUDER DRAKE has been promoted to associate professor at Southwestern Louisiana Institute.

WILLIAM GILBERT has been promoted to associate professor at the University of Kansas.

ALLEN J. GOING, formerly of the University of Alabama, has accepted appointment as associate professor, University of Houston.

HARRY HAROOTUNIAN, formerly assistant professor of history, Oklahoma State University, has accepted a position at the same rank at Pennsylvania State University.

ROBERT W. JOHANNSEN has been promoted to associate professor at the University of Kansas, and has taken a year's leave of absence to serve as a visiting member of the staff of the University of Wisconsin.

LOUIS KESTENBERG has returned from Reutlingen, West Germany, where he taught last year under the Fulbright teacher-exchange program.

ALFRED LEVIN, professor of history, Oklahoma State University, has returned from his Fulbright fellowship and sabbatical year in Finland, where he did research on the Third Imperial Duma.

G. W. MCGINTY, head of the Department of Social Science at Louisiana Polytechnic Institute, is engaged in a study of the Caddo Indian Treaty of 1835. The completed study will be presented to the Indian Claims Commission.

EDWIN A. MILES, University of Houston, has been promoted to associate professor.

HURSHEL HERBERT RISINGER, temporary assistant professor of history at Oklahoma State University, has returned to his permanent position at Southwestern (Oklahoma) State College.

ROBERT E. SCHOFIELD, assistant professor, University of Kansas, spent the summer in England doing research on Joseph Priestly under a grant from the American Philosophical Society.

ROY V. SCOTT, formerly of the University of Illinois, has been made assistant professor at Southwestern Louisiana Institute.

JAMES E. SEAVER, associate professor, has been made director of the Western Civilization program at the University of Kansas.

STANLEY E. SIEGEL has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at the University of Houston.

RICHARD D. YOUNGER, University of Houston, has been promoted to associate professor.

Sociology

IVAN C. BELKNAP, associate professor, University of Texas, has been granted a leave of absence for the first semester in order to spend more time directing a hospital-community research project for which he has a grant from the Hospital Facilities Research Study Section, National Institutes of Health. FRANK C. NALL

joined the staff on the project this fall.

HENRY A. BOWMAN, University of Texas, has become president-elect and program chairman of the National Council on Family Relations. He will assume office at the conclusion of the annual meeting in Eugene, Oregon, August 20-23, 1958.

CARROLL D. CLARK served as chairman of a human-relations work shop at the University of North Dakota during the summer and also as a staff member of the University of Kansas Executive Development Program.

RICHARD M. COLVARD has joined the staff of the University of Texas as an instructor.

FRED R. CRAWFORD has assumed the position of dean of Student Life at Trinity University.

HENRIETTA COX, instructor at the University of Kansas last year, has returned to Washington University (St. Louis) to continue doctoral work.

RAY P. CUZZORT, formerly with the Population Research Center of the University of Chicago, has accepted a position as assistant professor at the University of Kansas.

JOHN GIELE has joined the staff of the University of Kansas as instructor.

HAROLD A. GOULD, who has recently completed his doctoral work at Washington University, has joined the staff of the University of Kansas.

JOHN and JEANNE GULLAHORN served during the past summer as

consultants for the Foreign Student Leadership Project, a program of the National Student Association, and will continue these services throughout the coming year.

MARSTON M. MCCLUGGAGE, on sabbatical leave, is at the University of Washington, where he is visiting professor in human relations.

REECE J. MCGEE has joined the faculty of the University of Texas as assistant professor.

CARL M. ROSENQUIST, University of Texas, was a visiting professor at the National University of Mexico during the summer. He also read a paper, "Crime and the Law in the United States," at the Eighth Congress of Sociology in Durango, Mexico, in September.

WINIFRED G. STEGLICH has joined the faculty of Texas Technological College as associate professor of sociology.

LOUISE E. SWEET is a visiting assistant professor of anthropology at the University of Kansas.

SOL TANNENBAUM has joined the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Houston, as an instructor.

ESTHER TWENTE, University of Kansas, has resigned as chairman of the Department of Social Work in order to devote full time to teaching and to social work.

PAUL H. VOSSICK has joined the faculty of the University of Texas as an instructor.

CHARLES K. WARRIMER and E. JACKSON BAUR have received an ad-

ditional grant from the General Research Fund of the University of Kansas to continue their studies of Kansas Basin Water problems. Warrimer participated in the Social Science Research Council summer institute on organizational theory and research held at Carnegie Institute of Technology.

Of General Interest

Effective July 1, 1957 the Roper Public Opinion Research Center was established at Williams College. The main function of the Center is to make the Roper survey materials available to American educators and their students for teaching and research. Philip K. Hastings has been appointed director.

The Center contains the raw materials of more than 600,000 interviews, dating from 1938, conducted by the Roper organization for *Fortune Magazine* and various American industries. Through periodic gifts from Mr. Roper the collection is growing at the rate of about twelve studies each year. Upon request, accredited individuals may obtain statistical summaries of Roper data. For minor research projects, the tabulations are made at the Center. When the magnitude and complexity of the research warrant it, the Center lends duplicate sets of the requested materials for a stipulated period of time.

Serving on the Board of Advisers for the Center are: Frank W. Abrams, formerly chairman of the Board, Standard Oil Company (N.J.); President James P. Baxter, of Williams; Eric Hodgins, author, formerly a member of the board of

editors of *Fortune Magazine*; Mr. Roper of Elmo Roper and Associates; Frank Stanton, president of the Columbia Broadcasting System; Samuel A. Stouffer, professor of sociology and director of the Laboratory of Social Relations at Harvard University; and Wilson W. Wyatt, lawyer, formerly head of the National Housing Agency.

The University of Missouri has announced the formation of a Bureau of Government Research, with George Y. Harvey as director. Although the Bureau will concentrate on state and local problems in Missouri, it also plans to do basic research on fundamental governmental problems, whether directly related to Missouri situations or not. It will also give consultant service to governmental units in its state, will work closely with the Adult Education and Extension Service of the University, and will provide training for careers in government service. Research assistantships will be available for 1958-59.

An eight-week conference and work session, sponsored by the Behavioral Sciences Division, Air Force Office of Scientific Research, was held at the University of New Mexico during the summer of 1957. Participants from psychology were: Joseph D. Birch, University of Michigan; Donald T. Campbell, Northwestern University; Stuart W. Cook, New York University; Richard de Charms, University of North Carolina; Charles W. Eriksen, University of Illinois; William L. Hays, University of Michigan; William M. McCord, Harvard University; Joseph E. McGrath, Psychological Research Associates; Philburn Ratoosh,

Ohio State University; Thornton B. Roby, Tufts University; Milton Rosenbaum, University of North Carolina; Alvin Scodel, Ohio State University; William A. Scott, University of Colorado; Marvin E. Shaw, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Michael Wertheimer, University of Colorado; Ben Willerman, University of Minnesota; Philip Worchel, University of Texas; and Herbert Zimmer, Georgetown University.

Sociology was represented by Edgar F. Borgatta, Russell Sage Foundation; Edward L. Rose, University of Colorado; and William A. Westley, McGill University. From anthropology were Howard Maclay, University of Illinois; and Stanley Newman, University of New Mexico. Philosophy was represented by Max Brodbeck, University of Minnesota; and J. Sayer Minas, Ohio State University.

Other participants were: John S. Chipman, economics, University of Minnesota; Nathan B. Epstein, psychiatry, McGill University; Richard P. Calhoon, personnel administration, University of North Carolina; James L. Foy, psychiatry, Georgetown University; Byron E. Leach, biochemistry, Tulane University; and Anatol Rapoport, mathematics, University of Michigan. The conference was under the direction of Paul Walter, Jr., assisted by Ralph D. Norman, University of New Mexico. Publication of reports resulting from the conference is under way.

The International Institute for Advanced Studies in Journalism opened its doors at the University of Strasbourg on October 15, 1957. The project is supported jointly by

UNESCO and the government of France. In April, November, and December of 1956, experts met to consider what steps might be taken to improve training facilities for information personnel. One recommendation proposed the establishment of a number of regional centers. The Strasbourg Institute is the first such center to be set up and will serve countries in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. It will be staffed by specialists in journalism from several of UNESCO's member states, including David White, chairman of the Council on Communications Research at Boston University.

Information is invited regarding ownership and present location of portraits of John Marshall Harlan and his wife, Mallie. Also wanted are portraits or pictures of Harlan be-

fore he joined the Supreme Court in 1877, particularly representations in his younger days at Frankfort, in 1840-1861, 1863-1867. Please address any data to Professor Alan F. Westin, Yale University School of Law, New Haven, Conn.

Results of an annual census conducted by the Institute of International Education reveals that during the academic year 1956-57, more than 40,000 foreign students, representing 136 countries, were enrolled in American educational institutions. The importance attached to education by many Asian nations was indicated by the fact that almost one-third of the students were from the Far East. Over one-fifth were from Latin America. Canada led the list with 5,379, followed by China (3,055) and Korea (2,307).

for second-semester consideration

Craf

INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS

A practical orientation to the broad phases of business, organization, management, and operation, enabling students to obtain a knowledge of various business careers, advantages, and problems. An accompanying workbook supplements guides, questions, assignments, and bibliography in the text.

1957

Sultan

LABOR ECONOMICS

Lucid treatment of the effect of economic forces and theories on labor relations. Designed for a basic one-semester or two-semester course, this text assumes only elementary acquaintance with economics, yet deals with complex problems in clear and explicit terms.

1957

Dimock

BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT, 3rd Ed.

An analysis of the main issues of domestic and international economic policies, succinctly stated with timely material and illustrations, tightly knit for use in a one-semester course.

1957

Fox

READINGS IN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, From FORTUNE

Articles chosen according to what they contribute to an understanding of the basic job of any supervisor or administrator: the selection, development, and effective utilization of people. Readings classified for use with any standard text.

1957

HENRY HOLT and COMPANY

**383 Madison Avenue
New York 17, New York**

OUTSTANDING IRWIN TEXTS

IMMEDIATE ACCEPTANCE

ECONOMICS

By JOHN A. GUTHRIE, State College of Washington

This new text for one- or two-semester courses in introductory economics is appropriately brief, complete, and easily understood by the student. Among the first adopters are Alabama Polytechnic Institute, Louisiana State University, Ohio State University, and the universities of Maryland, Texas, and Wyoming.

READY IN DECEMBER

OFFICE MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL

Third Edition

By GEORGE R. TERRY, Northwestern University

The new Third Edition of this widely adopted basic text has been completely rewritten, revised, and brought up to date. It is complete, comprehensive, and teachable. Increased emphasis has been given to the management approach. There are nearly fifty new cases appearing for the first time in this edition.

READY IN JANUARY

MOTIVATION AND MARKET BEHAVIOR

Edited by ROBERT FERBER and HUGH G. WALES, both of the University of Illinois

Sponsored by The American Marketing Association, this unique volume brings together a carefully selected group of articles on motivation research, one of the most talked about and controversial topics in marketing today. It provides a sound, well-balanced, and objective view of motivation research and its relation to market behavior.

READY IN JANUARY

GROUP DISABILITY INSURANCE

By JESSE F. PICKRELL, North Texas State College

This new book provides an up-to-date study of group, accident, and sickness insurance contracts, rates, reserves, underwriting, and claims. It is published under the auspices of the S. S. Huebner Foundation for Insurance Education.

Write for Examination Copies

RICHARD D. IRWIN, INC.

Homewood, Illinois

